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ABSTRACT 
Non-tariff measures (NTMs) have become increasingly present in markets whereas 
border tariffs have been reduced from successive rounds of General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). This emergence of NTMs, 
especially standards like NTMs, has been also motivated by concerns about market 
imperfections to address asymmetric information and external effects. Sorting protectionism 
from legitimate market intervention has been difficult and attempts have lack formalism.  In 
addition, the empirical evidence on the impact of these NTMs on trade flows has been 
cluttered with few obvious implications for policy design. The first essay takes a meta-
analysis approach to rationalize the systematic variations in the estimated NTM effects on 
trade in the current literature. The second essay proposes simple yet formal indices to 
quantify protectionism. The indices are then applied to a large Maximum Residue Limits 
(MRL) dataset, and provide comprehensive measurements and insights on protectionism 
across countries, and sectors in food and agricultural industries. The third essay addresses the 
political economy of NTMs.  It proposes a parsimonious model of NTM determination using 
a partial equilibrium trade model with an externality corrected by a NTM standard in 
presence of rent-seeking activities. Then a derived reduced form of NTM determination is 
explored econometrically using the dataset of the second essay. 
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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
 
As tariffs have been dramatically reduced after successive rounds of General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), policy 
makers and researchers have turned their attention to non-tariff barriers (NTBs) or more 
recently called non-tariff measures (NTMs). NTMs cover all barriers to trade that are not 
tariffs, that is, a wide range of heterogeneous non-tariff regulations (Deardorff and Stern, 
1998). Among NTMs, and important and growing subset is made of technical measures that 
are standard like measures These standard-like NTMs include health and safety measures 
(Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures (SPS)) and technical standards (Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT)) such as maximum residue limits (MRLs), packaging and labeling requirements. 
This dissertation focuses on these standard-like non-tariff measures. They have 
common economic effects as they influence the unit cost of production by imposing 
standards, and they may influence demand if they address market imperfections (external 
effects and asymmetric information). Consumers may value the new information or 
characteristics induced by the standard-like measures. As a result these NTMs have 
controversial impacts on trade being the net effect of trade-impeding effects from raising the 
cost of producers and potential demand-enhancing effects from certifying quality and safety 
to consumers (Ganslandt and Markusen, 2001).  In addition, these NTMs are often misused 
as disguised protection because protectionism is hard to formalize and measure, especially in 
presence of market imperfections. This last point brings the issue of the political economy 
underlying the determination of these NTMs. The endogenous standards are determined by a 
policy maker under the influence of pressure groups. These three aspects (trade patterns, 
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protectionism, political economy) motivate each of the following three essays. The 
dissertation contribute knew empirical knowledge. It elucidates the conditions under which 
empirical investigations are likely to find NTMs impeding or enhancing trade; it proposes 
and implements a formal measure of protectionism of an important type of NTMs; and last, it 
investigates the political-economy determination of this type of NTMs.  
Summary of the three essays 
 
The first essay, “A meta-analysis of estimates of the impact of technical barriers to 
trade”, applies a meta-analysis to explain the variation in estimated trade effects of technical 
barriers to trade broadly defined, using available estimates from the empirical international 
trade literature, and accounting for data sampling and methodology differences. Agriculture 
and food industries tend to be more impeded by these barriers than other sectors. SPS 
regulations on agricultural and food trade flows from developing exporters to high-income 
importers tend to impede trade. Not controlling for “multilateral resistance” barriers increase 
the likelihood to overstate the trade impeding effect of technical measures and not accounting 
for their potential endogeneity with trade does the opposite. Studies using direct maximum 
residue limits tend to find more trade impeding effects than other measures and lead to 
clearer policy implications because they focus on a specific technical measure. Other 
technical measures proxies tend to find less significant trade effects because either they 
forego variation in actual policies and/or because they aggregate many NTMs into an index. 
Policy implications are harder to draw as well. Studies based on a count proxy yield trade-
effects estimates that are more likely to be either insignificant or positive. We interpret this 
result as reflecting the larger coverage of NTMs in count proxies including demand-
enhancing policies. The aggregation level of the trade data could also affect the estimated 
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trade effects, and the more disaggregated data tend to provide more positive significant 
estimated trade effects of technical measures relative to the conditional sample mean of t-
values. More disaggregated data lead to more sector-specific policy implications. This first 
essay has been published in the Journal of Policy Modeling. 
The second essay, “Protectionism Indices for Non-Tariff Measures: An Application 
to Maximum Residue Levels”, proposes aggregation indices of a subset of NTMs to quantify 
their protectionism relative to international standards. We apply the indices to national 
Maximum Residue Limit (MRL) regulations affecting agricultural and food trade and using a 
science-based criteria embodied in Codex Alimentarius international standards. The approach 
links two streams of the NTM literature, one concerned with the aggregation of various 
NTMs into operational indices for econometric and modeling purposes, and the other 
attempting to evaluate the protectionism of NTMs. The data used in the application come 
from a large international dataset on veterinary and pesticide MRLs and CODEX MRL 
standards for a large set of countries. Over-protected, non-protected and under-protected 
countries and/or sectors are identified.  We calculate both trade-weighted and equally 
weighted scores, since they offer complementary information. Looking at country scores, 
trade weights do not appear to be pivotal. However, trade weights induce more dispersion of 
product scores.  
Considering or not non-established MRLs is quite important in establishing a 
country’s MRL protectionism. The latter can arise from strict established MRLs or from 
strict default MRLs, or both. Australia ranks the most protectionist from all three indices: 
weighted, normalized weighted and equally weighted, because of its tight default value. The 
Russian Federation ranks the most protectionist from scores based on established MRLs (no 
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default). Other countries ranked differently to various extents based on the different weights 
used. However, the set of most protectionist countries is remarkably stable over the change of 
weights in indices. We also find that NAFTA integration on residue standards has been much 
deeper between Mexico and the United States, than with Canada. 
Meat and dairy products have lower protectionism scores in general than other goods. 
Fruit and vegetable products exhibit the most within-sector variation in protectionism. We 
checked the robustness of scores to address concerns for products with fewer substances used 
in their scores. Products with fewer substances seemed consistently biased upward (higher 
protectionism scores). Products scores based on no more than 3 substances have higher 
variance or noise. Country level scores are robust to the deletion of products with fewer 
substances and provide solid policy implications. 
         The third essay develops a parsimonious partial equilibrium political-economy model 
for a tradable good with a negative externality addressed by a single quality standard. The 
policy-maker solves for the standard that maximizes a weighted sum of welfare measures 
reflecting rent-seeking activities. Comparative statistics are derived and are ambiguous 
despite the simple setting. Then the investigation empirically implements a reduced form 
from the conceptual model to econometrically investigate the determinants of protectionism 
in maximum residue limits affecting food trade among a large number of countries, using the 
protectionism score from the second essay is the dependent variable, and a set of commodity 
and country level determinants derived from the political-economy model. 
After correcting endogeneity bias, tariff protection shows a 4-times larger impact on 
MRL protectionism score than without instruments. In addition, tariff and MRL protection 
are shown to be substitute instruments in protection (NTM and tariff are negatively linked). 
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A country with a higher income level has a higher protectionism score as expected, and 
revealed comparative advantage has negative impact on MRL. The price responsiveness of 
demand has a positive impact on the protectionism score, which may be explained via the 
negative relationship between demand price responsiveness and tariff, and substitution 
relationship between tariff and MRL. The investigation also finds an inverted u-shaped MRL 
protection level in terms of political institution from the least democratic to the most 
democratic regimes. In addition, comparing existing results with manufacturing industries, 
and/or coverage ratio measure of NTMs, and different set of NTMs, my results are mostly 
consistent in the directions of impact on protection level in the literature. Other results on the 
impact of exchange rates, regional trade agreements, and regulatory quality variables are less 
robust. The robustness analysis also suggests that income per capita and agricultural import 
penetration explain a large portion of the departure between actual standards and 
international ones.  
References 
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CHAPTER 2: A META-ANALYSIS OF ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACT OF 
TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 
Modified from a paper published in 
The Journal of Policy Modeling 
 
Yuan Li and John C. Beghin 
 
Abstract 
A meta-analysis explains the variation in estimated trade effects of technical barriers 
to trade broadly defined, using available estimates from the empirical international trade 
literature, and accounting for data sampling and methodology differences. Agriculture and 
food industries tend to be more impeded by these barriers than other sectors. SPS regulations 
on agricultural trade flows from developing exporters to high-income importers tend to 
impede trade. Controlling for “multilateral resistance” lowers the propensity to find that these 
policies impede trade. Estimations correcting endogeneity by using panel data and time fixed 
effect yield more negative (or less positive) trade effects of technical measures. 
Introduction 
Since tariffs have been decreasing, more attention has been paid to non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs), or as more recently called, non-tariff measures (NTMs). Due to their intrinsic 
heterogeneity, NTBs/NTMs are categorized into several relatively more homogeneous 
subgroups (Harrigan (1993); Deardorff and Stern (1998); Haveman, Nair-Reichert, and 
Thursby (2003); and Fontagné, Mayer, and Zignago (2005)). Health and safety measures and 
technical standards, comprising Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures (SPS), Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBTs), and other standard-like policies are often distinguished from other 
NTMs and their controversial effects on trade have been extensively analyzed. Ganslandt and 
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Markusen (2001) explain how standards and technical regulations have both the trade-
impeding effects by raising the costs of exporters and similar demand-enhancing effects by 
certifying quality and safety to consumers. 
 Our paper focuses on these TBTs SPS and standard-like policies, which we label 
technical measures1, and which affect international trade through changing production costs 
and/or enhancing demand. Empirical knowledge on technical measures has proliferated 
rapidly since the early 1990s, especially with investigations based on gravity equations. The 
literature shows a wide range of estimated effects from significantly impeding trade to 
significantly promoting trade. These results are difficult to rationalize without further formal 
investigation which we tackle in this paper with a meta-analysis. For example, Otsuki et al. 
(2001a, 2001b), Wilson and Otsuki (2001), and Wilson et al. (2003) found that stricter 
Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs) on aflatoxin or drug residues impeded trade. Chevassus-
Lozza et al. (2008) found positive trade effects of sanitary measures, and negative or 
insignificant impacts of phytosanitary and quality measures. Disdier et al. (2008b) showed 
negative or insignificant impacts of TBTs and SPS on agricultural and food aggregate trade. 
They also investigated 30 disaggregated industries at the HS2 aggregation level, and found 
that TBTs and SPS had positive effects for 8 industries, insignificant effects for 12 industries, 
and negative effects for 10 industries. Disaggregated findings of Nardella and Boccaletti 
(2004), Fontagné et al. (2005), and others also reveal that the direction and the significance 
of the technical measures trade effects could vary significantly across product groups and 
trading partners. In sum, this rich evidence of both trade-impeding and trade-enhancing 
effects of technical measures muddles their patterns, and creates a need for further 
                                                 
1Technical measures include TBTs, SPS and standard-like policies covered by MAST categories A through C. 
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rationalization.  
 The variations in findings are partly due to variations in their data samples, mostly 
variations in industry, country, and aggregation level, among other things. For example, 
Disdier et al. (2008b) found different TBTs and SPS trade effects for different exporters, and 
different industries. Beside the differences in data, variations in the trade effects may be 
caused by different forms of technical measures proxies, model specifications, and other 
methodology variations. Otsuki et al. (2001a, 2001b), Wilson and Otsuki (2001), and Wilson 
et al. (2003), use MRLs to proxy the strength of technical measures. MRLs enter the 
regression as numerical values, a straightforward and accurate measure of the technical 
measures of interest. However, in most cases, technical measures do not have direct 
numerical measurements, so proxies have to be constructed. Commonly used proxies of 
technical measures are dummy variables, ad valorem equivalent (ave) of the policies, 
frequency ratio, and count variables. Choices among these different proxies may lead to 
different estimates of trade effects of technical measures. Few researchers have tried and 
compared different proxies within their investigations (see Disdier et al. (2008b)), and most 
researchers only chose one. 
 Since the first foundation for gravity equations by Anderson (1979), advances in the 
specification of gravity equations have brought many variations and refinements. Empirical 
studies follow different theoretical underpinnings to different extents, which could also lead 
to variations in the estimated impact of technical measures on trade. 
 Deardorff and Stern (1998), Bureau and Beghin (2001), Maskus et al. (2001) distill 
the earlier literature on technical measures and associated methodologies to measure these 
policies and their effects. The earlier prevailing methods are still dominant today but with 
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substantial advances. The refined theory underlying gravity equations (Feenstra (2004)) and 
econometric estimation techniques address new issues, such as the treatment of zero trade 
flows.  In addition, in recent years, researchers tend to analyze technical-measure effects with 
disaggregated data and wider country and industry coverage.  
Our meta-analysis attempts to statistically explain the variations in estimated trade 
effects of technical measures, taking both data sampling and methodology differences into 
consideration. Meta-analysis provides a more objective and systematic assessment of the 
empirical results than narrative reviews do. It uses statistical methods to investigate 
underlying patterns, which might otherwise look complex, and help us understand the core 
determinants to the variations in available estimates of the impact of technical measures. 
Specifications of the gravity equation  
 
In its simplest and early formulation, the gravity equation says that trade volume 
between two countries is directly proportional to the product of the countries GDPs and the 
distance between these two countries. It takes the usual reduced form:  
0 1 2 3log log( ) log( )ij i j ij ijX Y Y Hα α α α ε= + + + + , (1)  
where ijX  is the value of trade from country i to country j.  and i jY Y  are the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) of country i  and country j . GDP is a proxy for production capacity in the 
exporting country, which at a sectoral level would be the supply of the exporter for that 
sector. GDP in the importing country is motivated by demand considerations of a 
representative consumer. Variable ijH includes variables that authors choose to explain the 
bilateral trade flow, such as distance between trade partners. The choice of the variables to be 
included is context specific and depends on the problem of interest. Variable ε is the error 
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term. 
 Many empirical applications of gravity equations are atheoretical. Researchers use 
equation (1) directly without specifying explicit underlying micro-foundations. This simple 
approach successfully explains trade flows but leaves the reader wanting for more 
conceptualization. Theoretical foundations eventually were spelled out. The gravity equation 
can be derived from a perfect competition model, monopolistic competition model, 
increasing return theories, or the Heckscher-Ohlin model, among others. Most derivations 
assume perfect specialization (Helpman (1987); Anderson (1979); and Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003 and 2004)). Each country produces its unique variety of goods and exports 
this unique variety to all other countries. This assumption greatly simplifies the price 
structure, as shown below (see Evenett and Keller (2002) for an attempt to relax the perfect 
specialization assumption).  
 Accounting for trade costs makes derivations and estimations of gravity equation 
more difficult, because of the different price effects induced by trade costs. To see this, we 
derive the gravity equation with trade costs, following mostly the notation of Feenstra (2004). 
Beside the assumption of perfect specialization across countries, we further assume each 
country only specializes in one unique good for simplicity. In a free trade world without 
transaction cost, each good has a unique price, which is the same across countries, so we 
could normalize all prices to one and greatly simplify the problem. However, in real world 
applications, we need to consider trade costs and the variation of prices over time; 
normalization only works for one year. Trade costs generally include transportation costs, 
tariffs, costs related to NTBs, and other trade costs.  
Suppose ijp  is the price in country j of the product produced in country i , and ip  is 
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the ex-factory price of the product produced in country i  before exports take place, that is, 
net of any trade costs. The aggregate trade cost factor associated with selling the product 
produced in country i in country j is denoted as ijT . Hence, we have ij ij ip T p= .  
With CES preferences, the representative consumer maximizes ( 1)/
1
( )
C
j ij
i
U c σ σ−
=
=∑  
subject to 
1
C
j ij ij
i
Y p c
=
=∑ ,  where jU  is the utility for country j ; number C  is the total number 
of countries. Variable ijc is the consumption in country j of the good produced in country i . 
Multiplying ijc  by price pij provides the total value of country i’s  exports to country j, 
denoted as ijX = pij ijc . Aggregate income or GDP of country j , jY  is equal to the production 
value j j jY p y= , where jy is the output production in country j . Corresponding demand 
functions are ( / ) ( / )jij ij j jc p P Y P
σ−= , with 
1/(1 )
(1 )
1
( )
C
j ij
i
P p
σ
σ
−
−
=
 
=  
 
∑  the overall price index in 
country j . Combining the latter with ijX = pij ijc , we have 
1( )ijij j
j
p
X Y
P
σ−= . 
We then substitute ij ij ip T p=  into the latter to obtain a gravity-like function   
1( )i ijij j
j
p T
X Y
P
σ−= . (2) 
 Total production (or GDP) of country i  does not appear in (2) as in (1). To further 
link (2) to the gravity equation, we slightly deviate from Feenstra (2004), which follows the 
symmetric trade costs assumption ( ij jiT T= ) of Anderson and von Wincoop (2003). We 
derive a more general gravity expression, and then compare the implications of different 
restrictive assumptions or estimation methods such as normalization of prices and symmetric 
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trade costs. The market-equilibrium condition 
1
C
i ij ij
j
y c T
=
=∑  says that production of good i  is 
equal to the sum of its demands over all destinations and inclusive of the resource cost 
associated with trade costs (expressed in units of good i ). It implies that i i iY p y= =
1
C
i ij ij
j
p c T
=
∑ .  
Then we make use of ij ij ip T p=  to obtain Yi =
1
C
ij ij
j
c p
=
∑ . Substitute ( / ) ( / )ij ij j j jc p P Y Pσ−=  to 
get 
Yi = 1
1
( / )
C
i ij j j
j
p T P Yσ−
=
∑  . (3)  
Define the world GDP
1
C
W j
j
Y Y
=
=∑ , and country i ’s share of world GDP /i i WY Yθ = . Divide 
both sides of (3) by WY  and define
1/(1 )
1
1
( / )
C
i i ij j j
j
P p T P
σ
σθ
−
−
=
 
=  
 
∑  to obtain 
 1( ) ii
w
YP
Y
σ − =1.  (3’)  
Apply (3’) to (2) to get  
1( )i j ijij
w j i
YY T
X
Y P P
σ−= 
,  (4) 
with /i i iP P p=
  . In equation (4), variables jP  and iP
  are called “multilateral resistance” terms. 
More specifically, jP  is an importer-specific function of overall distortions of prices on all 
exporters imposed by importer j through trade costs. iP
  is an exporter-specific function of 
overall distortions faced by exporter i in all destination markets. 
Taking the log of (4) provides a generalized expression of the traditional gravity 
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equation (1) under asymmetric cost, which explains the presence of jP and iP
 . Both indices 
depend on trade costs and price indexes of all the trading partners. This specification poses a 
problem for the empirical estimation, since it is hardly possible to take all trading partners 
into account. Anderson and von Wincoop (2003) assume symmetric trade costs, and get an 
implicit solution to the “multilateral resistance” term, which is similar to equating jP  and iP
  
or to assuming ex- factory prices pi normalized to one. The symmetric trade costs assumption 
is unrealistic in most cases. To overcome this undesirable assumption, Harrigan (1996), 
Hummels (1999), Redding and Venables (2004), and Rose and van Wincoop (2001) 
introduced country fixed effects to account for jP  and iP
 . Feenstra (2004) tested the fixed 
effect method and Anderson and von Wincoop (2003) method, and found they did almost 
equally well.  
To implement the derived gravity equation, one needs to choose a functional form for 
the trade costs. Authors usually choose multiplicative forms, such as 
1
( )
qQ q
ij ijq
T TC γ
=
= Π , for 
simplicity, and variables TC often come from previous empirical findings and/or certain 
estimated trade costs the author is interested in. In practice, Variables TC typically include 
distances, tariffs, non-tariff barriers such as TBTs and SPS measures, and others. The 
estimated responses (1 )qγ σ−  are the coefficient of interest for our meta-analysis when they 
pertain to technical measures. 
 In our meta-analysis of the estimates of technical-measure trade effects, we explain 
the variations of these estimates by two classes of explanatory variables. One class captures 
the variations in the model specification and estimation techniques, and the other class 
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captures the subpopulation variations. We elaborate on these two points next. 
Meta-analysis 
We construct explanatory variables based on theoretical arguments as well as 
conjectures expressed in the literature regarding important matters explaining these estimated 
impacts. The objective is to control for the determinants that are most likely to matter. The 
limitation of the data also restricts the determinants we can investigate as collinearity arises 
from the multiplicity of categorical variables.  
 Variations in estimation methods 
First, we look at classic errors in gravity estimations. Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) 
pointed out three mistakes in gravity equations that could lead to biasness in gravity equation 
estimates: the “gold medal error”, “silver medal error,” and “bronze medal error.” The “gold 
medal error” refers to the failure to include the relative price terms, which are equivalent to 
jP  and iP
  in (4), derived above. The omission of jP  and iP
  causes the omitted trade cost 
variables in the error term to be correlated with the trade cost variables accounted for. As 
discussed in the gravity equation section, the “multilateral resistance term” or fixed effects 
approximating the term could correct this mistake.  
The “silver medal error” refers to the situation when researchers mistakenly use the 
logarithm of the average instead of the average of the logarithm of trade flows (average of 
exports and imports). The “bronze medal error” is caused by inappropriately deflating trade 
values using the same deflator, say the U.S. consumer price index, and the resulting 
“spurious” correlation from the common deflator causes biases. This error would be a 
problem for multi-year data; time-series dummies could correct the biasness. In the meta-
analysis, we use dummy variables to control for the presence or not of correction for “gold” 
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and “bronze” errors, or more specifically, the inclusion of country fixed effects and/or time 
fixed effects used to estimate the technical measure effects. However, as “silver errors” are 
extremely scarce in our sample of studies, we are not able to consider this category in our 
analysis. 
 Second, we consider the treatment of zero-trade flows in the collected investigations. 
Since the gravity equation takes a log-linear form, the zero trade observations pose a problem 
for the estimation and raise the issue of sample selection bias, among others. A commonly 
used technique is to drop the zero trade observations. But if zero trade is due to the missing 
values, rounding, or no trade, then dropping those observations could lead to bias. Several 
techniques exist to retain the zeros. A simple practice to deal with the zero-trade problem is 
to add a small arbitrary number to all trade values, and make the log of zero trade a negative 
value. This method is quite arbitrary and could lead to some bias although the direction of the 
bias is not clear. There are some important advances in this issue in recent years. Silva and 
Tenreyro (2006) suggested a Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) technique to 
estimate the gravity equation in its multiplicative form and in levels instead of the commonly 
used log linear form. This technique naturally solves the numerical problem of zero trade  
and is also robust to heteroskedasticity in errors. However, it could also be biased as 
predicted trade is positive with the exponential functional form. 
However, Martin and Pham (2008) show that the PPML method could also be 
seriously biased if zero trades are frequent. The zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) model (Lambert, 
1992) improves upon the PPML and is able to handle excess zeros. More specifically, the 
probability of having zero trade is estimated with a logit/probit, and the non-zero trade part is 
estimated with PPML. The Tobit model and the Heckman two-step model are other methods 
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used to address zero trade observations. The choice between these two methods is mostly 
based on authors’ beliefs in the causes of zero trade observations. If zero trade is allegedly 
caused by censored data, then it is appropriate to use Tobit model. On the other hand, if zero 
trade is suspected to be caused by decisions or self-selection, they may choose the Heckman 
two-stage procedure instead. Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) (HMR hereafter) 
developed a novel modified two-stage estimation technique by accounting for firm 
heterogeneity and the extensive margin from new firms entering into export markets. Their 
approach enables the investigation of both intensive margin (existing trade) and extensive 
margin from new firms entering trade, hence differentiation between fixed and variable trade 
costs. 
However, due to the different popularity of procedures and limited availability of the 
studies, especially the relative scarcity of the studies based on PPML, ZIP, Tobit, Heckman 
two-stage model or HMR, we can only attempt to distinguish the difference between groups 
of these econometric procedures (see Appendix for the frequency table of different 
procedures). We tried three groupings based on our conjectures of their commonality. First, 
we controlled truncation (dropping zero data) versus other procedures. Second, we grouped 
modeling procedures that address zero data explicitly (ZIP, Tobit, Heckman two-stage, 
HMR) versus numerical accommodation of zero data (truncation, PPML, and adding small 
numbers). Third, we grouped PPML and adding small numbers based on the conjecture that 
they may cause bias from forcing level equation to accommodate zero data as small positive 
predicted or actual values. However, the dominant number of estimates from studies relying 
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on truncation leads to similar meta-analysis estimation results2 between the first and second 
grouping (excluding or including PPML and adding small number procedure). Further, the 
third grouping is too skewed for MNL regression. To avoid ambiguity, we choose the first 
grouping and use a dummy variable, which equals zero if truncation is applied and equals 
one if zero data are treated with other procedures. 
Third, endogeneity of the barriers to trade is another problem that might cause bias, 
since it is reasonable to argue that trade expands first and regulations, like TBTs, may come 
after as protectionism. Trefler (1993), and Lee and Swagel (1997) showed that the 
endogeneity problem could lead to the underestimation of NTMs’ impact on trade. 
Unfortunately, few studies in our sample addressed this problem directly. Baier and 
Bergstrand (2007) pointed out that a panel data approach could handle the endogeneity 
problem very well with panel data and fixed time effects. So we account when a paper uses 
panel data with time fixed effects as a way to address endogeneity. 
Fourth, the choice of technical measure proxy used in the investigations provides 
methodology variation which translates into a variation in data characteristics. Technical 
measure studies may differ in their choices of policy proxy measures: dummy variables for 
the existence of measures, count variable, frequency index, and ad-valorem equivalent 
(AVE) are commonly used. The literature has not settled yet on the best way to measure 
technical measures and which proxy measure is the best if any. For example, the AVE 
estimated by Kee et al. (2006) had some potential problems in its estimation procedures as it 
constrains NTMs effects to be trade restrictive and rules out trade expansion effects. 
Intuitively, the proxy choice could affect the variation in the estimates. Finally, quite of few 
                                                 
2  Estimation results for the second grouping are available upon request. 
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studies based on panel data with time dimension, ignore the time variation in the TBT proxy. 
This omission may have some systematic impact on the trade effects, so we use a dummy to 
control whether the proxy exhibits time variation, provided that panel data was used. 
 Subpopulation characteristics 
Data subpopulations used to estimate the effects of technical measures on trade differ 
by trading partners, industry coverage, and aggregation level. Trading-partner variations can 
be controlled by the development status of exporters/importers. Further, trade effects could 
be significantly different across agricultural (sectors HS01-HS15 in the Harmonized System 
2-digit level), processed food and beverage (HS16-HS25), and manufacturing products 
(HS26-HS99). In addition, in the context of North-South trade, we are interested to test the 
hypothesis that SPS regulations inhibit trade of agricultural products between developing 
exporters and developed importers rather than being catalyst of trade. This is an unsettled 
debate in the literature. 
Further, the sectoral aggregation level of the trade flow used in the investigations also 
matters for the size and variation of the trade effects (Hillberry (2002)). We use the digit of 
the Harmonized System (HS) indicating the aggregation level as the measure of aggregation 
level of the data. 2-digit HS, 4-digit HS, or 6-digit HS, measure the aggregation level takes 
values of 2, 4, and 6, respectively. The HS aggregation digit is an ordinal number, but for 
regression purpose, we use it as cardinal number to measure the disaggregation level with the 
usual limitations of doing so. The motivation is to limit the multiplicity of dummy variables 
compounding singularity issues in our investigation. 
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Our dataset of SPS/TBT studies 
 
Our data set includes 27 papers that use gravity equations to estimate technical-
measure effects on trade flows, and totals 618 observations. Table 1 lists the studies and the 
number of estimates collected from each study and the sector coverage. The selection of our 
studied sample is based on availability. We have performed extensive searches with Econlit, 
REPEC, SSRN, IATRC, Agecon Search, and other web-servers and working paper 
repositories completed by summer 2009. 
 The first criterion used to select investigations is that the study investigates the trade 
effects of technical measures. We focus on technical measures, rather than on all NTMs 
because “all NTMs” include all barriers but tariffs, and lack communality of effects on 
agents’ decisions. For example, many classifications of NTMs include macro policies, price 
control measures, quantity control measures, etc. (Deardorff and Stern (1998)). Too wide of a 
policy coverage would dilute the validity and precision of the meta-analysis, but too narrow 
of a coverage could lack generality on how technical measures are believed to affect 
international trade through changing production costs and/or enhancing demand through 
quality and information effects. 
The second criterion of our selection is that the empirical model used in the study has 
to be based on the gravity equation. Using the derived gravity equation (4) and including an 
explicit technical measure trade cost proxy variable, and then taking logarithm of both sides 
lead to: 1 20 1 2log log( ) log( ) (1 ) (1 )ij i j i j ij ij ijX Y Y TM Hα α α α α γ σ γ σ ε= + + + + + − + − + ,  (4’)  
where iα  and jα  correspond to the “multilateral resistance” terms iP  and iP
 . The 
coefficients of the log of GDPs are not always restricted to 1 in practice. The coefficient 
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1(1 )γ σ−  represents the impact of technical measures on trade flows 
(log | , , , ) /ij i j ij ij ijX Y Y TM H TM∂ ∂ . Given ijX and  
TMij , the value of 
1(1 )γ σ− depends on the 
log linear form of ijX  as well as all the information upon which it is conditioned. 
Table 1: The list of papers included and the number of estimates per paper 
Paper 
Index 
Author(s) # of 
Estimates 
Industry Coverage 
1 Disdier, Fontagné, Mimouni (2008) 38 Ag, Food, Manufacturing 
2 Wilson and Otsuki (2004) 2 Ag 
3 Disdier and Marette (2009) 2 Ag 
4 Olper and Raimondi (2008) 1 Food 
5 Chevassus-Lozza et al. (2008) 6 Ag, Food 
6 Nardella and Boccaletti (2004) 40 Ag, Food 
7 Wilson, Otsuki, and Majumdar (2003) 2 Ag 
8 Disdier, Fekadu, Murillo, and Wong (2008) 84 Ag, Food 
9 Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2001a) 2 Ag, Food 
10 Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2001b) 3 Ag 
11 Wilson and Otsuki (2001) 3 Ag 
12 Disdier and Fontagné (2008) 46 Ag 
13 Chen, Yang, and Findlay (2008) 5 Ag 
14 Babool and Reed (2007) 1 Ag, Food 
15* Gebrehiwet, Naqangweni and Kirsten(2007) 2 Food 
16 Anders and Caswell(2006) 9 Ag 
17 Nguyen and Wilson (2009) 21 Ag 
18 Jayasinghe, Beghin, and Moschini (2009) 6 Ag 
19* Scheepers, Jooste, Alemu (2007) 1 Ag 
20 Nardella and Boccaletti (2003) 8 Ag, Food 
21 Nardella and Boccaletti (2003) 90 Ag, Food 
22 Fontagné, Mimouni, and Pasteels (2005) 182 Ag, Food, Manufacturing 
23 Chen, N (2004) 2 Food, Manufacturing 
24 Fontagné, Mayer, and Zignago (2005) 1 Food, Manufacturing 
25 Blind and Jungmittag (2005) 4 Ag, Food, Manufacturing 
26 Blind(2001) 4 Manufacturing 
27 Harrigan (1993) 56 Food, Manufacturing 
Total   618   
* Estimates are dropped because of missing sample size information          
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We use explanatory variables which capture the variations in information from one study to 
the next. Hence, estimates from the same gravity model are comparable in a conceptual sense. 
In addition, papers in our sample differ from the ones that analyze the trade effects of 
harmonized or reciprocal technical measures as opposed to idiosyncratic measures (Moenius 
(2004, 2007a, 2007b); Blind (2001); Blind and Jungmittag (2005); and Swann et al. (1996)). 
The latter investigations of technical measures intend to gauge the impact of the harmonized 
technical measures as opposed to unilateral national measures. Papers in our sample studied 
the general technical measure impacts abstracting away from this complication of the 
potential impact of harmonized or reciprocal policies.  
Empirical implementation of the meta-analysis 
Pooling the technical measure trade effects in a meta-analysis, we compare the trade 
effects of different polices or different proxies. Many policies are categorized as technical 
measures. Nardella and Boccaletti (2005), and Anders and Caswell (2006) estimated the 
impact of hazard analysis and critical control points on trade. Otsuki et al. (2001a, 2001b) 
investigated the trade effects of aflatoxin residue standards. In addition, researchers could use 
different technical measure proxy types (count of measures, dummies, AVEs, among others). 
One cannot represent these effects under a common metric such as elasticity as was done for 
distance elasticities in Disdier and Head (2005). This heterogeneity of representations of 
TBTs creates a conundrum which we resolve as follows. 
 The estimates of different technical measure proxies have different scales and some 
are continuous, whereas others are dichotomous. One could think of categorical variables, 
classifying the available estimates into three sets (negative significant, insignificant, and 
positive significant, respectively). The latter classification corresponds to the barrier/catalyst 
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view of TBT policies. In addition, one would like to preserve further information, like 
magnitude of estimates and significance levels which would be lost by just using categorical 
variables to pigeonhole the estimates. To achieve this, we use the t-values of the available 
technical measure estimates. The t-value, defined as the point estimate divided its standard 
error, is unit free, so we make the estimates comparable. By using t-values, we sacrifice the 
information on the magnitude of the effect but we keep the direction of the effect and the 
magnitude of the significance of the estimates. A positive coefficient on the right-hand side 
covariates in the meta-analysis means the explanatory variable has a trade enhancing effect 
(or less trade-impeding effect), and vice versa. 
 The basic meta analysis model is: 0
1
K
es kes es
k
k
t Zβ β µ
=
= + +∑ ,     (5) 
where est  is the t-value of the e-th estimate of the s-th study, kesZ  is the k-th explanatory 
variable used to capture the variation in characteristics of the studies. Note that we use 
multiple estimates from one study so as to keep as much variation and information as 
possible.  
        Although we control for some important characteristics as stated above, there are more 
intrinsic differences among studies left in the error terms esµ . Thus, violations of normality, 
heteroskedasticity, outliers, and influential data points are likely to exist in our sample of 
studies. Therefore, we adopt a robust regression technique to deal with the unknown 
underlying distributions in addition to regular least squares. As we use multiple estimates 
from one study, the estimates from the same study are likely to be correlated. Robust 
regression could also down- weight clusters, to prevent the study that provides more 
estimates from having unduly influence. We detect and down-weight outliers and influential 
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data points by examining residuals and some influence statistics (i.e. Cook’s distances, 
DIFIT, etc). We do not delete them, however, to preserve data. Robust regression mitigates 
the problem of outliers and influential data points by down-weighting them, and makes the 
estimates more resistant to their influence (Belsley et al. (1980)). 
 In addition to the linear OLS and robust regression models, we employ a multinomial 
logit (MNL) model to help interpretation of results and we check their consistency with  the 
robust regression results. In the MNL approach we split the data into significantly negative 
estimates (t value smaller than -1.96), insignificant ones (t value comprised within (-1.96, 
1.96)), and positively significant ones (t-value larger than 1.96). The approach is  
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 = 110 1
1
K
kes es
k
k
Zβ β µ
=
+ +∑ , 
Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
= 220 2
1
K
kes es
k
k
Zβ β µ
=
+ +∑  ,                (6) 
where D is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the corresponding ijt ≤ -1.96, equal to 2 if -1.96 
< ijt < 1.96, and equal to 3 if ijt ≥1.96 . Each paper can be seen as a cluster, and we have 
multiple observations from each cluster and independent clusters. We use a robust estimator 
of the clustered error structure, assuming independence among clusters, but dependence 
among observations that are within the same cluster. The estimates from the MNL regression 
show the impact of the explanatory variables on log odds, not the impact on the probability 
of the categorical variable D. We normalize the probabilities 
( Pr( 1) Pr( 2) Pr( 3) 1D D D= + = + = = ), to derive the conditional probabilities: 
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The associated marginal effects are: 
1
1 1 2 1 2 3( ( ) )k k kk
P P P P
Z
β β β∂ = + −
∂
,  
2
2 1 1 2 3( )k kk
P P P P
Z
β β∂ = − +
∂
, and  (8) 
3
3 2 2 2 1 1( ( ) )k k kk
P P P P
Z
β β β
∂
= + −
∂
. 
Conditional probabilities and marginal effects all depend on all Z’s and β ’s, so we condition 
the interpretation on the latter evaluated at the mean of all Z’s. 
To summarize, the following variables are included in our meta-analysis specification: 
Fix_country_pair: a dummy variable, which equals 1if panel data and the model has country-
pair fixed effects; Panel_fix_time: a dummy variable, which equals 1 if panel data and the 
model with time fixed effects; Panel_var_time: a dummy variable, which equals 1 if panel 
data and proxy has time variation; Zero_treated: a dummy variable, which equals 1 if zero-
trade is treated with two-stage, Tobit, PPML, etc.; Ag: a dummy variable, which equals 1 if 
the related products are agricultural products; Food: a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the 
related products are processed food, beverage; Manu: a dummy variable, which equals 1 if 
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the related products are manufacturing products; dev_SPS: a dummy variable, which equals 1 
if data refer to and developing exporters, and developed importers, and agricultural products 
affected by SPS measures; Sample_centered: a number, the sample size of each study, 
centered at its mean 14,172.53, and scaled by 10,000; Agg_hs_centered: a number, the # of  
HS digits of the data, centered by the aggregation level 5.14 (average of the variable); 
Proxy_dummy: a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the proxy of technical measures is a 
dummy variable; Proxy_count: a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the proxy of technical 
measures is a count variable; Proxy_freq: a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the proxy of 
technical measures is a frequency or coverage ratio variable; a Proxy_mrl: dummy variable, 
which equals 1 if a maximum residue level (MRL) is used directly, or equivalently, if the 
related policy is a MRL; SPS_no_mrl: a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the related policy 
is SPS but not measured by a MRL; and TBT: a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the 
related policy is a TBT. 
         Table 2 provides summary statistics on how the collected observations are pigeonholed 
according to their characteristics, and the statistical significance and sign of their TBT 
estimates. Dummy variables capture the sample or model specification choices, and they are 
intrinsically uncorrelated. Unlike experimental data with the number of “controlled” 
observations and “experimental” observations perfectly balanced, for our observational data, 
we cannot control the “balance” of the data. In the first two columns of table 2, we check the 
balance of the data by calculating the number of papers and estimates corresponding to each 
dummy variable applied in the meta-analysis. For example, 21 out of 28 papers estimated 
trade effects in agricultural sectors, 13 out of 28 papers estimated trade effects in the food 
sector, and only 7 in manufacturing.  
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Table 2: Summary statistics on the distribution of observations of categorical variables 
for D1 (negative significant), D2 (insignificant), and D3 (positive significant) 
Explanatory 
Variable in meta 
analysis 
Number of 
papers affected 
by exp. variable 
(dummy=1) 
Number of 
estimates 
for which 
dummy=1 
Breakdow
n for 
negative 
effects 
D=1 
Breakdow
n for 
insig. 
effects 
D=2 
Breakdown 
for positive 
effects D=3 
Fix_country_pair 13 392 101 242 49 
Panel_fix_time 7 73 49 24 0 
Panel_var_time 8 94 58 32 4 
Zero_treated 9 291 88 158 45 
Ag 21 347 144 159 45 
Food 15 192 77 84 29 
Manu 7 177 42 105 30 
dev_SPS 8 143 61 74 8 
Proxy_dummy 7 169 68 93 8 
Proxy_count 6 152 57 55 40 
Proxy_freq 5 241 53 155 33 
Proxy_mrl 10 20 18 2 0 
SPS_no_mrl 13 537 171 296 70 
TBT 14 451 116 267 68 
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Ideally, we would like the coverage to be more evenly distributed across sectoral 
activities. Similarly, the second column indicates the number of estimates for which a 
categorical variable is equal to 1. For example, 392 out of 618 estimates are estimated from 
the gravity equations with country-pair fixed effects. Although we don’t have perfectly 
balanced data, the first two columns show that the data is not very skewed or unbalanced. As 
we estimate MNL model, every variable must have some variations within each category 
D=1, 2, 3. From the last three columns of table 2, variables Proxy_mrl and Panel_fix_time 
have no variations when D=3, so we exclude these two variables in the MNL model. 
Estimation results 
 We check the data for some potential collinearity as we have numerous dichotomous 
variables. If collinearity is a problem , it can confound our estimation. We use the 
conditioning index, variance inflation index (VIF), and variance-decompositions jointly to 
diagnose the multi-collinearity problems in our sample (Belsley et al. (1980)). Practically, 
multicollinearity may be a serious problem when the conditioning index is greater than 30, 
the VIF is greater than 10, and variance-decomposition proportions for two or more 
estimated regression coefficient variances are higher than 0.5.   
Diagnostic outputs3 suggest possible strong collinearity between the intercept, variable 
Proxy_mrl, variable SPS_no_mrl, and variable Proxy_count. Since Proxy_mrl has the least 
variation within the sample, we drop it to break the possible collinearity. Then we run the 
diagnostic procedure again,possible strong collinearity emerges between variables Ag, Food, 
Manu. So we drop variable Manu, because it seems to have relative high VIF and low 
explanation power. Following this second step, the diagnostic output suggests no additional 
                                                 
3 Diagnostic outputs available upon request. 
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serious collinearity problem. In addition, we informally check the stability of the regression 
results by sequentially dropping each variable (results reported in Appendix), and we believe 
collinearity issues have been addressed successfully. 
 Table 3 presents the results from the OLS, the robust, and the MNL regressions with 
clustered error structure. In OLS and robust regressions, the dependent variable is the t-value 
of the estimated technical-measure trade effects. Although we preserve the most variations 
possible to make trade effects from different studies comparable, a major limitation of using 
t-values is the difficulty in interpreting the coefficients. The results tell us which variables 
have significant impacts on the t-values and the direction of the impacts, but we need to 
know the current t-value to say more.  
          For example, given a negative coefficient of some variable, an increase in this variable 
makes the trade effects more negative significant or less positive significant, but we cannot 
tell whether it becomes negative significant, insignificant, or positive significant unless we 
have the current value of the t-value. The marginal effects are conditional on the current t-
value. To facilitate the interpretation, we centered the sample size variable and aggregation 
level variable at the mean of the dataset, 14172.53 and 5.14, respectively. So we can interpret 
the intercept of the linear regression as conditional mean of the t-value when sample size and 
aggregation level are at the sample mean, and all categorical variables equal zero. We 
interpret the coefficients of the variables as the impact on the t-values conditional on the t-
value being equal to the intercept or the conditional sample mean described above. In 
addition, the MNL results help to sort out this issue as they provide estimated marginal 
effects. 
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Table 3: Regression results  
Explanatory Var. OLS Robust 
Regression 
Multinomial Logit 
(MNL) 
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
   Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 
Marginal Effect of MNL 
(conditional on sample means) 
1
k
P
Z
∂
∂
            2
k
P
Z
∂
∂
          3
k
P
Z
∂
∂
 
Intercept -0.11 -0.11 1.88 0.56 0.4 -0.38 -0.02 
(1.12) (0.73) (1.21) (0.93) (0.27) (0.26) (0.08) 
Fix_country_pair 2.19*** 2.89*** -1.81** 0.17 -0.42** 0.33* 0.09* 
(0.72) (0.45) (0.83) (0.62) (0.18) (0.17) (0.05) 
Panel_fix_time -2.16** -1.79*** n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
(1.04) (0.66)      
Panel_var_time -1.16 -1.07* 1.68** -1.25* 0.44*** -0.23 -0.20*** 
(0.91) (0.57) (0.76) (0.70) (0.17) (0.15) (0.06) 
Zero_treated -3.18*** -2.93*** 0.42 0.88** 0.06 -0.13 0.08* 
(0.57) (0.36) (0.43) (0.37) (0.10) (0.09) (0.04) 
Ag -0.86* -0.93*** 0.29 -1.03*** 0.11 0.01 -0.12*** 
(0.49) (0.31) (0.41) (0.24) (0.08) (0.09) (0.02) 
Food -0.97* -1.18*** 0.68 -0.88** 0.19* -0.07 -0.12** 
(0.49) (0.31) (0.46) (0.44) (0.10) (0.08) (0.05) 
dev_SPS -3.56*** -2.53*** 1.03** 0.2 0.23** -0.20** -0.02 
(0.60) (0.38) (0.44) (0.58) (0.10) (0.10) (0.06) 
Agg_hs_centered 0.73*** 0.56*** -0.1 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.01 
(0.18) (0.12) (0.16) (0.18) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) 
Sample_centered 0.05 -0.02 0.21** 0.26*** 0.04** -0.06** 0.02*** 
(0.04) (0.02) (0.09) (0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Proxy_dummy 2.95*** 1.74*** -2.22*** -2.09*** -0.42** 0.55*** -0.13* 
(0.87) (0.55) (0.82) (0.85) (0.19) (0.16) (0.08) 
Proxy_count 2.22** 2.12*** -2.27** 0.73 -0.55*** 0.38* 0.17*** 
(1.00) (0.63) (0.99) (0.76) (0.21) (0.21) (0.06) 
Proxy_freq 2.65*** 2.17*** -1.48** -1.97*** -0.26 0.40*** -0.15** 
(0.91) (0.58) (0.75) (0.60) (0.17) (0.15) (0.06) 
SPS_no_mrl -1.13* -0.81** -0.48 -0.4 -0.09 0.12 -0.02 
(0.61) (0.39) (0.49) (0.40) (0.11) (0.10) (0.05) 
TBT -0.55 -1.18*** -0.05 -0.08 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 
(0.64) (0.40) (0.64) (0.22) (0.15) (0.12) (0.04) 
R2 0.24 0.16 0.17    
Observations 618 618 618    
*, **, *** denote the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
 
We use the MNL regression together with robust regression to obtain a more precise 
interpretation of the results. For the most part, robust regression results and MNL results 
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agree. In a few cases, MNL results indicate insignificant marginal effects of some variable(s) 
whereas robust regression shows significant impact of the same variable(s). This is caused by 
the limited variation of categorical dependent variables and the limited number of 
observations from splitting the data set into three zones. We use a specific example (figure 1 
and table 4) to illustrate the situation later. 
The variable Fix_country_pair controls for the correction of the “gold medal error.” 
Robust regression shows that including the correction makes the conditional mean of t-values 
more positive; MNL results show that the estimates in the literature with country-pair fixed 
effect are less likely to have negative significant technical measure trade effects, and more 
likely to have insignificant or positive significant technical measure trade effects than models 
estimated without the correction. The variable Panel_fix_time corresponds to the correction 
of the “bronze error” as well as the endogeneity of the technical measures. The results 
suggest that the latter correction makes the effects of technical measures more negative 
relative to the conditional average t-values.  Investigations with panel data and time variation 
(Panel_var_time) are more likely to have negative significant trade effects, and less likely to 
have insignificant and positive significant trade effects. Their t-values tend to be more 
negative. 
          MNL results show that the treatment of zero-trade has a marginally small positive 
impact on the probability of getting positive estimates. However, the robust regression result 
seems to contradict that of the MNL estimation because it shows the conditional mean of t-
values becomes more negative by retaining zero-trade. This is a rare case where robust 
regression results do not agree with MNL results, and the possible reason could be the 
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limited variation of the categorical dependent variables. We illustrate this issue in figure 1 
and table 4 below. 
         Figure1 shows that t-values are more closely clustered when zero trade is not treated, 
and t-values are more spread out in the negative range when zero trade is treated. 
Consequently, we have a negative significant coefficient for variable Zero_treated in the 
robust regression. 
  
Figure 1: t-value against zero_treated dummy variable (1=treated) 
 
Table 4: Frequency of variable zero_treated in each category D=1, 2, 3 
    Zero_treated                                              
D 
 0 1 Total 
1 121 88 209 
2 162 158 320 
3 44 45 89 
Total 327 291 618 
 
         However, the relative position in the negative end of t-values is not shown in 
categorical variable D, because of its limited variation. Instead, the D=3 category has relative 
more observations (45 out of 291) when zero trade is treated, than when zero trade is not 
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treated (44 out of 327). Hence, the MNL regression results suggest that treating zero trade 
increase the probability of having positive significant estimates. 
For agriculture (Ag) and processed food products (Food), the technical measure trade 
effects are less likely to be positive significant. We verify that the finding of SPS regulations 
having a trade impeding effect for agricultural products produced by developing exporters 
and going to developed importers is systematic. Both the robust regression and the MNL 
results show this effect to be significantly present. The result of interaction variable dev_SPS 
shows that the SPS trade effect from developing exporter to developed importer is more 
negatively affected and is most likely to be negatively significant, and less likely to be 
insignificant or positively significant. 
The aggregation level of the data (Agg_hs_centered) is highly significant in the robust 
regression but not in the MNL. The more disaggregated the trade data, the more positive 
significant are the trade effects from the conditional mean of the t-values. The larger datasets 
(Sample_centered) tend to bring more conclusive results on the trade effects of technical 
measures as shown by the MNL results. The probability to have significant trade effects 
(either positive or negative) increases with the sample size. Not surprisingly, the OLS and 
robust regressions cannot capture this result. 
Last and importantly, choosing the count proxy of technical measures (Proxy_count) 
is more likely to lead to positive or insignificant trade effects and less likely to have negative 
significant trade effects. Choosing the dummy proxy (Proxy_dummy) is more likely to lead to 
insignificant trade effects and less likely to have negative significant trade effects, while 
estimates obtained with the frequency proxy (Proxy_freq) are less likely to be positive and 
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more likely to be insignificant. Robust regression results suggest that these three proxies have 
a significant and positive influence on the estimated trade impact of technical measures.  
The robust regression cannot reject the null hypotheses that these three proxies are the same 
in terms of the positive and significant effect to the significance of trade effects. However, a 
similar set of tests in the MNL approach strongly rejects the null hypothesis that 
Proxy_dummy and Proxy_count have a similar impact on the probability of the technical 
measure estimates to fall in the third zone relative to the second zone (P3/P2). The null 
hypothesis that Proxy-dummy and Proxy-freq are equal in their effect on (P3/P2) cannot be 
rejected, nevertheless. In conclusion, these results are consistent with ruling out a negative 
influence of these proxies on estimated trade effects, although the two approaches disagree 
on their relative impacts. Finally, OLS and robust regression results suggest that SPS other 
than those proxied by MRLs (SPS_no _mrl) and TBT (TBT) policies lead to more negative 
trade coefficients. However, MNL results do not suggest any significant patterns. 
Robustness check 
We consider two major robustness checks, one associated with the existence of 
influential observations, and another one based on the cut-off values used to separate the 
three MNL regions into which technical measure estimates fall (negative significant, 
insignificant, positive significant). First, due to the cluster-structure of our sample, we 
undertake influential data diagnostics based on clusters represented by the papers included in 
the dataset, instead of individual observations. We calculate standardized DFbetas and 
Cook’s D statistics4. Following the rule of thumb on DFbetas and Cook’s D, we flag possible 
influential clusters 1, 5, 8, 21, because associated DFbetas or Cook’s Ds were higher than 1. 
                                                 
4 Results available upon request. 
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To further check the influences of these papers, we drop one paper at a time and rerun the 
meta-analysis and compare regression results with those based on the full sample. Results are 
shown in Appendix. Dropping observations from paper 1 causes complications with the 
estimates associated with variables Proxy_dummy, Proxy_count, and Proxy_freq, especially 
in the MNL model. This is due to a convergence problem in the MNL (the log likelihood 
does not converge). Variables Proxy_dummy, Proxy_count, and Proxy_freq are nearly co-
linear once paper-1 observations are dropped. Results are stable to the deletions of 
observations from Papers 5, 8, or 21.   
Second, we check whether our MNL regression results are robust to different cutoff 
points of the categorical dependent variable. In the previous MNL regressions, the 
categorical dependent variable equals to -1, 0, 1 when t-values are larger than 1.96, within (-
1.96, 1.96), and smaller than -1.96, respectively. We compares regression results for cut off 
points +,- 1.96, and +,- 1.64 (see Appendix for details). Changes in the regression results are 
small and qualitative results on determinants are essentially similar on signs, significance, 
and order of magnitude of the estimated coefficients. The only difference is that the intercept 
for the log of the probability to be negative relative to being insignificant (log(P1/P2) is 
significantly positive, suggesting that estimates of trade effects are more likely to be 
negative. So we conclude that the choice of cutoff values is not a cause of concern. 
Conclusions 
We conducted a meta-analysis to explain the systematic variations found in estimated 
trade effects of technical measures using both data sampling and methodology differences. 
Although it is impossible to control for all the differences among the studies, we controlled 
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for the determinants that are most likely to matter, based on theoretical findings as well as 
important conjectures found in the previous empirical literature. 
Analyses of agriculture and food industries lead to estimates of trade effects of 
technical measures, which are less likely to be positive. Trade flows in these sectors tend to 
be more impeded by technical measures than do trade flows in other sectors. Further, we find 
systematic impeding effect of SPS regulations on agricultural exports sourced from 
developing countries and going to high-income countries. Both robust regression and MNL 
approaches sustain this important finding which suggests that SPS regulations are trade 
barriers rather than catalysts in the set of studies analyzed here. We find that models that 
control for the “multilateral resistance” terms using country-pair dummies are more likely to 
yield positive and significant estimates of trade effects of technical measures than those that 
do not control for multilateral resistance. Similarly, the former studies are less likely to yield 
negative significant trade effects than are the latter. 
The evidence of the three technical measure proxies is mixed. The three proxies tend 
to have a positive effect on the estimates of trade effects of technical measures. No strong 
evidence shows that the three different forms of technical measure proxies (count, frequency, 
dummy) would lead to systematically different trade effects in the robust regression, 
however, the MNL results strongly suggest that studies based on a count proxy yield 
estimates that are more likely to be positive and much less likely to be negative. These two 
effects are the largest in magnitude for the count proxy. The results on proxies, although 
convoluted, are consistent with ruling out a negative influence of these proxies on the 
estimated trade effects of technical measures. The aggregation level of the trade data could 
also affect the estimated trade effects, and the more disaggregated data tend to provide more 
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positive significant estimated trade effects of technical measures relative to the conditional 
sample mean of t-values. These effects were found in the robust regression results but could 
not be confirmed with the MNL approach because of lack of statistical significance. 
In the future one could pool our dataset with studies analyzing multilateral, harmonized, 
and reciprocal technical measures and incorporate technical measure estimates associated 
with these standards. These standards have a different function with much potential to exhibit 
trade- expanding ability and with ambiguous effects on cost of production. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A: Frequency of Zero-treatment procedures 
 
 
 
 
Table B:  Sensitivity of results to variable deletion (one by one) 
Explanatory Var. Multinomial Logit (all variables) 
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
  
 
Multinomial Logit  
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
  
 
Multinomial Logit  
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
  
 
Intercept 1.88 
(1.21) 
0.56 
(0.93) 
2.15** 
(1.11) 
-0.36 
(0.99) 
2.14** 
(1.10) 
0.37 
(0.90) 
Ag 0.29 
(0.41) 
-1.03*** 
(0.24) 
  -0.05 
(0.34) 
-0.60** 
(0.25) 
Food 0.68 
(0.46) 
-0.88** 
(0.44) 
0.55 
(0.40) 
-0.36 
(0.59) 
  
Proxy_dummy -2.22*** 
(0.82) 
-2.09*** 
(0.85) 
-2.29*** 
(0.78) 
-2.25** 
(0.96) 
-2.22*** 
(0.76) 
-2.37*** 
(0.90) 
Proxy_count -2.27** 
(0.99) 
0.73 
(0.76) 
-2.24** 
(0.98) 
0.54 
(0.97) 
-1.89** 
(0.94) 
0.27 
(0.75) 
Proxy_freq -1.48** 
(0.75) 
-1.97*** 
(0.60) 
-1.68*** 
(0.66) 
-1.16* 
(0.64) 
-1.79*** 
(0.73) 
-1.39*** 
(0.56) 
Sample_centered 0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
SPS_no_mrl -0.48 
(0.49) 
-0.40 
(0.40) 
-0.53 
(0.50) 
-0.29 
(0.39) 
-0.51 
(0.47) 
-0.45 
(0.38) 
TBT -0.05 
(0.64) 
-0.08 
(0.22) 
-0.08 
(0.65) 
0.03 
(0.23) 
-0.04 
(0.62) 
-0.11 
(0.22) 
Agg_hs_centered -0.10 
(0.16) 
0.02 
(0.18) 
-0.11 
(0.15) 
0.06 
(0.21) 
-0.17 
(0.15) 
0.13 
(0.18) 
Panel_var_time 
 
1.68** 
(0.76) 
1.68** 
(0.76) 
1.70** 
(0.74) 
-0.80 
(0.83) 
1.39** 
(0.69) 
-0.60 
(0.68) 
Fix_country_pair -1.81** 
(0.83) 
-1.81** 
(0.83) 
-1.78** 
(0.81) 
0.19 
(0.76) 
-1.61** 
(0.77) 
0.02 
(0.67) 
Zero_treated 0.42 
(0.43) 
0.42 
(0.43) 
0.51 
(0.39) 
0.41 
(0.44) 
0.62 
(0.38) 
0.43 
(0.34) 
dev_SPS 1.03** 
(0.44) 
1.03** 
(0.44) 
1.10*** 
(0.40) 
0.11 
(0.66) 
1.19*** 
(0.39) 
0.13 
(0.65) 
Procedures Frequency 
in 
observations 
Frequency 
in papers 
Negative 
significant 
estimate (%) 
Insignifica
nt estimate 
(%) 
Positive 
significant 
estimate 
(%) 
Adding arbitrary 
small numbers 
4 1 100 0 0 
PPML 48 2 58 42 0 
Heckman two 
stage 
7 2 71 0 29 
Tobit 232 4 22 59 19 
Truncation 327 18 37 50 13 
Total 618 27    
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Table B:  Sensitivity of results to variable deletion (one by one) (continued) 
Explanatory 
Var. 
Multinomial Logit  
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 
Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
  
 
Multinomial Logit  
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 
Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
  
 
Multinomial Logit  
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 
Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
  
 
Multinomial Logit  
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 
Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
  
 
Intercept 0.75 
(1.02) 
-0.44 
(1.02) 
0.4 
(0.91) 
1.18*** 
(0.42) 
1.09 
(1.04) 
-0.64 
(0.99) 
1.68 
(1.26) 
0.87 
(1.02) 
Ag 0.43 
(0.44) 
-1.03*** 
(0.27) 
0.19 
(0.47) 
-1.05*** 
(0.26) 
0.54* 
(0.33) 
-0.72** 
(0.35) 
0.44 
(0.44) 
-0.92*** 
(0.34) 
Food 0.72 
(0.48) 
-0.94*** 
(0.48) 
0.36 
(0.59) 
-0.83** 
(0.39) 
0.84** 
(0.40) 
-0.66 
(0.43) 
0.83* 
(0.45) 
-0.71 
(0.48) 
Proxy_dummy   -1.04* 
(0.55) 
-2.44** 
(1.01) 
-1.51** 
(0.72) 
-1.16 
(0.84) 
-1.95*** 
(0.72) 
-1.27 
(0.80) 
Proxy_count -0.96 
(0.84) 
1.86** 
(0.93) 
  -1.23* 
(0.69) 
2.14*** 
(0.83) 
-2.50*** 
(0.99) 
-0.03 
(1.04) 
Proxy_freq -0.58 
(0.70) 
-1.33* 
(0.70) 
-0.39 
(0.47) 
-2.45*** 
(0.63) 
  -1.65** 
(0.83) 
-2.50*** 
(0.85) 
Sample_centered 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
 
 
SPS_no_mrl -0.57 
(0.50) 
-0.37 
(0.52) 
-0.41 
(0.49) 
-0.35 
(0.40) 
-0.71 
(0.46) 
-0.61 
(0.41) 
-0.43 
(0.50) 
-0.35 
(0.44) 
TBT -0.30 
(0.74) 
-0.19 
(0.27) 
-0.35 
(0.70) 
-0.04 
(0.22) 
-0.37 
(0.63) 
-0.41* 
(0.22) 
-0.11 
(0.64) 
-0.15 
(0.22) 
Agg_hs_centered -0.28** 
(0.12) 
-0.16 
(0.17) 
-0.33*** 
(0.10) 
0.12 
(0.17) 
-0.12 
(0.18) 
-0.06 
(0.21) 
-0.12 
(0.16) 
0.01 
(0.19) 
Panel_var_time 
 
0.72 
(0.81) 
-2.15** 
(0.95) 
1.13 
(0.99) 
-1.19 
(1.07) 
1.62* 
(0.91) 
-1.35 
(0.89) 
1.80*** 
(0.68) 
-1.41 
(1.11) 
Fix_country_pair -1.36* 
(0.84) 
0.51 
(0.76) 
-0.62 
(0.53) 
-0.36 
(0.38) 
-1.29 
(0.80) 
0.93 
(0.85) 
-1.91** 
(0.82) 
-0.52 
(0.81) 
Zero_treated 0.45 
(0.48) 
1.01** 
(0.42) 
0.16 
(0.48) 
1.12*** 
(0.43) 
-0.18 
(0.35) 
-0.01 
(0.41) 
0.64 
(0.45) 
1.50*** 
(0.59) 
dev_SPS 0.10 
(0.41) 
-0.80 
(0.49) 
0.83*** 
(0.34) 
0.21 
(0.62) 
0.93** 
(0.46) 
0.14 
(0.65) 
0.81** 
(0.39) 
-0.42 
(0.66) 
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Table B:  Sensitivity of results to variable deletion (one by one) (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Explanatory 
Var. 
Multinomial Logit  
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 
Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
  
 
Multinomial Logit  
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 
Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
  
 
Multinomial Logit  
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 
Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
  
 
Multinomial Logit  
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 
Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
  
 
Intercept 1.33 
(0.99) 
-0.04 
(0.69) 
1.84 
(1.14) 
0.48 
(0.77) 
2.20** 
(1.12) 
0.52 
(0.83) 
2.07** 
(0.88) 
0.75 
(0.80) 
Ag 0.34 
(0.41) 
-0.99*** 
(0.24) 
0.30 
(0.42) 
-1.02*** 
(0.24) 
0.31 
(0.41) 
-1.03*** 
(0.26) 
0.25 
(0.39) 
-0.88*** 
(0.23) 
Food 0.69 
(0.46) 
-0.88** 
(0.43) 
0.68 
(0.46) 
-0.88** 
(0.43) 
0.75* 
(0.44) 
-0.90** 
(0.43) 
0.38 
(0.53) 
-0.63** 
(0.31) 
Proxy_dummy -2.23*** 
(0.84) 
-2.08*** 
(0.84) 
-2.23*** 
(0.80) 
-2.11*** 
(0.85) 
-2.48*** 
(0.64) 
-1.98*** 
(0.55) 
-1.25** 
(0.53) 
-3.00*** 
(1.03) 
Proxy_count -2.16** 
(0.92) 
0.87 
(0.68) 
-2.28** 
(0.99) 
0.73 
(0.75) 
-2.64*** 
(0.69) 
0.82 
(0.74) 
-1.72* 
(0.91) 
0.38 
(0.56) 
Proxy_freq -1.63** 
(0.78) 
-2.08*** 
(0.57) 
-1.51** 
(0.68) 
-2.01*** 
(0.58) 
-1.51** 
(0.70) 
-1.90*** 
(0.49) 
-1.47 
(0.91) 
-1.63*** 
(0.56) 
Sample_center
ed 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
SPS_no_mrl   -0.47 
(0.40) 
-0.3 
(0.32) 
-0.54 
(0.55) 
-0.40 
(0.37) 
-0.53 
(0.54) 
-0.42 
(0.37) 
TBT 0.07 
(0.63) 
0.06 
(0.22) 
  -0.01 
(0.63) 
-0.08 
(0.24) 
-0.59 
(0.77) 
-0.15 
(0.27) 
Agg_hs_center
ed 
-0.13 
(0.16) 
0.00 
(0.18) 
-0.10 
(0.15) 
0.03 
(0.18) 
  -0.26** 
(0.12) 
0.13 
(0.19) 
Panel_var_tim
e 
 
1.72** 
(0.78) 
-1.19* 
(0.73) 
1.71*** 
(0.63) 
-1.22* 
(0.74) 
1.90*** 
(0.71) 
-1.31 
(0.82) 
  
Fix_country_p
air 
-1.80** 
(0.80) 
0.19 
(0.61) 
-1.83*** 
(0.73) 
0.14 
(0.65) 
-2.08*** 
(0.61) 
0.21 
(0.70) 
-1.41* 
(0.86) 
-0.02 
(0.53) 
Zero_treated 0.47 
(0.44) 
0.94*** 
(0.34) 
0.44 
(0.39) 
0.90 
(0.36) 
0.34 
(0.46) 
0.84** 
(0.37) 
0.64 
(0.58) 
0.53 
(0.34) 
dev_SPS 0.94** 
(0.46) 
0.14 
(0.55) 
1.03** 
(0.43) 
0.20 
(0.59) 
1.12*** 
(0.42) 
0.12 
(0.49) 
0.56 
(0.36) 
0.69 
(0.68) 
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Table B:  Sensitivity of results to variable deletion (one by one) (continued) 
Explanatory 
Var. 
Multinomial Logit  
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
  
 
Multinomial Logit  
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 
Multinomial Logit  
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
  
Intercept 0.62 
(1.03) 
0.74 
(0.55) 
1.88 
(1.23) 
0.29 
(0.93) 
1.42 
(1.06) 
0.4 
(0.89) 
Ag 0.25 
(0.45) 
-1.09*** 
(0.28) 
0.34 
(0.36) 
-0.84*** 
(0.28) 
0.50 
(0.39) 
-0.98*** 
(0.25) 
Food 0.46 
(0.59) 
-0.92** 
(0.42) 
0.73* 
(0.40) 
-0.68** 
(0.38) 
0.86** 
(0.42) 
-0.83* 
(0.45) 
Proxy_dummy -1.58** 
(0.66) 
-2.03** 
(0.91) 
-2.27*** 
(0.92) 
-2.22** 
(0.95) 
-1.31*** 
(0.47) 
-1.86*** 
(0.42) 
Proxy_count -0.40 
(0.43) 
0.58 
(0.36) 
-2.12** 
(1.01) 
1.11 
(0.75) 
-1.98** 
(0.91) 
0.79 
(0.72) 
Proxy_freq -0.63 
(0.66) 
-2.08*** 
(0.70) 
-1.13** 
(0.52) 
-1.07*** 
(0.41) 
-1.38* 
(0.83) 
-1.89*** 
(0.62) 
Sample_centered 0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
SPS_no_mrl -0.53 
(0.46) 
-0.35 
(0.42) 
-0.53 
(0.47) 
-0.50 
(0.37) 
-0.27 
(0.52) 
-0.38 
(0.38) 
TBT -0.59 
(0.72) 
-0.13 
(0.28) 
-0.14 
(0.62) 
-0.24 
(0.22) 
-0.18 
(0.70) 
-0.10 
(0.23) 
Agg_hs_centered -0.37*** 
(0.10) 
0.02 
(0.19) 
-0.07 
(0.18) 
0.06 
(0.19) 
-0.17 
(0.13) 
0.03 
(0.16) 
Panel_var_time 
 
1.16 
(1.16) 
-1.22 
(0.96) 
1.75** 
(0.81) 
-1.04 
(0.73) 
1.19 
(0.77) 
-1.28 
(0.82) 
Fix_country pair   -1.63** 
(0.82) 
0.63 
(0.61) 
-1.63** 
(0.82) 
0.25 
(0.59) 
Zero_treated -0.02 
(0.37) 
0.97** 
(0.40) 
  0.35 
(0.50) 
0.79** 
(0.41) 
dev_SPS 0.81** 
(0.33) 
0.11 
(0.59) 
0.99** 
(0.50) 
0.31 
(0.69) 
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Table C: Robustness checks. Influential cluster check 
 Full data set Paper 1 observations dropped 
Explanatory Var. Robust 
Regression 
Multinomial Logit  
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
    Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 
Robust 
Regression 
Multinomial Logit      
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 
Intercept -0.11 
(0.73) 
1.88 
(1.21) 
0.56 
(0.93) 
-1.64** 
(0.75) 
2.63* 
(1.62) 
-18.45*** 
(1.21) 
Ag -0.93*** 
(0.31) 
0.29 
(0.41) 
-1.03*** 
(0.24) 
-0.72** 
(0.33) 
0.11 
(0.50) 
-1.16*** 
(0.19) 
Food -1.18*** 
(0.31) 
0.68 
(0.46) 
-0.88** 
(0.44) 
-0.82*** 
(0.32) 
0.48 
(0.56) 
-0.80* 
(0.45) 
Proxy_dummy 1.74*** 
(0.55) 
-2.22*** 
(0.82) 
-2.09*** 
(0.85) 
4.61*** 
(0.96) 
-3.98** 
(1.71) 
17.72# 
(.) 
Proxy_count 2.12*** 
(0.63) 
-2.27** 
(0.99) 
0.73 
(0.76) 
4.42*** 
(0.84) 
-3.59** 
(1.66) 
20.35 
(1.11) 
Proxy_freq 2.17*** 
(0.58) 
-1.48** 
(0.75) 
-1.97*** 
(0.60) 
5.88*** 
(1.14) 
-3.71** 
(1.62) 
18.37*** 
(0.76) 
Sample_centered -0.02 
(0.02) 
0.21** 
(0.09) 
0.26*** 
(0.09) 
-0.04 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.03* 
(0.01) 
SPS_no_mrl -0.81** 
(0.39) 
-0.48 
(0.49) 
-0.40 
(0.40) 
-1.93*** 
(0.55) 
0.25 
(0.38) 
-0.96*** 
(0.17) 
TBT -1.18*** 
(0.40) 
-0.05 
(0.64) 
-0.08 
(0.22) 
-1.80*** 
(0.48) 
0.45 
(0.60) 
-0.58*** 
(0.22) 
Agg_hs_centered 0.56*** 
(0.12) 
-0.10 
(0.16) 
0.02 
(0.18) 
0.71*** 
(0.12) 
-0.18 
(0.18) 
0.14 
(0.20) 
Panel_fix_time -1.79*** 
(0.66) 
         n/a 
 
     n/a 
 
-1.72*** 
(0.64) 
n/a n/a 
Panel_var_time 
 
-1.07* 
(0.57) 
1.68** 
(0.76) 
-1.25* 
(0.70) 
-1.00* 
(0.57) 
1.80** 
(0.77) 
-0.92 
(0.75) 
Fix_country_pair 2.89*** 
(0.45) 
-1.81** 
(0.83) 
0.17 
(0.62) 
2.07*** 
(0.47) 
-1.65* 
(0.86) 
-0.10 
(0.63) 
Zero_treated -2.93*** 
(0.36) 
0.42 
(0.43) 
0.88** 
(0.37) 
-2.80*** 
(0.36) 
0.67 
(0.51) 
0.81** 
(0.41) 
dev_SPS -2.53*** 
(0.38) 
1.03** 
(0.44) 
0.20 
(0.58) 
-1.77*** 
(0.40) 
0.97** 
(0.50) 
0.58 
(0.57) 
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Table D: Robustness check. Influential cluster checks for papers 5, 8, and 2 
 Full data set Paper 5 observations dropped Paper 8 observations dropped Paper 21 observations dropped 
Explanatory 
 Var. 
Robust 
Regression 
Multinomial Logit 
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
    
Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 
 
Robust 
Regression 
Multinomial Logit 
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
    
Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 
 
Robust 
Regression 
Multinomial Logit 
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
   
Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 
Robust 
Regression 
Multinomial Logit 
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 
Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 
Intercept -0.11 
(0.73) 
1.88 
(1.21) 
0.56 
(0.93) 
-0.54 
(0.80) 
1.90 
(1.20) 
0.52 
(0.92) 
-0.59 
(0.82) 
1.85 
(1.17) 
0.51 
(0.82) 
-0.98 
(0.86) 
2.04 
(1.43) 
-1.62 
(1.37) 
Ag -0.93*** 
(0.31) 
0.29 
(0.41) 
-1.03*** 
(0.24) 
-0.88*** 
(0.32) 
0.27 
(0.41) 
-0.97*** 
(0.34) 
-0.72** 
(0.37) 
-0.07 
(0.37) 
-1.17*** 
(0.24) 
-1.06*** 
(0.31) 
0.39 
(0.44) 
-0.84*** 
(0.26) 
Food -1.18*** 
(0.31) 
0.68 
(0.46) 
-0.88** 
(0.44) 
-1.13*** 
(0.32) 
0.66 
(0.47) 
-0.82* 
(0.47) 
-1.28*** 
(0.37) 
0.76 
(0.49) 
-0.77** 
(0.41) 
-1.37*** 
(0.32) 
0.69 
(0.57) 
-1.71 
(0.25) 
Proxy_dummy 1.74*** 
(0.55) 
-2.22*** 
(0.82) 
-2.09*** 
(0.85) 
1.84*** 
(0.55) 
-2.23*** 
(0.84) 
-2.09** 
(1.02) 
2.45*** 
(0.87) 
-1.24 
(1.12) 
-1.68 
(1.27) 
1.43*** 
(0.55) 
-
1.79*
** 
(0.66) 
-1.46 
(0.99) 
Proxy_count 2.12*** 
(0.63) 
-2.27** 
(0.99) 
0.73 
(0.76) 
2.11*** 
(0.63) 
-2.24*** 
(0.98) 
0.53 
(0.85) 
2.30*** 
(0.71) 
-2.22*** 
(0.91) 
0.75 
(0.66) 
1.43* 
(0.75) 
-1.43 
(0.95) 
1.93* 
(1.02) 
Proxy_freq 2.17*** 
(0.58) 
-1.48** 
(0.75) 
-1.97*** 
(0.60) 
1.98*** 
(0.58) 
-1.47** 
(0.75) 
-2.07*** 
(0.59) 
2.30*** 
(0.65) 
-1.71** 
(0.77) 
-2.01*** 
(0.57) 
1.54*** 
(0.60) 
-0.93 
(0.71) 
-2.15*** 
(0.73) 
Sample_centered -0.02 
(0.02) 
0.21** 
(0.09) 
0.26*** 
(0.09) 
-0.20 
(0.13) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
0.18* 
(0.10) 
0.24*** 
(0.09) 
SPS_no_mrl -0.81** 
(0.39) 
-0.48 
(0.49) 
-0.40 
(0.40) 
-0.69* 
(0.40) 
-0.45 
(0.50) 
-0.43 
(0.36) 
-0.71* 
(0.43) 
-0.49 
(0.50) 
-0.41 
(0.39) 
-0.97** 
(0.45) 
-0.29 
(0.68) 
0.65 
(0.54) 
TBT -1.18*** 
(0.40) 
-0.05 
(0.64) 
-0.08 
(0.22) 
-1.04*** 
(0.41) 
-0.08 
(0.66) 
-0.05 
(0.24) 
-0.92** 
(0.48) 
0.27 
(0.66) 
0.02 
(0.23) 
-0.26 
(0.55) 
-0.86 
(0.69) 
0.22 
(0.62) 
Agg_hs_centered 0.56*** 
(0.12) 
-0.10 
(0.16) 
0.02 
(0.18) 
0.53*** 
(0.12) 
-0.10 
(0.16) 
0.04 
(0.18) 
0.57*** 
(0.13) 
-0.05 
(0.12) 
0.05 
(0.17) 
0.33** 
(0.16) 
-0.06 
(0.32) 
-0.29** 
(0.13) 
Panel_fix_time -1.79*** 
(0.66) 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
-1.31* 
(0.72) 
n/a n/a -1.95*** 
(0.75) 
n/a n/a -0.96* 
(0.58) 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
Panel_var_time -1.07* 
(0.57) 
1.68** 
(0.76) 
-1.25* 
(0.70) 
-1.15** 
(0.57) 
1.65** 
(0.78) 
-1.04 
(0.87) 
-1.44** 
(0.73) 
1.17 
(0.93) 
-1.42** 
(0.58) 
-1.18* 
(0.66) 
1.10 
(0.77) 
-1.90*** 
(0.69) 
Fix_country_ pair 2.89*** 
(0.45) 
-1.81** 
(0.83) 
0.17 
(0.62) 
2.90*** 
(0.45) 
-1.80** 
(0.82) 
0.04 
(0.72) 
2.81*** 
(0.51) 
-1.78** 
(0.76) 
0.20 
(0.52) 
2.95*** 
(0.47) 
-1.52* 
(0.88) 
0.86 
(0.76) 
Zero_treated -2.93*** 
(0.36) 
0.42 
(0.43) 
0.88** 
(0.37) 
-2.74*** 
(0.37) 
0.40 
(0.44) 
0.99** 
(0.43) 
-2.90*** 
(0.41) 
0.36 
(0.37) 
0.81*** 
(0.32) 
-1.98*** 
(0.55) 
-0.10 
(0.90) 
1.48** 
(0.63) 
dev_SPS -2.53*** 
(0.38) 
1.03** 
(0.44) 
0.20 
(0.58) 
-2.58*** 
(0.38) 
1.02** 
(0.43) 
0.26 
(0.62) 
-2.30*** 
(0.49) 
1.48*** 
(0.40) 
0.39 
(0.45) 
-1.85*** 
(0.49) 
0.57 
(0.42) 
0.08 
(0.93) 
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Table E: Robustness check on different cutoff points 
 
 Cut off points +,- 1.96 Cut off points +,- 1.64 
Explanatory Var. Multinomial Logit 
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
    Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 
Multinomial Logit Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
   
Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 
Intercept 1.88 
(1.21) 
0.56 
(0.93) 
1.93* 
(1.13) 
0.72 
(1.04) 
Ag 0.29 
(0.41) 
-1.03*** 
(0.24) 
0.36 
(0.41) 
-1.09** 
(0.29) 
Food 0.68 
(0.46) 
-0.88** 
(0.44) 
0.75 
(0.41) 
-0.80* 
(0.46) 
Proxy_dummy -2.22*** 
(0.82) 
-2.09*** 
(0.85) 
-1.88*** 
(0.75) 
-1.47** 
(0.68) 
Proxy_count -2.27** 
(0.99) 
0.73 
(0.76) 
-2.13** 
(0.95) 
0.93 
(0.84) 
Proxy_freq -1.48** 
(0.75) 
-1.97*** 
(0.60) 
-1.24* 
(0.70) 
-1.72*** 
(0.72) 
Sample_centered 0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
SPS_no_mrl -0.48 
(0.49) 
-0.40 
(0.40) 
-0.47 
(0.46) 
-0.42 
(0.43) 
TBT -0.05 
(0.64) 
-0.08 
(0.22) 
-0.05 
(0.55) 
-0.25 
(0.24) 
Agg_hs_centered -0.10 
(0.16) 
0.02 
(0.18) 
-0.06 
(0.15) 
-0.02 
(0.19) 
Panel_fix_time n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Panel_var_time 1.68** 
(0.76) 
-1.25 
(0.70) 
1.34** 
(0.73) 
-1.29** 
(0.56) 
Fix_country_pair -1.81** 
(0.83) 
0.17 
(0.62) 
-1.70** 
(0.80) 
0.24 
(0.66) 
Zero_treated 0.42 
(0.43) 
0.88** 
(0.37) 
0.31 
(0.42) 
0.93** 
(0.44) 
dev_SPS 1.03** 
(0.44) 
0.20 
(0.58) 
0.92** 
(0.40) 
-0.24 
(0.43) 
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CHAPTER 3: PROTECTIONISM INDICES FOR NON-TARIFF MEASURES: AN 
APPLICATION TO MAXIMUM RESIDUE LEVELS 
 
A paper submitted to Food Policy 
Yuan Li and John C. Beghin 
 
Abstract 
We propose aggregation indices of Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs) to quantify their 
protectionism relative to international standards. We apply the indices to national Maximum 
Residue Limit (MRL) regulations affecting agricultural and food trade and using a science-
based criteria embodied in Codex Alimentarius international standards. The approach links 
two streams of the NTM literature, one concerned with the aggregation of various NTMs into 
operational indices for econometric and modeling purposes, and the other attempting to 
evaluate the protectionism of NTMs. The data used in the application come from a large 
international dataset on veterinary and pesticide MRLs and CODEX MRL standards for a 
large set of countries. 
Introduction  
We fill a gap in the literature on empirical measures of protectionism of nontariff 
measures (NTMs) by proposing simple yet formal aggregation indices of NTMs. The indices 
measure the protectionism of Maximum Residue Limit (MRL) standards relative to science-
based criteria embodied in international standards such as Codex Alimentarius. MRLs set 
limits on harmful substances, like pesticide residues, veterinary drug residues, and other 
harmful substances, that importing countries allow on similar imported and domestic 
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products as implied by national treatment. MRLs are often substance, product, and country 
specific. MRLs can also be used to impede trade to protect domestic producers rather than 
protecting health or the environment.  
We link two streams of the NTMs literature, each addressing a specific problem. 
These two problems have been vexing and remain largely unresolved. One stream is 
concerned with the aggregation of various NTMs into meaningful indices, to characterize 
NTM regimes and to be used in econometric analyses of trade flows or to model and analyze 
policy impact (Disdier, Fontagné, and Mimouni (2008)). The other stream attempts to 
evaluate the protectionist nature of NTMs. Unlike tariffs for which the presumption is that 
they distort trade and welfare, NTMs may improve welfare because they address some 
market imperfection (Beghin et al. (2012)). So quantification, aggregation, and delineation of 
the potential protectionism of NTMs are a complex and important issue in the analysis of 
NTMs. 
Empirical studies of NTMs almost inevitably involve quantification and aggregation 
of several policies. Unlike tariffs, a single policy type whose numerical values can be directly 
used and interpreted, NTMs cover a lot of intrinsically different policies. For example, a 
Multi-Agency Support Team (MAST) of international organizations proposed a classification 
of NTMs, which consists of 16 major categories, including Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) 
measures, Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), other technical measures, price control 
measures, quantity control measures, etc. These NTMs can be qualitative and/or quantitative 
standards. For qualitative standards, like labeling, no numerical values can be directly used. 
Further, these qualitative policies affect different components of cost of production and 
marketing and cannot be easily aggregated into a single price equivalent. Evaluating the 
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protectionist component of these numerous qualitative policies into a protectionist score is 
likely to remain a challenge. For quantitative NTM policies, we show that aggregation is a 
much more manageable task 
Individual NTMs have been used empirically in a disaggregated fashion (Disdier and 
Marette (2010); Wilson and Otsuki (2004)). For qualitative standards, dummies are usually 
used to indicate the existence of such a standard. For quantitative standards, like Maximum 
Residue Limits (MRLs), the numerical levels may be directly used in the model (Xiong and 
Beghin (2012)). However, a single disaggregated NTM has limited application. Usually, a 
myriad of standards work together to regulate the quality of a product, and picking just one 
of the NTMs may lead to subjective selection bias and a mischaracterization of the set of 
NTMs regulating the market under study. In addition, even if there is no bias, a single NTM 
is not exhaustive and may not be representative. 
 Based on that concern, researchers often aggregate regulations and standards in 
summary indicators (Winchester et al., forthcoming). Indices involve aggregating over 
different regulations and standards, like labeling and MRL, and/or aggregating over products 
of different importance. Recent investigations focus on measuring the heterogeneity of 
NTMs across countries and products. Kox and Lejour (2006) propose an index based on a 
binary indicator of NTMs similarity. Rau, Shutes, and Sclueter (2010) developed a 
heterogeneity index of trade (HIT) of NTMs that can be applied to binary, ordered, or 
quantitative NTMs. The HIT is non-directional which means it measures the bilateral 
dissimilarity of NTMs, but gives no information about the relative strictness of NTMs. 
Winchester et al. (forthcoming) extend the HIT, to a directional HIT (DHIT) capturing the 
asymmetric stringency between two countries and apply it to MRL data in an investigation of 
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bilateral trade of agricultural products. Vigani, Raimondi, and Opler (2009), Drogué and 
DeMaria (forthcoming), and Achterbosch et al. (2009) offer alternative scalar measures of 
dissimilarity of policies.  
 An alternative to these indices, the frequency ratio, is often used (Harrigan (1993); 
Fontagné, Mimouni, and Pasteels (2005); Disdier, Fontagné, Mimouni (2008)). It calculates 
the coverage of NTMs of product categories relative to the total number of product categories 
of at aggregated level (say HS4 or HS2 digit) and weighted by production levels. Other 
aggregate or summary NTM proxies exist. See Li and Beghin (2011) for a systematic review 
of various NTM proxies and aggregators used in econometric investigations. 
Many NTMs investigations assume NTMs impede trade (and implicitly welfare) and 
rule out trade or welfare enhancing effects. However, we know market imperfections such as 
asymmetric information and externalities abound and NTM policy interventions could 
increase welfare and may be trade-impeding or trade enhancing while increasing welfare. 
NTMs may also be protectionist of course. Nevertheless, some agnostic priors on their 
protectionist nature ought to prevail. The empirical literature actually shows numerous cases 
of trade-enhancing NTMs (Li and Beghin 2011). There is no simple mapping between NTMs 
and their trade and welfare effects in presence of market imperfections.  
To complicate further, market imperfections may justify some NTMs but do not 
exclude protectionism because the level of the chosen measure may be overly stringent, 
hence, protectionist by creating unnecessary frictions in trade. This is an increasing 
preoccupation in policy forums (Disdier and van Tongeren (2010)). Several investigations 
correlate frequency and trade frictions, without formalizing what is protectionism. For 
example, Disdier and van Tongeren (2010) make the conjecture that protectionism is 
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responsible for some variance of incidence of NTMs across agri-food products. Disdier, 
Fontagné, Mimouni (2008) posit that protectionism may exist when a SPS measure is 
enforced by only a few countries. Finally, Winchester et al. (forthcoming) investigate how 
bilateral stringency differences in NTMs affect bilateral trade. Reducing stringency 
differences to common lower stringency levels would increase trade; the welfare grounds to 
do so are less clear, unless protectionism is presumed to prevail in the most stringent 
countries. These “conjectures” are intuitive, but lack formalism. 
Formalizing protectionism 
 
When defining protectionism of NTMs one can start with the simple science-based 
test. In absence of scientific evidence establishing market imperfections or risk, a NTM is 
protectionist.5 In presence of established risk or imperfections, identifying protectionism is 
more cumbersome.  
More conceptually, Fischer and Serra (2000) provide a formal criterion for gauging 
protectionism in presence of market imperfection. They conceptually analyze the 
protectionism behavior of a local social planner (LSP) setting up a quality standard to lower a 
negative consumption externality. The authors define a standard as protectionist if its 
optimum level is higher under a local LSP than under a global social planner treating all 
firms competing for the domestic market (foreign and domestic firms) as purely domestic. 
They find that when there a negative consumption externality the LSP always set the 
optimum domestic standard at a higher (protectionist) level than the level chosen by the 
global planner. Their results hinge on the domestic firms being more efficient at meeting the 
                                                 
5 There is a caveat of the precautionary principle which lets a country introduce a NTM while establishing the 
science. A precautionary policy without the pursuit of evidence is protectionist according to the WTO. 
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quality standard than foreign firms are. Marette and Beghin (2010) show that if foreign firms 
are much more efficient at meeting the standard, the domestic LSP will choose an anti-
protectionist standard, lower than the global standard. Berti and Falvey (2009) extend the 
analysis of Fisher and Serra and incorporate rent seeking industries influencing the way the 
LSP sets standards. They investigate how rent-seeking and socially optimum standards vary 
from autarky to free trade. Rent-seeking under free trade between two countries promotes the 
harmonization of standards that were heterogeneous under autarky. Finally, earlier on, 
Baldwin (1970) defines a NTM as protectionist whenever it lowers global real income. The 
latter criteria could conceptually accommodate cases with market imperfections.  
These conceptual efforts provide clear definitions of protectionism. However, they 
are difficult to operationalize in realistic empirical applications when many NTMs are 
imposed at once and because informational requirements are extensive. The issue of an 
aggregator lurks again in presence of many NTMs. Further, the Fisher and Serra criterion is 
not directly applicable when the supply is only made of foreign firms as in the case of 
tropical exports to most of the Northern hemisphere (e.g., the EU peanut market). The 
Baldwin criterion is also difficult to implement in real empirical cases given the “world” 
dimension of the criteria. 
 The World Trade Organization (WTO) does not set standards but encourages 
countries to use internationally accepted science-based standards, like Codex Alimentarius 
standards whenever available. However, the WTO allows its members to set their own 
standards away from international ones, as long as their individual standards are science 
based, non-discriminating, and least trade restrictive (WTO Doha Ministerial (2001)). The 
issue of “appropriate level of protection” is still under discussion, and the WTO has not yet 
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disambiguated what this means practically. Yet the science-based argument is a corner stone 
to fight protectionism and has led to several ruling by the WTO against policies in the EU, 
Japan, and Australia which could not be justified using scientific evidence (see WTO dispute 
cases DS245, DS367, and DS26). 
In the next section, we propose indices of NTM protectionism based on their 
departures from international science-based standards. We consider MRL measures, which 
are quantitative standards and give us a basis for comparison and aggregation. We use the 
Codex Alimentarius MRL standards as the non-protectionist science-based reference level. 
MRLs that exceed Codex levels are defined to be protectionist, a simple criterion. It extends 
naturally from the WTO recommendation to use international standards. We also limit our 
analysis to science-based situations for each of which an international standard exists.  
Defining protectionism indices 
 
Different aggregation levels have specific purposes. A measure of the protectionism 
for a given importer and given good provides detailed information for importers by 
commodities. This aggregator is useful for cross section (goods and countries) econometric 
investigations. Aggregate-country level protectionism scores over all considered goods 
facilitate straightforward country differences in MRL protectionism. These most aggregate 
scores allow us to assess and rank countries by their relative protectionism. These could also 
be compared to summary protection measures via tariffs and farm subsidies to analyze the 
policy composition of protectionism. Product level protectionism scores facilitate 
straightforward high-level interpretation in the sector or commodity differences in MRL 
protectionism and are the building blocks of the other two aggregation scores. 
We define an importer’s MRL to be protectionist when its stringency exceeds the 
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corresponding science-based international MRL. If an importer’s MRL is higher than the 
corresponding international MRL, then we deem the MRL non-protectionist. The aggregation 
over a multitude of substances (and goods) provides robustness to the indices. An 
“unintended” accidental protectionist MRL will be swamped by other non-protectionist 
MRLs included in the three indices proposed below if a country is mostly non-protectionist. 
 Define the maximum residue level of importer i, for good j, and harmful 
substance ;  and let be the international maximum residue level for the same good 
and harmful substance. Denote total number of importers as I, total number of goods as J, 
and total number of chemical/pesticides applied to product j as . To each of the three 
problems stated above, we propose the following indices: 
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where is the weight assigned to product  when we aggregate over products for given 
country . Ideally, weights should reflect the dead-weight loss associated with each product 
in aggregation over products for a given country. However, dead-weight loss data are not 
readily available, and we substitute import value instead. Similarly,  is the weight 
assigned to country when we aggregate over countries for given product to obtain total in 
that product. More specifically, 
1
ij
Jij
ij
j
IMw
IM
=
=
∑
 and 
1
' ij
Iij
ij
i
IMw
IM
=
=
∑
, where is the 
( )jijk
M
( )jk ( ), jintl jkM
( )jK
ijw j
i
'
ijw
i j
ijIM
55 
 
 
import value of country  for total trade of product . Below, we refer to the traded scores as 
“trade-weighted” or simply “weighted” and we refer to the unweighted scores as “equally-
weighted” or “unweighted.” 6 
To summarize, index  measures the protectionism of the MRLs for a given product 
and importer, aggregating over substances;  measures the protectionism of MRLs for a 
given importer, aggregating over substances and products; and  measures the 
protectionism of MRLs for a given product, aggregating over substances and importers. 
Properties of the indices 
By design, the indices have the following properties: invariance to scale, increasing 
marginal difficulty of attaining stricter standards (convexity in protectionism), invariance to 
regulation intensity, monotonicity (non-decreasing in MRL stringency of different countries, 
same product and same harmful substance, other things equal), and lower and upper bounded. 
  First, we subtract the importer’s MRL from the international MRL, because, by the 
definition of protectionism, only the part of the importer’s MRL that is more stringent than 
the international MRL contributes to protectionism. When the MRL is laxer than the 
international standard, it is anti-protectionist. MRLs have different scales, which could vary 
from 0.01 ppm(parts per million) to 10ppm or more. To make the index invariant to the scale 
of different residue levels, we scale the differences between importer and international MRLs 
by the international MRL. Second, the lower (i.e, stricter) the standard the harder it is for 
exporters to achieve. For example, some importers may relax all but one MRL above the 
international accepted level. But the one stringent MRL may become tough to achieve. By 
                                                 
6 In the empirical section, we also investigate normalized trade weights by dividing trade weights by a measure 
of aggregate trade openness. 
 
i j
ijS
iS
jS
56 
 
 
taking the exponential of the protectionism contributing part of the MRL, we put more 
weight on the MRLs that are relatively more stringent.  
Third, the number of substances regulated varies by products in many cases. In our 
application, this number of substances ranges from over a hundred to below 10. For example, 
the United States has established 107 pesticide MRLs for apples, and only 7 pesticide MRLs 
for coconut. The different regulatory intensity is possibly due the heterogeneous popularity 
of products with consumers. By averaging the sum of protectionism scores of each pesticide 
by the total number of pesticides, we make the protectionism indices invariant the regulation 
intensity. This property is further analyzed later in the paper as the regulatory intensity may 
be confounded with some missing data issue.  
Fourth, the indices are non-decreasing in stringency (  getting smaller) for 
different countries given the same j, and all other things being equal. If a country’s 
standard is more stringent, its protectionist scores will be nondecreasing in that stringency. 
Last, the scores are bounded by 0 at the lower bound and at the upper bound. A 
score of 1 indicate a non-protectionist policy. Scores larger than 1 indicate “protectionism” of 
policies as MRLs can be more stringent than Codex, and scores below 1 indicate the “anti-
protectionism,” of policies as MRLs can be laxer than Codex.7 
 
Application and data description  
 
 The MRL data used here are publicly available and come from the USDA FAS 
                                                 
7 In an earlier version, we truncated the indices below at 1 by constraining MRLs to have a score of 1 if they are 
not protectionist, including anti-protectionist MRLs. Avoiding truncation allows for anti-protectionism and 
provides a better measure of the variation in scores within a given index, but allows to have protectionism and 
anti-protectionism offsetting each other within the index. The latter would be reflected in an index with a large 
variance. 
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International MRL database (http://www.mrldatabase.com/) made available on line in 2010. 
The database consists of pesticide MRLs and veterinary drug MRLs. Pesticide and veterinary 
drug MRLs are maintained in two separate databases and their data structures are different. 
We discuss the pesticide MRLs database first. 
The pesticide MRLs database covers 341 products (Table 1), 19,486 (product by 
pesticide) pairs, and 83 countries (Table 2), and has 1,617,338 records. Among the 83 
countries covered by the pesticide MRLs database, 29 countries completely comply with 
Codex standards; 18 countries comply with EU standards; 7 countries defer to exporting 
countries standards; 5 countries comply with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) standards; 
and Mexico adopted U.S. standards. Finally, 22 out of 83 countries set their own standards 
only or partially combined with Codex or EU standards.  
This rich database has several shortcomings, however. First, there is some 
redundancy in the listed products. This is not a problem when we calculate product-level 
protectionism indices. However, when we aggregate over products to calculate country-level 
protectionism indices, this redundancy causes larger influence for the redundant products. 
The redundancy is a result of different names of products that different countries use. 
Specifically, there are two types of redundancies. One is exact redundancy: same product 
with alternative names but with similar MRL data. For example, “Beet”, “Beet, Garden”, and 
“Beet, Garden, Roots” are the same commodity.  These product names are listed separately 
in the database but with the same MRL data. We manually detect and delete the redundant 
names. 
The second type of redundancy occurs when some specific commodities belong to a 
general commodity group, and all commodities in the group are listed in the database.  
58 
 
 
Table 1: Product categories in the pesticide database  
Category Count 
Grains & Oilseeds 14 
Poultry & Eggs 6 
Dairy 2 
Horticultural & Tropical 
Products 
313 
Animal Products 15 
 
For example, "Beans", "Bean Dry", "Broad Bean Dry", "Mung Bean", "kidney Bean", and 
"Lima Bean" are listed separately. But “Beans” include “Broad Beans”, “Mung Beans”, 
“Kidney Beans”, etc. Some countries specify their MRLs for specific kinds of beans (“Mung 
Mean”,” Pink Bean”, etc), but some other countries just specify MRL for "Beans" in general. 
This type of redundancy is more complicated, and harder to resolve. We keep the redundant 
products of this kind, in order to make the product list consistent and comparable across 
countries but with the caveat in mind.  
A second issue is that the MRL database only lists chemicals that are available to U.S. 
farmers. This problem also applies to the veterinary drug database. A foreign MRL for a 
product or chemical is only included in the database if there is a U.S. MRL for that product 
or chemical. Hence, the foreign country could be regulating other residues but we do not 
know for which chemical and the corresponding MRLs. Luckily the U.S list is the most 
extensive so this limitation is not frequent.  
The third problem with the database resides with non-established MRLs. This 
problem also applies to Veterinary Drug database. Usually, the default MRLs defined by 
countries may apply when no MRLs are established. But there are rare cases when chemicals 
are exempt or banned. Since the database only includes the chemicals that the United States 
has positively listed, it is unlikely that these chemicals are considered exempt by other 
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countries. In addition, it is difficult to find lists of banned chemicals maintained by other 
countries. We have no further information to distinguish between the situations when a not-
established MRL means default, exempt, banned, or just plain missing data. Because the 
Table 2: Established Pesticide MRL Standards for All Countries  
Category  Number 
of 
countries 
Country list Additional  
notes 
Countries set their 
own standards 
22 Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Israel, 
Japan, Korea, Russia, Singapore, 
Switzerland, South Africa, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Turkey, New Zealand, Vietnam, 
United Arab Emirates, Malaysia 
Countries 
may set 
their 
standards 
and defer 
to codex if 
there is not 
set 
standards 
Countries defer to 
Codex  
29 Algeria, Angola, Barbados, Bermuda, 
Bahamas, Bangladesh, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hong 
Kong, Honduras, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, 
Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Venezuela 
defer to 
codex 
completely 
Countries defer to 
EU standards 
18 Belgium, Denmark, Finland, French 
Pacific Islands, France, French West 
Indies, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Jamaica, Netherland, Norway, Poland, 
Portland, Spanish, Sweden, United 
Kingdom 
 
Countries defer to 
GCC standards 
5 Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, 
Qatar 
 
Countries defer to 
exporting 
countries 
standards 
7 Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Cayman 
Island, Haiti, Nevis, Sri Lanka, St. Lucia 
 
Countries defer to 
US standards 
2 United States, Mexico  
 
 exempt and banned cases are rare, we substitute non-established MRLs with individual 
country’s default MRLs (see table 3). Missing data remain a concern. The USDA database 
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was considerably updated in 2012 after its initial (2010) release with many non-established 
data being eventually updated by actual MRLs. Presumably missing data have been greatly 
reduced. 
Table 3: Default Values for Not-established Pesticide MRLs 
 
The original veterinary drug database covers 7 product groups (hogs, chickens, 
turkeys, sheep, cattle, milk, and eggs), 19 countries and/regions and international standards 
(Codex) and contains 8,820 records. The non-established MRLs are substituted with default 
values (table 4). However, for Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and 
Vietnam, we did not find their default veterinary drug MRLs. So we deleted the non-
established MRLs from these countries. Since Chile and Indonesia only have non-established 
veterinary drug MRLs shown in the database, all of their veterinary drug MRLs are deleted 
unfortunately.  
Unlike the pesticide MRLs database, which is a balanced country by (product and 
pesticide) panel data set, the veterinary data are unbalanced. In the pesticide MRLs database, 
almost every country has the same products and pesticides associated with these products. In 
                                                 
8 The veterinary drug default for South Africa is 0.05ppm 
9 We did not find the default MRL for Turkey, but assumed it to be EU MRLs. 
Default values for 
non established 
Pesticide MRLs 
Countries Number of 
Countries 
0 ppm Australia, Taiwan 2 
0.01ppm European Union, Malaysia, South Africa8, Japan, 
Argentina 
5 
0.1ppm Canada 1 
Codex Chile, China, Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC), 
Indonesia, India, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, 
Brazil, Russia, New Zealand, United Arab Emirates 
12 
EU Switzerland, Turkey9 2 
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contrast, for the veterinary drug database, products and the veterinary drugs associated are 
different for different countries. To combine pesticide MRLs with veterinary drug MRLs, we 
matched the products based on the pesticide database. Due to the incompleteness of the 
second dataset, at the commodity level, veterinary drugs are included for some countries but 
not for other countries.  
Table 4: Default Values for Non-established Veterinary Drug MRLs 
Default Values for Non-
established Veterinary 
Drug MRLs 
Countries 
0.01ppm Japan 
0 ppm Australia, Canada, European Union, United States, 
Taiwan 
Codex Colombia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Peru, Philippines, Venezuela,  
Unknown Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Vietnam 
 
The products covered by the MRL databases are manually mapped into 6-digit or 4-
digit Harmonized System classification (HS) (Appendix A). The mapping between the 
products listed in the MRL database and HS is not bijective. Correspondences exist both 
ways. One product could be mapped into multiple 6-digit HS code, and one 6-digit HS code 
could be mapped with more than one product in the MRL database, given that some products 
are very specific and others are broadly defined. Given the HS 6 or HS 4 digits codes, we 
compile the trade data from the United Nations Comtrade database. Trade weights, which are 
used in calculating trade weighted indices, are the average of trade values for all products 
falling under the same HS 6-digit (or 4-digit) category if more than one product are mapped 
to one HS 6-digit (or 4 digit) category. If one product is mapped to multiple HS 6-digit (or 4-
digit) categories, we sum up trade values of the mapped HS categories. 
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We use the Codex MRL standards as the non-protectionism science-based reference 
levels. Codex is established using scientific expert advice and established science, and aims 
to protect consumer health and the environment. Codex MRL standards are set by the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission (CAC), which is a joint Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
and World Health Organization (WHO) commission. Some Codex standard may not be 
established, and the reasons for that may be hard to determine. CAC may decide not to 
establish the MRL, or decide the chemical should not be allowed, or that the chemicals are 
not harmful, or it might be that the standard setting process is still undergoing. Codex MRLs 
are established through a multi-year process by the Codex Commission on Pesticide Residue 
(CCPR). Member countries nominate MRLs they wish to establish. It takes an average of two 
to four years for Codex to complete a standard (Roberts and Josling (2010)). However, 
Codex maintains a rather extensive list of chemical MRLs, and more than half of the 
countries in our dataset completely or partially defer to Codex standards.  
Therefore, to avoid ambiguity in our investigation, we focus on the subset of products 
and chemicals for which Codex MRLs are established. For countries that have non-
established standards for certain chemicals, we substitute their default values based on that 
individual country’s default MRLs (see Table 3 and Table 4). In addition, since the GCC 
standards are not available in the database, we remove the 5 GCC countries from our sample.  
The final combined MRL dataset for calculation in this paper consists of 273 products, 
77 countries, and includes 411,304 records. Note that the chemicals applied to each product 
may differ, and the set (product x chemicals) associated with different countries may vary 
due to the unbalanced veterinary drug data we mentioned above. In addition, we added EU-
27 as a group, in addition to the individual EU countries. So, in total we have 77 countries 
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(83 countries (all countries in the original MRL database), minus 5 excluded GCC countries, 
minus 2 data unavailable countries (Switzerland and Norway), plus one aggregate EU-27 as a 
group). 
Results  
 
We calculated 21,021 country-by-product level protectionism scores10 with non-
established MRLs substituted with default levels (method 1) and 18,758 country-by-product 
level protectionism scores with non-established MRLs deleted (method 2). For each method, 
we then aggregated country-by-product scores to country level and product level with trade 
weights, and then equal weights. We have 50 trade-weighted country level indices and 77 
equally-weighted country level indices (Appendix B). Note that the difference in number of 
countries is due to the availability of COMTRADE trade data of year 2009 (in 2011). In 
addition, EU countries have the same EU standards and similar trade structures, so, instead of 
individual EU countries, we report for the aggregate EU-27. Mexico complies with U.S. 
standard, yet it has a slightly different protectionism score, which is caused by its own import 
structure leading to different weights in the indices’ aggregation.  
Table 5 presents the protectionism scores by country. The first two columns are un-
weighted scores with method 1 and method 2 respectively, the next two columns are the 
trade-weighted protectionism scores, and third set of two columns shows the normalized 
trade-weighted scores, which are the trade-weighted scores normalized by the openness. For 
simplicity of discussion, we refer the (un)weighted protectionism scores calculated with 
method 1 and method 2 as (un)weighted score 1 and (un)weighted score 2.  The last column 
is the sum of non-established MRLs count by country.  12 countries have non-zero count of 
                                                 
10Detailed results are available upon request. 
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non-established MRLs. The number of non-established MRLs range from 4883 (China) to 
856 (EU).  
The openness is measured by the ratio of total agricultural imports over GDP of the 
country. The normalized score is intended to correct the potential upward biasness in scores 
for countries with stricter MRL standards and large imports. The latter does not have an 
upper bound. Caution should be used in interpreting the normalized protectionism indices. 
Adjusting for openness reduces the influence of trade-weights used in aggregating over 
products. The indices, by design, put heavier weights on the products with higher imports, 
which indicate the importance of the related products. Whether protectionism scores for large 
importers should be adjusted downwards is an open question. The MRLs could also be 
endogenous and may have appeared after an import surge (Trefler (1993)). We believe that 
different measures presented in table 5 offer complementary insights into the protectionist 
question. On the one hand, one could argue these large importers are not protecting their 
domestic industries –trade is sizeable-- even though their standards exceed international 
norms. Instead, the stringency could be intended to protect their consumers with higher 
health standards. The political analysis of Kono (2006) states that politician in more 
democratic societies tend to be more sensitive to public safety, health and environment. 
Producers and consumers may demand higher standards.  
On the other hand, higher imports may indicate higher demand, but strict MRLs pose 
a hurdle for other countries with laxer MRL standards. Therefore, their imports come from 
both countries with equal or stricter MRLs or other non-protectionist countries that incurred 
extra cost to meet stricter standards. For those lower-standard countries, where MRLs are 
based on internationally accepted standards or even lower, the strict MRLs of large importers 
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could represent protectionism. 
Table 5: Country-level Protectionism Scores11 
country 
Equally-weighted 
Protectionism 
Score 
Trade-Weighted 
Protectionism Score 
Normalized 
Weighted 
Protectionism 
Score* 
Count 
non-
establishe
d MRLs 
Method 1 
Method 
2 Method 1 Method 2 Method 1 Method 2 
Australia 
1.95 
(0.58) 
1.19 
(0.43) 
1.66 
(0.55) 
1.20 
(0.39) 572.81 414.53 
 
2219 
Japan 
1.71 
(0.76) 
0.93 
(0.26) 
1.57 
(0.71) 
1.11 
(0.29) 291.92 206.52 
 
1580 
Jamaica 
1.51 
(0.58) 
1.27 
(0.39) 
1.22 
(0.41) 
1.12 
(0.27) 41.31 37.94 
 
856 
European 
Union 
1.51 
(0.57) 
1.27 
(0.38) 
1.23 
(0.59) 
1.09 
(0.41) 337.20 298.63 
 
856 
Turkey 
1.50 
(0.58) 
1.30 
(0.57) 
1.26 
(0.47) 
1.75 
(0.70) 187.36 259.25 
 
4499 
Canada 
1.46 
(0.50) 
1.20 
(0.43) 
1.29 
(0.44) 
1.09 
(0.36) 157.72 132.52 
 
2751 
Israel 
1.06 
(0.20) 
1.06 
(0.20) 
1.06 
(0.08) 
1.06 
(0.08) 118.07 118.07 
 
0 
Brazil 
1.04 
(0.11) 
1.29 
(0.48) 
1.10 
(0.12) 
1.25 
(0.22) 470.54 534.87 
 
4342 
Chile 
1.03 
(0.15) 
1.01 
(0.32) 
1.04 
(0.10) 
1.05 
(0.14) 101.77 103.37 
 
2684 
Argentina 
1.03 
(0.09) 
1.03 
(0.09) 
1.04 
(0.07) 
1.04 
(0.07) 374.36 374.36 
 
0 
Russian 
Federation 
1.03 
(0.10) 
1.55 
(0.75) 
1.07 
(0.14) 
1.83 
(0.79) 76.90 130.97 
 
4744 
Rep. of Korea 
1.01 
(0.16) 
0.98 
(0.46) 
1.00 
(0.11) 
0.99 
(0.21) 99.93 98.82 
 
3867 
 
   
                                                 
11Countries not listed have protectionism scores equal to one. All figures are rounded to the second digit after 
the decimal point. 
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Table 5: Country-level Protectionism Scores12 continued 
country 
Equally-weighted 
Protectionism 
Score 
Trade-Weighted 
Protectionism Score 
Normalized 
Weighted 
Protectionism 
Score* 
Count 
non-
establishe
d MRLs 
Method 1 
Method 
2 Method 1 Method 2 Method 1 Method 2 
China 
1.01 
(0.05) 
1.04 
(0.40) 
1.03 
(0.10) 
1.17 
(0.37) 145.56 165.04 
 
4883 
Malaysia 
0.99 
(0.04) 
0.99 
(0.04) 
0.99 
(0.04) 
0.99 
(0.04) 37.25 37.25 
 
0 
United Arab 
Emirates 
0.99 
(0.03) 
0.99 
(0.03) 
0.99 
(0.03) 
0.99 
(0.03) 31.25 31.25 
 
0 
United States 
0.98 
(0.36) 
0.98 
(0.36) 
0.89 
(0.35) 
0.89 
(0.35) 356.85 356.85 
 
0 
Mexico 
0.98 
(0.35) 
0.98 
(0.35) 
0.97 
(0.26) 
0.97 
(0.26) 72.93 72.93 
 
0 
India 
0.97 
(0.14) 
0.96 
(0.18) 
1.03 
(0.09) 
1.05 
(0.13) 163.84 166.77 
 
1859 
New Zealand 
0.97 
(0.07) 
0.97 
(0.07) 
0.97 
(0.04) 
0.97 
(0.04) 137.79 137.79 
 
0 
Singapore 
0.96 
(0.13) 
0.96 
(0.13) 
0.98 
(0.11) 
0.98 
(0.11) 55.15 55.15 
 
0 
South Africa 
0.87 
(0.15) 
0.87 
(0.15) 
0.82 
(0.11) 
0.82 
(0.11) 113.40 113.40 
 
0 
Sri Lanka 
0.53 
(0.20) 
0.55 
(0.20) 
0.43 
(0.15) 
0.47 
(0.16) 19.92 22.02 
 
013 
*Note: Normalized Weighted Protectionism Score=Weighted Protectionism Score / (Ag Import/GDP), where 
Ag Import is the import value of agricultural sectors HS02, HS04, HS06, HS07, HS08, HS09, HS10, HS12, and 
HS15 that we covered in this paper (see table 6 below for sector descriptions). Trade data come from 
COMTRADE, GDP data come from World Bank, and these data are of the year 2009.  
**Note: Numbers within parentheses are standard deviations of the (country×product) level protectionism 
scores. 
 
                                                 
12Countries not listed have protectionism scores equal to one. All figures are rounded to the second digit after 
the decimal point. 
13  Sri Lanka complies with exporter’s MRLs. We substitute the maximum MRLs of matching 
country×product×substance as Sri Lanka MRLs. The maximum could change as the datasets of method 1 and 
method 2 differ, so we observe slight difference between score1 and score2 given Sri Lanka has no non-
established MRLs. 
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 The variation of scores for a given country comes from two sources: the difference 
between method 1 and method 2; and the weights and normalization method. The difference 
between scores 1 and 2 (under similar weights) depends on the number of non-established 
MRLs and differences between the default MRL level and the other established MRLs for 
that country. A much larger score 1 than score 2 indicates a default MRL being relatively 
stricter than established MRLs and indicates that protectionism in that country is caused by a 
protectionist default rather than by a concerted effort to be stringent on a particular MRL. 
The data could also have some missing MRLs, which are confounded with non-established 
MRLs. We keep this caveat in mind when drawing implications about discrepancies between 
scores 1 and 2. 
We also note some differences between trade-weighted and equally-weighted scores 
for a given country; the trade-weighted score could be higher or lower than or close to the 
equally-weighted score. Self-evidently, if a country has higher trade-weighted scores relative 
to equally-weighted scores, products with strict MRLs are heavily imported. Conversely, if a 
country has lower trade-weighted scores than equally-weighted scores, products with less 
stringent MRLs are heavily imported. 
Australia, Japan, the EU, Jamaica, Turkey, and Canada rank among protectionist 
MRL regimes based on score1 both weighted and unweighted. Australia and Japan have 
substantial difference between score 1 and score 2, because of their large number of non-
established MRLs and their tight default levels (0 ppm for Australia, and 0.01 ppm for Japan) 
leading to their score 1 being larger than their score 2.  Much of the protectionism in MRLs 
in these two countries arises from the tight default. Australia also exhibits some protection in 
established MRLs. Again here the caveat applies on potentially missing data and the implied 
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upward bias in score 1. The EU, Canada, and Jamaica have similar but more moderate 
patterns given their tight default (0.01 ppm) but smaller number of non-established MRLs. 
Chile, Korea, and India, despite their large number of non-established MRLs, have 
close score 1 and score 2. The default MRL level of these countries (Codex) is similar to 
their established MRLs.  Since score 1 and score 2 are close, we feel confident to conclude 
that these countries do not exhibit MRL protectionism. The United States is not protectionist 
based on any of the unweighted/weighted scores 1 and scores 2, and even shows evidence of 
slight “anti-protectionism” (below Codex) based on trade-weighted scores. South Africa and 
Sri Lanka have score 1 and score 2 well below one, indicating they might be under protecting 
their consumers. Singapore and New Zealand show scores very close to but slightly under 1. 
Also notable, the Russian Federation and Brazil have higher protectionist scores 2 
than scores 1, suggesting that their established MRLs is chiefly responsible for their MRL 
protectionism.  Their low default and large number of non-established MRLs make them 
appear moderately protectionist and mitigates the protectionism of establish MRLs. Turkey 
illustrates the importance of weights. With trade weights, it appears that protectionism arises 
more from established MRLs, whereas with unweighted scores, Turkey’s protectionism 
seems to come from both established and default MRLs. For the EU and the US, trade-
weighted scores are lower than equally-weighted scores, indicating that some heavily 
imported products face less stringent standards. For some other countries, we observe trade-
weighted scores higher than unweighted scores for one of or both score 1 and score 2. 
Stringent MRLs exceeding international norms affect heavily traded products, possibly as a 
reaction to import surges. 
          If we normalize the protectionism score by openness, Brazil, Argentina, Australia, the 
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EU and the US come to the top.  For Australia and the EU, this normalization does not alter 
the notion that they exhibit MRL protectionism, but for Jamaica, the normalized scores are 
very low and mitigating the conclusion that this country shows some MRL protectionism. 
Finally, NAFTA integration on residue standards has been much deeper between Mexico and 
the United States, relative to what Canada has done with its own standards, a surprising 
finding. Unlike for tariffs, MRL regulations have not been harmonized across the three 
NAFTA members. 
Each score comes with an estimated standard deviation, reflecting the variation of 
product scores for each country. For trade-weighted scores’ standard deviations, products 
with smaller import shares count for less and vise-versa. Generally, notable differences 
between scores 1 and 2 for any country, extend to their standard deviations. A significantly 
higher score (either 1 or 2) for a country tends to show higher standard deviation for the 
corresponding score. Hence, we do not see evidence of countries being non-protectionist “on 
average” by offsetting protectionist MRLs with anti-protectionist ones. In most cases, 
standard deviations are small relative to scores suggesting the scores and indices are 
informative. We turn to product scores next. We average them over all countries and 
regulated substances by product (detailed scores presented in Appendix A). 
The averaging over all countries leads to smaller variations. The maximum of 
equally-weighted scores 1 is 1.28 (Green onion) and minimum is 0.75 (Guava). The 
maximum of equally-weighted score 2 is 1.21 (Belgian endive) and minimum is 0.74 
(Guava).  Adding trade weights expands the variation of the scores.  The maximum of trade-
weighted score 1 is 2.47 (Belgian endive) and minimum is 0.42 (Guava); the maximum of 
trade-weighted scores 2 is 2.10 (Belgian endive) and minimum is 0.19 (Plantain).  
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Figure1: Boxplot of Weighted Protectionsim Scores by HS 2-digit Sectors  
 
 
Figure2: Boxplot of Unweighted Protectionsim Scores by HS 2-digit Sectors 
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To better elucidate the product-level protectionism, we look at score distribution plots 
by grouping products by HS2 digit sectors, and then select a few commonly-discussed 
products to investigate their MRL protectionism. Table 6 shows HS2 digit sectors, associated 
products that fall into each sector, the number of products in each sector, and the number of 
non-established MRLs for the product. The boxplots of weighted protectionism scores and 
unweighted scores for each sector are presented in figures 1 and 2. Score 1 shows a wider 
dispersion and higher mean than score 2 for fruit and vegetables. This observation shows that 
substituting non-established MRLs with default levels risks inflating these products’ 
protectionism scores. Animal products (HS02 and HS15) seem have little discrepancy 
between score 1 and score 2. Meat, diary, and egg products have the lowest average, and 
mostly span in the lower protectionism region.  
Disdier and van Tongeren (2010) clustered products based on three criteria: the 
number of notified NTMs, the number of SPS trade concerns officially communicated to the 
WTO, and the share of imports affected by notified NTMs. They show that meat products 
and many dairy products fall in the clusters with high NTM trade coverage, high number of 
notifications, and high/very high number of concerns. However, they did not explicitly 
measure the strictness of individual policies. Their stylized facts together with our results on 
product-level protectionism suggest that meat and dairy products are subjected to a high 
number of NTM notifications but which are relatively less stringent.  
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Table 6: Products categorized in HS 2-digit sectors 
HS 2-digit sector descriptions Number 
of 
products  
Count of 
non-
established 
MRLs 
Details of products  
02: MEAT & EDIBLE MEAT 
OFFAL 
18 11,505 cattle by-products, cattle 
meat, cattle liver, etc. 
04: DAIRY, EGGS, HONEY, & 
ED. PRODUCTS 
3 1,879 egg, milk, milk fat 
06: LIVE TREES  
& OTHER PLANTS 
4 355 chicory roots, chufa, 
dasheen corm, canna 
edible 
07: EDIBLE VEGETABLES 131 20,229 bean, cabbage, pea, 
spinach, turnip, tomato, 
etc. 
08: ED. FRUITS & NUTS, PEEL 
OF CITRUS/MELONS 
73 17,899 apple, almond, banana, 
cherry, lemon, strawberry, 
etc 
09: COFFEE, TEA, MATE  
& SPICES 
3 290 ginger, pepper, savory 
summer 
10: CEREALS 10 1,450 barley grain, corn grain, 
rice grain, etc. 
12: OIL SEEDS/MISC. 
GRAINS/MED.PLANTS/STRAW 
6 1,575 cotton seed, hop dried 
cones, mustard seed, 
peanut, sesame seed, sugar 
beet  
15: ANIMAL OR VEGET. FATS, 
OILS & WAXES 
414 192 cattle fat, hog fat, poultry 
fat, sheep fat 
 
These heavily regulated sectors may not be heavily protected, but rather may involve 
more health and food safety concerns. Disdier and van Tongeren (2010) also found that 
vegetable products are spread over several clusters with high or low number of notifications. 
We observe a similar variation in protectionism scores for vegetable products; their 
protectionism scores have the widest span. The protectionism span is related to the large 
number of the products in this sector. Fruit product protectionism scores are also found to 
exhibit large variations. Disdier and van Tongeren (2010) suggest fruit products overall have 
                                                 
14 Cattle fat and hog fat fall into both HS15 and HS02. 
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a high number of notifications and high number of concerns. This again indicates the 
complexity of gauging protectionism. Frequency of notifications and concerns are not 
sufficient to establish protectionism; the actual stringency of the standards should also be 
taken into consideration. 
Table 7: Top Contributors of Protectionism Scores for Selected Products 
product Score type and level top  5 contributing countries 
total 
contribu
tion 
Subs. 
Count 
non-
establish
ed 
MRLs 
count 
Apple 
weighted 
score 1 1.11 
EU (32%), Russia (20%), Canada 
(5%), Mexico (5%), US (5%) 
67% 
64 580 
weighted 
score 2 1.17 
EU (30%), Russia (26%), Mexico 
(5%), US (5%), Canada (4%) 70% 
unweighted 
score 1 1.02 
Australia (3%), Turkey (3%), 
Argentina (3%), Brazil (3%), Israel 
(3%)  
15% 
unweighted 
score 2 1.03 
Turkey (4%), Russia (3%), Brazil 
(3%), Argentina (3%), Israel (3%) 
16% 
Banana 
weighted 
score 1 0.88 
EU (46%), US (19%), Japan 
(10%), Russia (8%), Canada (6%) 
89% 
21 121 
weighted 
score 2 0.85 
EU (48%), US (20%), Japan 
(11%), Canada (6%), Russia (4%) 
89% 
unweighted 
score 1 0.96 
Canada (3%), Israel (3%), Brazil 
(3%), Singapore (2%), Argentina 
(2%) 
13% 
Unweighte
d score 2 0.95 
Canada (3%), Brazil (3%), Israel 
(3%), Singapore (3%), Argentina 
(3%) 
15% 
Cattle, 
meat 
weighted 
score 1 1.17 
US (17%), Japan (15%), Russia 
(14%), EU (14%), Mexico (7%) 
67% 
90 1152 
weighted 
score 2 1.38 
Russia (27%), US (14%), Japan 
(13%), EU (11%), Mexico (6%) 
71% 
unweighted 
score 1 1.05 
Australia (3%), Jamaica (3%), EU 
(3%), Mexico (3%), Japan (3%) 
15% 
Unweighte
d score 2 1.08 
Russia (5%), Jamaica (3%), EU 
(3%), Mexico (3%), Australia (3%) 
17% 
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Table 7: Top Contributors of Protectionism Scores for Selected Products Continued 
product Score type and level top  5 contributing countries 
total 
contribu
tion 
Subs. 
Count 
non-
establish
ed 
MRLs 
count 
Corn, 
grain 
weighted 
score 1 0.98 
EU (21%), Malaysia (19%), US 
(18%), Canada (7%), Russia (5%) 
70% 
42 243 
weighted 
score 2 0.97 
Malaysia (20%), EU (20%), US 
(18%), Canada (7%), Russia (5%)  
70% 
unweighted 
score 1 1 
Australia (3%), Israel (2%), China 
(2%), India (2%), Turkey (2%) 
11% 
Unweighte
d score 2 1 
China (3%), Turkey (3%), 
Indonesia (2%), Israel (2%), India 
(2%) 
12% 
Hog, 
meat 
weighted 
score 1 1.24 
Japan (43%), Russia (16%), 
Mexico (8%),  US (8%),  Korea 
(5%) 
80% 
62 403 
weighted 
score 2 1.47 
Japan (35%), Russia (30%), 
Mexico (7%), US (6%), Korea 
(4%) 
82% 
unweighted 
score1 1.07 
Jamaica (3%), EU (3%), Mexico 
(3%), Australia (3%), Japan (3%)  15% 
Unweighte
d score 2 1.09 
Russia (6%), Jamaica (4%), 
Mexico (4%), EU (4%), Canada 
(3%) 
21% 
Grapefru
it 
weighted 
score 1 1.27 
EU (63%), Japan (19%), Russia 
(9%), Canada (6%), Hong Kong 
(1%) 
98% 
43 241 
weighted 
score 2 1.32 
EU (60%), Japan (16%), Russia 
(16%), Canada (4%), Hong Kong 
(1%) 
97% 
unweighted 
score 1 1.06 
Australia (4%), Turkey (4%), EU 
(4%), Canada (4%), Argentina 
(3%) 
19% 
Unweighte
d score 2 1.08 
Russia (6%), Turkey (5%), EU 
(4%), Brazil (3%), Argentina (3%) 
21% 
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Table 7: Top Contributors of Protectionism Scores for Selected Products Continued 
product Score type and level top  5 contributing countries 
total 
contribu
tion 
Subs. 
Count 
non-
establish
ed 
MRLs 
count 
Poultry, 
meat 
weighted 
score 1 0.98 
Hong Kong (17%), Russia (16%), 
China (13%), Japan (13%), Mexico 
(9%) 
68% 
45 281 
weighted 
score 2 1.04 
Russia (21%), Hong Kong (16%), 
China (12%), Japan (12%), Mexico 
(8%) 
69% 
unweighted 
score 1 0.97 
Russia (2%), Japan (2%), EU 
(2%), Chile (2%), Singapore (2%) 
10% 
Unweighte
d score 2 0.98 
Russia (3%), Japan (2%), Chile 
(2%), Singapore (2%), Thailand 
(2%) 
11% 
Sheep, 
meat 
weighted 
score 1 1.33 
EU (53%), US (17%), United Arab 
Emirates (6%), Japan (4%), 
Canada (4%) 
84% 
66 487 
weighted 
score 2 1.34 
EU (50%), US (17%), United Arab 
Emirates (6%), Canada (5%), 
China (5%)  
83% 
unweighted 
score 1 1.06 
Jamaica (3%), Australia (3%), EU 
(3%), Japan (3%), Mexico (3%) 
15% 
Unweighte
d score 2 1.1 
Russia (6%), Canada (4%), 
Jamaica (3%), Australia (3%), EU 
(3%) 
19% 
Wheat, 
grain 
weighted 
score 1 1.05 
EU (10%), Algeria (9%), Egypt 
(8%), Japan (7%), Indonesia (7%) 
41% 
38 200 
weighted 
score 2 1.1 
Turkey (9%), EU (9%), Algeria 
(9%), Egypt (7%), Indonesia (7%) 41% 
unweighted 
score1 1.05 
Australia (3%), Canada (3%), 
Turkey (3%), India (3%), China 
(3%)  
15% 
Unweighte
d score2 1.07 
Turkey (5%), China (3%), 
Australia (3%), India (3%), Russia 
(3%) 
17% 
 
The differences between trade-weighted and equally-weighted scores are quite 
obvious for product-level scores. Most of the large trade-weighted scores are higher than 
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their equally-weighted scores counterparts, and conversely for low-level scores. A trade-
weighted score being higher than its unweighted counterpart means that larger importers tend 
to have stricter MRLs for that product; and vise versa. To see this clearly, we list the top 
country contributors to the scores of selected products in table 7. 
The top contributors to unweighted scores are countries that have the tightest MRLs 
for the corresponding product.  Trade weights temper or exacerbate these with import shares. 
Countries, that contribute large percentage to weighted scores, have large import share and/or 
large unweighted scores contribution.  Top contributors to weighted scores are generally 
consistent from score 1 to score 2. In contrast, Australia and Japan, probably due to their 
tight default values and the discrepancy between default with the rest of their MRLs, 
sometimes appear to be the top contributors of unweighted score 1 but not for unweighted 
score 2 (i.e., apple, corn grain, grapefruit). On the other hand, The Russian Federation, 
sometimes is the top contributor for unweighted score 2, but not for unweighted score1 (i.e., 
cattle meat, hog meat, grapefruit). This is probably due the discrepancy between its relatively 
“low” default value (Codex) and its tight established MRLs.    
A weighted score is larger than its unweighted counterpart when countries with 
stricter MRLs are large or dominant importers (i.e., sheep meat, hog meat, grapefruit, etc.). A 
weighted score is close to or smaller than its unweighted counterpart, when there are no 
dominant importers or when countries with less stringent MRLs are large importers (i.e., 
banana, poultry meat, wheat, etc.).  
Further, for selected meat products (cattle, hog, sheep, and poultry meat), score 2 is 
always higher than score 1. Unweighted score1 and score 2 are similar and close to one 
(slightly above or below 1). Accounting for the trade weights, we observe some obvious 
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increase from score 1 to score 2 in weighted scores. Cattle, hog, and sheep meat have larger 
weighted score well above 1 (1.17, 1.24, 1.33 for score 1, and 1.38, 1.47, 1.34 for score 2), 
and poultry meat has trade-weighted score close to 1 (0. 98 for score 1 and 1.04 for score 2). 
It shows that cattle, hog, sheep meat are more protected than poultry meat product overall. In 
addition, we observe relatively large increase from weighted score 1 to weighted score 2 for 
cattle meat and hog meat. Russia is playing an important role in driving this discrepancy for 
cattle and hog with its high established MRLs for cattle and pork products which are much 
tighter  than its default. Russia is also a large importer of cattle and hog products, which 
induces large differences for trade-weighted scores. 
 A look at the top contributors in scores is interesting. For example, the dominant top 
contributor to weighted score 1 for sheep meat is the EU (43%), and the EU sheep meat 
MRLs are among the tightest (one of the top contributors to unweighted scores). Therefore, 
we see a big increase form unweighted scores to weighted scores. Australia, on the other 
hand, does not import much sheep meat while keeping tight MRLs. Australia is a large 
exporter, so it set its MRLs to meet high EU standards. The economic and rent-seeking 
determinants of protectionism scores will be investigated in a subsequent investigation.   
Looking at selected fruit products, the weighted scores for apple are 1.11 and 1.17 for 
score 1 and score 2 respectively, larger than that of unweighted scores. Banana has weighted 
scores smaller than unweighted scores, and weighted scores are well below 1 (0.88 and 0.85 
for score 1 and score 2 respectively). The dominant contributor, the EU (46%), has lax MRLs 
and a score of 0.9 for banana.15 The EU imports a lot of banana, and clearly exhibits MRL 
anti-protectionism for banana. This explains why we observe the weighted scores of banana 
                                                 
15 Countries by product protectionism score results are available upon request. 
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being even smaller than the unweighted scores. Grapefruit weighted scores are 1.27 and 1.32 
for score 1 and score 2. The EU is the dominant importer and has tight grapefruit MRLs, 
hence the EU is the top contributor to weighted scores (63%). Among these three fruit 
products, grapefruit is more protected than apple, and banana is “under” protected.  
Regarding grains, corn scores are around 1. The top contributors EU (21%), Malaysia 
(19%), and US (18%) have lax MRLs, and hence corn is a non-protected product overall. 
Weighted scores for oats are also around 1. The dominant contributor to weighted score, the 
US (72%),  has lax oat grain MRLs (0.94 and 0.88 for score 1 and score 2), which drives the 
overall weighted scores below 1. Weighted and unweighted scores for wheat are slightly 
above 1. This is because there are no dominant importers of wheat and specific influences are 
diffused.  
Robustness check 
 
We evaluate the robustness of our scores with a focus on the weights used in the 
scores (between trade weighted scores and unweighted scores), and also on data limitations 
and their potential impact on the stability of the protectionism scores. Since we have several 
products with small substance counts, we find it imperative to check the robustness of the 
product-level protectionism scores as well as country-level protectionism scores relative to 
the variation in substance count per product score.  
In the dataset, the number of substances for each product ranges from 1 to 98, and we 
conjecture that this number is likely to be positively related with the “true” number of 
substances regulated for this product. One of the possible explanations for the variations 
could be that some products may raise more health concerns than others. The other potential 
reason, mentioned before, is that the list is determined by the U.S. list of substances. We 
79 
 
 
have 13% of the products (34 out of 252) with less or equal to 5 substances (Appendix C). 
The protectionism scores for products with fewer substances may still be valid, but we 
certainly have more confidence in the scores calculated with more substances. In order to 
systematically check the robustness, bias, variance as well as identify outliers in the product 
protectionism scores, we look at box plots of scores grouped by substance count, Quantile-
Quantile plots (QQ-plots) with small counts against the rest, and compute some statistical 
tests, when applicable. 
Figure 3 shows the histograms of combinations of weighted and unweighted score 1 
and score 2. The variation shows the patterns for weighted-unweighted, and score 1- score 2. 
Trade weight creates more dispersion and higher scores. Figures 4 and 5 show the boxplots 
of weighted and unweighted protectionism scores grouped by the number of substances. For 
both weighted and unweighted, products with fewer substances (say substance count <20) 
tend to have higher score 1 and a wider dispersion than products with more substances (say 
substance count >20). But no obvious difference is found for products with different 
substance counts for scores 2, both weighted and unweighted.  
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Figure 3: Histograms of Protectionism Scores 
 
Figure 4: Boxplots of Weighted Scores by Groups of Substance Count 
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Figure 5: Boxplots of Unweighted Scores by Groups of Substance Count 
 
QQ plots of product scores (available upon request) are sorted out using cut off 
numbers of substances. The difference between weighted and unweighted scores is not 
obvious, but we observe systematic difference between score 1 and score 2. Score 1 of 
products with smaller substance count show more variation (fatter left tail) in the lower side 
and similar variation but higher scores on the upper side, comparing to the same score 1 of 
products with larger substance count. Scores 2 for products with smaller substance count 
show more variation (fatter tails) in both lower and upper tails than products with larger 
substance count.  This is consistent with the box plots. Scores with substance count of less or 
equal to 4 do not line up close to the 45-degree line but show a much steeper pattern.  
In addition to the plots, we conduct non-parametric Cochran tests for the variability 
and differences among product scores groups. We group products by substance count, i.e., 
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substance count equals 1-4, 5-9, 9-10, etc., and try to make each group of similar size of 
about 30 products. The test suggests that the product group with less or equal to 4 substances 
have “outlying variance” for all combinations of weighted/unweighted/score1/score 2, which 
means that the scores of products with no more than 4 substances exhibit more variability 
than the rest. However, there is a caveat to the test, which is that it maintains normality, 
which is rejected for unweighted scores and for some groups of weighted scores. 
We also check the robustness of country-level scores. We compare the country 
protectionism scores by gradually deleting products with up to 5 substances, and recalculate 
them. We see only negligible variations in the scores and country ranking, which strongly 
suggests that country level scores are robust to the presence of products scores established 
based on fewer substances (results are available upon request). 
 
Conclusions 
 
We proposed aggregation indices of NTMs to quantify the protectionism of 
Maximum Residue Limit (MRL) regulations at various level using a science-based criteria 
embodied in international standards such as Codex Alimentarius. We applied the aggregators 
to a large international dataset on pesticide and veterinary drug MRLs and associated 
CODEX MRL standards. We calculated both trade-weighted and equally-weighted scores, 
since they offer complementary information. Looking at country scores, trade weights do not 
appear to be pivotal. However, we found trade weights induce more dispersion of product 
scores. Considering or not non-established MRLs is quite important in establishing a 
country’s MRL protectionism. The latter can arise from strict established MRLs or from 
strict default MRLs, or both. 
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Country-level results show that Australia ranks the most protectionist from all three 
indices: weighted, normalized weighted and equally weighted, using score 1 because of its 
tight default value. The Russian Federation ranks the most protectionist from scores based on 
established MRLs (no default). Other countries ranked differently to various extents based on 
the different weights used. However, the set of most protectionist countries is remarkably 
stable over the change of weights in indices. We also found that NAFTA integration on 
residue standards has been much deeper between Mexico and the United States, than with 
Canada. 
Product level protectionism scores are shown by sector-wise distribution first. Meat 
and dairy products (HS02, HS04, HS15) have lower protectionism scores in general than 
other goods. Fruit and vegetable products (HS07, HS08) exhibit the most within-sector 
variation in protectionism. Breaking down scores by top contributors, we found that products 
like beans, apple, cattle meat, etc. are controlled by a few dominant importers who set stricter 
MRLs than other small importers. We checked the robustness of scores to address concerns 
for products with fewer substances used in their scores. Products with fewer substances 
seemed consistently biased upward (higher protectionism scores). Some evidence suggest 
that products scores based on no more than 3 substances have higher variance or noise. As a 
positive note, country level scores are robust to the deletion of products with fewer 
substances and provide solid policy implications. 
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Appendix A: Product level weighted and unweighted protectionism scores and standard 
deviations 
product Unwtd. 
score1 
Unwtd
.  std1 
Unwtd
.   
score2 
Unwd
.   
std2 
Wtd. 
score
1 
Wtd
. 
std1 
Wtd. 
score
2 
Wtd. 
std2 
Subs
. 
Cnt. 
HS
2 
HS6 
Almond 0.96 0.18 0.94 0.14 0.93 0.09 0.93 0.12 48 8 080211, 
080212 
Amaranth, 
Leafy 
1.09 0.32 1.02 0.15 1.36 0.62 1.16 0.33 10 7 070990 
Apple 1.02 0.17 1.03 0.23 1.11 0.19 1.17 0.33 64 8 080810,    
081330 
Apricot 1.04 0.18 1.05 0.24 1.23 0.33 1.55 0.71 33 8 080910, 
081310 
Arracacha 1.12 0.39 1.02 0.19 1.54 0.60 1.28 0.35 8 7 071490 
Arrowroot 1.06 0.28 1.03 0.21 1.38 0.52 1.23 0.32 8 7 071490 
Artichoke 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 3 7 070910 
Artichoke, 
Chinese 
1.12 0.39 1.02 0.19 1.54 0.60 1.28 0.35 8 7 071490 
Artichoke, 
Jerusalem 
1.06 0.28 1.03 0.21 1.38 0.52 1.23 0.32 8 7 071490 
Arugula 1.07 0.31 1.01 0.11 1.27 0.58 1.07 0.20 10 7 070990 
Asparagus 1.00 0.27 0.98 0.36 0.85 0.52 0.78 0.55 10 7 070920 
Avocado 1.00 0.18 0.96 0.26 0.83 0.37 0.74 0.41 4 8 080440 
Balsam 
Apple 
1.14 0.43 0.98 0.08 1.27 0.59 0.99 0.07 19 8 081090 
Balsam 
Pear 
1.13 0.43 0.98 0.09 1.57 0.85 0.97 0.09 19 7 070990 
Banana 0.96 0.14 0.95 0.16 0.88 0.15 0.85 0.19 21 8 080300 
Barley, 
grain 
1.08 0.20 1.13 0.32 1.15 0.18 1.40 0.58 25 10 1003 
Bean 1.16 0.40 1.10 0.32 1.67 0.64 1.48 0.54 9 7 070820, 
071022 
Bean, 
Adzuki 
1.17 0.44 1.05 0.25 1.60 0.83 1.03 0.07 12 7 071332 
Bean, Broad 1.20 0.43 1.18 0.36 1.80 0.64 1.62 0.49 10 7 071029 
Bean, Broad 
Dry 
1.11 0.30 1.07 0.25 1.10 0.29 1.05 0.15 11 7 071350 
Bean, Broad 
Succulent 
1.16 0.43 1.09 0.29 1.60 0.68 1.48 0.62 11 7 070890 
Bean, Dry 1.05 0.22 1.03 0.27 1.11 0.27 1.08 0.29 26 7 071331, 
071332, 
071339 
071333 
Bean, 
Edible 
Podded 
1.09 0.34 1.03 0.18 1.31 0.46 1.11 0.17 12 7 070820, 
071022 
Bean, 
Kidney 
1.09 0.37 0.96 0.29 1.54 0.85 0.96 0.24 26 7 071333 
Bean, 
Lablab 
1.15 0.39 1.01 0.25 1.61 0.77 1.19 0.30 8 7 070890 
Bean, Lima 1.14 0.40 1.07 0.22 1.33 0.49 1.24 0.36 15 7 071339 
Bean, Moth 1.21 0.50 1.04 0.17 1.38 0.56 1.17 0.29 12 7 071339 
Bean, Mung 1.13 0.43 0.96 0.30 1.17 0.50 0.98 0.10 26 7 071331 
Bean, Navy 1.07 0.30 1.00 0.31 1.23 0.38 1.19 0.40 26 7 071333 
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Bean, Rice 1.18 0.48 1.00 0.31 1.29 0.51 1.09 0.19 12 7 071339 
Bean, 
Runner 
1.07 0.30 1.01 0.16 2.09 1.18 1.03 0.08 14 7 070890, 
071029 
Bean, Snap 1.09 0.31 1.04 0.24 2.18 1.24 1.17 0.28 23 7 070890, 
071029 
Bean, 
Tepary 
1.18 0.48 1.04 0.24 1.29 0.51 1.10 0.14 12 7 071339 
Bean, Urd 1.18 0.48 1.01 0.30 1.29 0.51 1.10 0.17 12 7 071339 
Bean, 
Yardlong 
1.08 0.37 0.98 0.10 1.21 0.36 1.05 0.09 13 7 070890 
Beechnut 1.05 0.31 0.97 0.16 1.15 0.51 0.85 0.19 24 8 080290 
Beet, 
Garden, 
Roots 
1.01 0.27 0.96 0.14 1.12 0.44 1.07 0.25 8 7 070690 
Beet, 
Garden, 
Tops 
1.14 0.43 1.02 0.13 1.51 0.75 1.22 0.34 3 7 070990 
Blackberry 1.04 0.21 1.00 0.14 1.21 0.34 1.14 0.30 12 8 081020, 
081120 
Blueberry 1.06 0.22 1.02 0.18 1.19 0.33 1.12 0.26 20 8 081040, 
081190 
Boysenberr
y 
1.08 0.32 1.00 0.17 1.40 0.61 1.17 0.41 11 8 081020, 
081190 
Broccoli 1.07 0.29 1.06 0.30 1.19 0.32 0.99 0.17 33 7 070410 
Broccoli, 
Chinese 
1.10 0.34 1.03 0.19 1.30 0.61 0.93 0.19 18 7 070490 
Broccoli, 
Raab 
1.16 0.46 1.07 0.29 1.40 0.62 1.12 0.25 12 7 070490 
Brussels 
Sprouts 
1.02 0.25 0.99 0.24 1.08 0.41 0.95 0.34 20 7 070420 
Butternut 1.09 0.38 0.99 0.16 1.26 0.60 0.78 0.25 24 7 070990 
Cabbage 1.08 0.24 1.11 0.30 1.13 0.28 1.09 0.40 33 7 070490 
Cabbage, 
Chinese, 
Bok Choy 
1.11 0.34 1.05 0.18 1.39 0.63 1.10 0.19 12 7 070490 
Cabbage, 
Chinese, 
Napa 
1.18 0.43 1.10 0.26 1.54 0.67 1.42 0.49 14 7 070490 
Calamondin 1.16 0.50 1.05 0.28 1.49 0.75 1.41 0.64 32 8 080520 
Canna, 
Edible 
1.10 0.32 1.01 0.24 1.76 0.78 1.37 0.46 8 6 060210 
Cantaloupe 1.00 0.14 1.00 0.20 1.03 0.22 1.05 0.29 42 8 080719 
Carrot 1.00 0.15 0.98 0.22 1.02 0.15 0.91 0.22 22 7 070610 
Cashew 0.97 0.20 0.94 0.23 0.93 0.24 0.88 0.15 25 8 080131, 
080132 
Cassava, 
Leaves 
1.21 0.57 0.99 0.03 1.83 1.06 1.00 0.01 3 7 070990 
Cassava, 
Roots 
1.09 0.28 1.06 0.20 1.02 0.12 1.14 0.19 9 7 071410 
Cattle, by 
products 
1.02 0.10 1.01 0.08 0.99 0.07 0.97 0.08 57 2 020629 
Cattle, fat 1.02 0.16 1.00 0.09 1.06 0.12 1.05 0.11 26 15 1502 
Cattle, 
kidney 
1.01 0.11 0.98 0.15 0.97 0.11 0.94 0.17 98 2 020629 
Cattle, liver 1.00 0.15 0.98 0.21 0.99 0.05 0.52 0.67 92 2 020622 
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Cattle, meat 1.05 0.15 1.08 0.24 1.17 0.21 1.38 0.56 90 2 0201, 
0202 
Cauliflower 1.06 0.26 1.05 0.26 1.11 0.23 0.94 0.18 28 7 070410 
Celeriac, 
root 
1.05 0.28 1.02 0.20 1.23 0.48 1.28 0.51 7 7 070690 
Celery 0.98 0.26 0.96 0.30 0.90 0.26 0.56 0.51 16 7 070940 
Celery, 
Chinese 
1.13 0.36 1.09 0.25 1.60 0.60 1.61 0.61 1 7 070940 
Chayote, 
fruit 
1.13 0.43 0.98 0.09 1.27 0.59 0.99 0.07 19 8 081090 
Cherry 1.03 0.19 1.03 0.24 1.24 0.37 1.34 0.58 48 8 080920, 
081190 
Chervil 1.11 0.35 1.04 0.19 1.42 0.66 1.24 0.44 10 7 070990 
Chervil, 
Turnip, 
Roots 
1.13 0.42 1.01 0.19 1.29 0.52 1.31 0.54 7 7 070690 
Chestnut 0.97 0.23 0.94 0.19 0.87 0.14 0.79 0.20 24 8 080240 
Chickpea 1.09 0.28 1.01 0.27 1.18 0.31 1.19 0.33 8 7 071320 
Chicory, 
Roots 
1.04 0.27 0.98 0.27 1.17 0.41 1.11 0.27 7 6 060120 
Chicory, 
Tops 
1.14 0.40 1.07 0.18 1.48 0.75 1.08 0.13 3 7 070521 
Chrysanthe
mum, 
Edible 
Leaved 
1.17 0.50 1.00 0.10 1.84 1.08 1.01 0.20 10 7 071290 
Chufa 1.05 0.33 0.99 0.23 1.32 0.51 1.23 0.41 8 6 060110 
Citron, 
Citrus 
1.05 0.21 1.06 0.28 1.25 0.29 1.35 0.51 37 8 080590 
Coconut 0.94 0.37 0.87 0.28 0.73 0.49 0.65 0.46 2 8 080111, 
080119 
Collards 1.13 0.44 1.03 0.24 1.33 0.60 0.98 0.20 16 7 070490 
Corn Salad 1.08 0.36 1.00 0.09 1.45 0.83 1.00 0.11 10 10 1005 
Corn, grain 1.00 0.14 1.00 0.14 0.98 0.07 0.97 0.08 42 10 100510 
Corn, pop 1.11 0.34 1.06 0.25 1.51 0.66 1.17 0.19 19 7 070990 
Corn, 
Sweet, 
Kernels 
Plus Cob 
With Husks 
Removed 
0.92 0.16 0.89 0.19 0.79 0.20 0.70 0.24 24 7 071040 
Cottonseed 1.10 0.20 1.12 0.24 1.13 0.21 1.15 0.23 44 12 120720 
Cowpea 1.14 0.39 1.08 0.24 1.33 0.49 1.24 0.39 12 7 071339 
Crabapple 1.05 0.27 0.99 0.11 1.06 0.17 1.03 0.15 30 8 081090 
Cranberry 1.03 0.19 1.01 0.20 1.23 0.34 1.12 0.30 19 8 081040, 
081190 
Cress 1.10 0.41 1.02 0.17 1.35 0.70 1.15 0.38 10 7 070990 
Cress, 
Garden 
1.07 0.31 1.01 0.11 1.27 0.58 1.07 0.20 10 7 070990 
Cress, 
Upland 
1.21 0.50 1.17 0.44 1.94 0.95 1.93 0.93 1 7 070990 
Cucumber 0.97 0.17 0.97 0.20 0.96 0.18 1.02 0.31 49 7 070700 
Currant 1.07 0.32 1.04 0.26 1.26 0.37 1.21 0.29 10 8 081030, 
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081120 
Dandelion, 
leaves 
1.17 0.50 1.00 0.10 1.69 0.98 0.99 0.19 10 7 070990 
Dasheen, 
Corm 
1.06 0.32 0.99 0.21 1.23 0.57 1.05 0.20 8 6 060120 
Date 1.15 0.44 1.06 0.23 1.11 0.39 1.03 0.14 1 8 080410 
Dewberry 1.09 0.33 1.01 0.16 1.39 0.51 1.17 0.34 10 8 081020, 
081120 
Dock 1.09 0.32 1.03 0.15 1.36 0.61 1.17 0.33 10 7 070990 
Eggplant 1.03 0.16 1.01 0.16 1.02 0.27 0.97 0.20 27 7 070930 
Eggs 0.96 0.14 0.92 0.20 0.94 0.13 0.83 0.31 42 4 0407, 
0408 
Elderberry 1.05 0.30 0.98 0.19 1.05 0.19 0.93 0.34 8 8 081090 
Endive 1.05 0.16 1.02 0.11 1.37 0.42 1.15 0.22 11 7 070529 
Endive, 
Belgian 
1.27 0.59 1.21 0.49 2.47 1.30 2.10 1.10 1 7 070529 
Fennel 1.24 0.54 1.19 0.47 1.89 0.94 1.87 0.92 1 7 070990 
Fennel, 
Florence, 
Fresh 
Leaves and 
Stalk 
1.01 0.41 0.95 0.34 0.95 0.90 0.75 0.78 2 7 070990 
Fruit, 
Passion 
0.76 0.41 0.75 0.41 0.73 0.40 0.49 0.48 1 8 081090 
Garlic 1.02 0.17 0.99 0.23 1.08 0.19 1.10 0.28 11 7 070320 
Ginger 1.11 0.39 1.09 0.33 1.25 0.53 1.20 0.45 1 9 091010 
Gooseberry 1.05 0.30 0.98 0.18 1.22 0.35 1.15 0.27 9 8 081030, 
081120 
Gourd, 
Edible 
1.13 0.43 0.96 0.14 1.57 0.85 0.97 0.09 19 7 070990 
Grape 1.03 0.17 1.04 0.24 1.15 0.22 1.16 0.30 60 8 080610 
Grapefruit 1.06 0.21 1.08 0.30 1.27 0.35 1.32 0.50 43 8 080540 
Groundcher
ry 
1.08 0.31 1.03 0.12 1.07 0.18 1.07 0.13 13 8 081090 
Guar 1.19 0.49 1.04 0.21 1.82 0.84 1.47 0.58 8 7 070890 
Guava 0.75 0.41 0.74 0.41 0.42 0.52 0.33 0.54 1 8 080450 
Hazelnut 0.98 0.28 0.90 0.22 0.93 0.12 0.92 0.12 28 8 080221 
Hog, by 
products 
1.04 0.11 1.03 0.10 1.00 0.05 1.00 0.04 41 2 020649 
Hog, fat 1.05 0.23 1.03 0.13 1.10 0.20 1.11 0.19 18 2 020900, 
1501 
Hog, fat 1.05 0.23 1.03 0.13 1.10 0.20 1.11 0.19 18 15 1501 
Hog, kidney 1.03 0.10 1.01 0.09 1.01 0.03 1.03 0.05 66 2 020649 
Hog, liver 1.01 0.08 1.01 0.08 1.00 0.03 1.00 0.05 68 2 020641 
Hog, meat 1.07 0.17 1.09 0.26 1.24 0.25 1.47 0.59 62 2 0203 
Honeydew 1.00 0.13 0.99 0.20 1.03 0.19 1.04 0.27 39 8 080719 
Hop, Dried 
Cones 
1.10 0.31 1.09 0.27 1.18 0.31 1.17 0.26 22 12 121010 
Horseradish 1.03 0.19 1.02 0.21 1.09 0.20 1.22 0.45 9 7 070690 
Huckleberr
y 
1.14 0.45 0.97 0.11 1.55 0.80 0.96 0.10 14 8 081040 
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Jackbean 1.18 0.47 1.01 0.08 1.63 0.79 1.13 0.17 9 7 070890 
Juneberry 1.19 0.51 1.03 0.24 1.32 0.65 0.93 0.46 5 8 081090 
Kale 1.07 0.25 1.03 0.22 1.18 0.32 1.01 0.17 15 7 070490 
Kiwifruit 0.99 0.17 0.98 0.19 1.09 0.25 1.00 0.31 5 8 081050 
Kohlrabi 1.07 0.34 0.96 0.31 1.22 0.56 0.94 0.19 13 7 070490 
Kumquat 1.00 0.32 0.95 0.13 1.27 0.76 0.90 0.18 1 8 080590 
Leeks 0.97 0.34 0.91 0.28 1.07 0.24 0.88 0.15 4 7 070390 
Lemon 1.01 0.00 1.02 0.00 1.01 0.00 1.02 0.00 43 8 080530 
Lentil 1.09 0.23 1.06 0.25 1.20 0.42 1.12 0.37 10 7 071340 
Leren 1.13 0.39 1.02 0.19 1.32 0.46 1.40 0.51 8 7 070690 
Lettuce, 
Head 
1.02 0.17 1.06 0.35 1.04 0.27 0.82 0.28 34 7 070511 
Lettuce, 
Leaf 
1.05 0.18 1.06 0.22 1.31 0.35 0.93 0.15 26 7 070519 
Lime 1.01 0.00 1.02 0.00 1.01 0.00 1.02 0.00 39 8 080530 
Loganberry 1.07 0.31 1.01 0.16 1.26 0.41 1.20 0.34 10 8 081020, 
081120 
Loquat 1.03 0.18 0.99 0.13 1.08 0.19 1.10 0.23 24 8 081090 
Lupin, 
Grain 
1.11 0.33 1.04 0.30 1.56 0.61 1.55 0.63 10 10 100890 
Mango 0.94 0.24 0.88 0.27 0.82 0.47 0.71 0.43 7 8 080450 
Melon 0.98 0.12 0.97 0.15 1.00 0.15 1.01 0.19 35 8 080719 
Milk 0.98 0.14 0.99 0.14 0.97 0.14 0.99 0.16 77 4 0401, 
0402 
Milk, fat 1.11 0.46 1.04 0.41 1.13 0.56 1.09 0.60 10 4 0405 
Millet, 
pearl, grain 
1.16 0.43 1.02 0.13 1.65 0.85 1.01 0.09 8 10 100820 
Millet, 
proso, grain 
1.08 0.25 1.03 0.14 1.23 0.43 1.09 0.13 8 10 100820 
Mizuna 1.09 0.34 1.02 0.12 1.37 0.65 1.16 0.27 12 7 070990 
Mushroom 1.09 0.27 1.09 0.29 1.27 0.27 1.39 0.49 5 7 070951, 
071230 
Muskmelon 0.99 0.13 0.97 0.23 1.01 0.17 1.02 0.26 38 8 080719 
Mustard 
Greens 
1.06 0.23 1.05 0.28 1.25 0.38 1.16 0.29 18 7 070990 
Mustard 
Spinach 
1.14 0.43 1.01 0.07 1.77 1.04 1.01 0.05 12 12 120750 
Mustard, 
Seed 
1.02 0.31 1.01 0.25 1.03 0.37 0.99 0.09 2 7 070990 
Nectarine 1.04 0.19 1.04 0.22 1.14 0.28 1.39 0.63 44 8 080930 
Nut, Brazil 0.99 0.20 0.94 0.12 0.91 0.30 0.84 0.16 25 8 080121, 
080122 
Nut, 
Hickory 
1.05 0.31 0.97 0.16 1.15 0.51 0.85 0.19 24 8 080290 
Nut, 
Macadamia 
0.96 0.18 0.91 0.19 0.87 0.21 0.84 0.16 26 8 080290 
Nut, Pine 1.02 0.56 0.97 0.47 1.39 1.06 1.34 1.08 1 8 080290 
Oat, grain 1.04 0.25 1.01 0.23 0.98 0.34 0.91 0.17 16 10 1004 
Okra 1.11 0.31 1.09 0.33 1.39 0.46 1.26 0.30 9 7 070890 
Olive 1.13 0.33 1.14 0.35 1.76 0.75 1.74 0.70 4 7 071120 
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Onion, bulb 1.00 0.17 0.99 0.19 0.97 0.21 1.00 0.32 27 7 070310 
Onion, 
Green 
1.28 0.60 1.03 0.08 2.28 1.22 1.17 0.17 9 7 070390 
Onion, 
Welsh 
1.10 0.33 1.05 0.20 1.54 0.71 1.26 0.34 2 7 070390 
Orach 1.18 0.54 0.99 0.08 1.69 0.98 0.99 0.19 10 7 070990 
Orange 1.04 0.19 1.05 0.27 1.22 0.30 1.38 0.59 47 8 080510 
Papaya 0.98 0.22 0.92 0.19 0.80 0.36 0.68 0.27 10 8 080720 
Parsley, 
fresh 
1.13 0.36 1.15 0.39 1.43 0.50 1.46 0.50 1 7 070990 
Parsley, 
Turnip 
Rooted 
1.07 0.35 1.01 0.20 1.24 0.51 1.25 0.52 8 7 070690 
Parsnip 1.02 0.19 1.00 0.14 1.05 0.17 1.12 0.26 8 7 070690 
Pawpaw 1.13 0.59 0.92 0.28 1.22 1.09 0.22 0.81 1 8 080720, 
081340 
Pea 1.08 0.26 1.04 0.25 1.41 0.44 1.23 0.32 17 7 070810, 
071021 
Pea, Dry 1.07 0.29 1.06 0.29 1.07 0.21 1.08 0.20 13 7 071310 
Pea, Edible 
Podded 
1.04 0.24 0.98 0.12 1.23 0.37 1.03 0.15 13 7 070810, 
071021 
Pea, English 1.10 0.33 1.05 0.24 1.50 0.58 1.37 0.50 14 7 070810, 
071021 
Pea, Field 1.13 0.34 1.12 0.32 1.20 0.33 1.23 0.29 13 7 070810, 
071021, 
071310 
Pea, Garden 1.11 0.32 1.06 0.24 1.50 0.58 1.37 0.50 14 7 070810, 
071021 
Pea, Green 1.11 0.32 1.06 0.24 1.50 0.58 1.37 0.50 14 7 070810, 
071021 
Pea, Pigeon 1.22 0.52 1.06 0.26 1.07 0.33 1.02 0.17 9 7 071390 
Pea, 
Succulent 
1.10 0.35 1.04 0.21 1.47 0.60 1.31 0.41 15 7 070810, 
071021 
Pea, Sugar 
Snap 
1.09 0.33 1.03 0.20 1.24 0.37 1.08 0.07 13 7 070890 
Peach 1.07 0.21 1.09 0.26 1.18 0.30 1.33 0.51 51 8 080930, 
081340 
Peanut 0.98 0.16 0.98 0.19 0.96 0.09 0.89 0.17 27 12 1202 
Pear 1.03 0.17 1.05 0.26 1.16 0.23 1.34 0.55 55 8 080820, 
081340 
Pear, 
Oriental 
1.03 0.28 0.98 0.13 1.05 0.17 1.03 0.11 30 8 081090 
Pecan 0.97 0.22 0.94 0.17 0.88 0.23 0.84 0.18 38 8 080290 
Pepino 1.09 0.31 1.03 0.13 1.10 0.21 1.13 0.20 13 8 081090 
Pepper 1.08 0.30 1.04 0.21 1.14 0.47 1.03 0.28 31 9 0904 
Pepper, 
Non-Bell 
1.09 0.33 1.05 0.23 1.25 0.46 1.17 0.35 35 7 070960 
Pimentos 1.14 0.50 1.02 0.25 1.33 0.76 0.87 0.20 52 7 070960 
Pineapple 0.93 0.20 0.95 0.28 0.69 0.32 0.74 0.43 6 8 080430 
Pistachio 0.99 0.18 0.98 0.18 0.98 0.10 0.97 0.06 29 8 080250 
Plantain 0.79 0.37 0.75 0.39 0.43 0.62 0.19 0.60 2 8 080300 
Plum, 
prune, dry 
1.18 0.51 1.00 0.12 1.89 1.06 1.05 0.24 6 8 081320 
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Plum, 
prune, fresh 
1.02 0.16 1.03 0.20 1.21 0.30 1.27 0.42 36 8 080940 
Pomegranat
e 
0.93 0.29 0.91 0.26 0.93 0.30 0.80 0.29 3 8 081090 
Potato 0.97 0.15 0.94 0.15 0.96 0.16 0.98 0.16 56 7 070190 
Poultry, 
byproducts 
0.95 0.13 0.94 0.13 0.92 0.13 0.89 0.14 33 2 020713, 
020714, 
020726, 
020727, 
020735, 
020736 
Poultry, fat 1.04 0.34 0.99 0.19 1.00 0.20 0.98 0.16 7 2 020900, 
1501 
Poultry, 
kidney 
0.95 0.14 0.93 0.18 0.92 0.15 0.81 0.31 41 2 0207 
Poultry, 
liver 
0.96 0.12 0.90 0.20 0.92 0.10 0.92 0.10 41 2 020734 
Poultry, 
meat 
0.97 0.10 0.98 0.12 0.98 0.09 1.04 0.20 45 2 0207 
Pummelo 1.05 0.22 1.06 0.31 1.23 0.28 1.32 0.49 31 8 080590 
Pumpkin 1.00 0.15 0.93 0.21 1.00 0.15 0.97 0.16 24 7 070990 
Purslane, 
Garden 
1.09 0.32 1.03 0.15 1.36 0.61 1.17 0.33 10 7 070990 
Purslane, 
Winter 
1.09 0.32 1.03 0.15 1.36 0.61 1.17 0.33 10 7 070990 
Quince 1.03 0.18 1.02 0.22 1.16 0.26 1.29 0.47 30 8 080820 
Radish 1.00 0.19 0.97 0.12 1.02 0.11 1.00 0.17 11 7 070690 
Radish, 
Tops 
1.12 0.35 1.12 0.35 1.49 0.67 1.43 0.52 9 7 070990 
Raisin 1.15 0.44 1.02 0.07 2.00 1.14 1.10 0.14 18 8 080620 
Rape 
Greens 
1.17 0.48 1.01 0.07 1.71 0.95 1.05 0.12 12 7 070990 
Raspberry 1.03 0.20 1.00 0.14 1.15 0.33 1.09 0.30 17 8 081020, 
081120 
Rice, grain 1.05 0.17 1.04 0.19 1.07 0.18 1.04 0.17 25 10 1006 
Rutabaga, 
Roots 
1.04 0.23 1.03 0.20 1.13 0.26 1.26 0.44 7 7 070690 
Rutabaga, 
Tops 
1.20 0.54 0.99 0.03 1.78 1.00 1.00 0.01 3 7 070990 
Salsify, 
Roots 
1.03 0.22 1.03 0.21 1.11 0.22 1.30 0.46 7 7 070690 
Salsify, 
Tops 
1.21 0.57 0.99 0.03 1.83 1.06 1.00 0.01 3 7 070990 
Savory, 
Summer 
1.08 0.32 1.06 0.23 1.26 0.48 1.20 0.32 1 9 091099 
Sesame, 
Seed 
0.88 0.35 0.88 0.37 0.68 0.41 0.56 0.48 1 12 120740 
Shallots 1.04 0.22 1.04 0.12 1.08 0.29 1.13 0.19 2 7 070310 
Sheep, by 
products 
1.03 0.10 1.03 0.08 1.11 0.19 1.10 0.17 52 2 020680, 
020690 
Sheep, fat 1.02 0.22 0.99 0.09 1.02 0.14 0.99 0.04 12 15 1502 
Sheep, 
kidney 
1.04 0.21 0.98 0.16 1.08 0.17 1.06 0.16 72 2 020680, 
020690 
Sheep, liver 1.02 0.10 0.99 0.19 1.08 0.16 1.07 0.17 65 2 020680, 
020690 
Sheep, meat 1.06 0.17 1.10 0.26 1.33 0.33 1.34 0.31 66 2 0204 
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Skirret 1.13 0.42 1.01 0.19 1.29 0.52 1.31 0.54 7 7 070690 
Sorghum, 
grain 
1.08 0.25 1.06 0.20 1.46 0.77 0.97 0.12 25 10 1007 
Spinach 1.02 0.25 1.01 0.26 1.17 0.29 0.79 0.33 14 7 070970 
Spinach, 
New 
Zealand 
1.04 0.18 1.02 0.15 1.46 0.52 1.02 0.13 10 7 070970 
Spinach, 
Vine 
1.18 0.53 0.98 0.05 1.66 0.97 0.92 0.09 10 7 070990 
Squash, 
Summer 
1.00 0.16 1.01 0.31 1.00 0.20 1.01 0.36 40 7 070990 
Squash, 
Winter 
1.00 0.16 0.97 0.13 1.00 0.18 0.97 0.19 26 7 070990 
Strawberry 1.03 0.18 1.01 0.18 1.15 0.31 1.01 0.20 32 8 081010, 
081110 
Sugar, Beet, 
Roots 
0.92 0.13 0.93 0.13 0.97 0.12 0.97 0.12 24 12 121291 
Sweet 
Potato 
1.00 0.17 1.00 0.26 1.06 0.10 1.25 0.49 17 7 071420 
Swiss Chard 1.08 0.24 1.05 0.18 1.31 0.39 1.23 0.34 11 7 070990 
Swordbean 1.18 0.47 1.01 0.08 1.63 0.79 1.13 0.17 9 7 070890 
Tangelo 1.06 0.22 1.07 0.26 1.23 0.31 1.43 0.57 37 8 080520 
Tangerine 1.07 0.21 1.09 0.28 1.22 0.27 1.46 0.62 42 8 080520 
Tanier 1.06 0.30 1.00 0.21 1.23 0.35 1.23 0.36 9 7 070990 
Taro 1.02 0.18 1.00 0.25 1.13 0.18 1.15 0.26 9 7 071490 
Tomatillo 1.09 0.35 1.02 0.10 1.07 0.20 1.07 0.13 13 8 081090 
Tomato 1.03 0.20 1.04 0.25 1.09 0.22 1.18 0.43 64 7 070200 
Turnip 1.00 0.19 0.99 0.21 1.05 0.20 1.06 0.23 11 7 070610 
Turnip, 
Tops 
1.07 0.27 1.01 0.17 1.31 0.54 1.13 0.39 8 7 070990 
Walnut 0.97 0.20 0.95 0.16 0.93 0.21 0.93 0.22 36 8 080231, 
080232 
Watercress 1.12 0.31 1.09 0.23 1.47 0.54 1.44 0.48 2 7 070990 
Watermelon 1.03 0.10 1.05 0.27 1.01 0.18 1.05 0.40 26 8 080711 
Wheat, 
grain 
1.05 0.16 1.07 0.22 1.05 0.12 1.10 0.26 38 10 1001 
Yam Bean 1.06 0.34 1.03 0.36 1.18 0.32 1.19 0.37 8 7 070890 
Yam, True, 
Tuber 
1.05 0.20 1.08 0.27 1.28 0.28 1.27 0.28 10 7 071490 
Youngberry 1.12 0.44 0.97 0.16 1.60 0.84 0.86 0.19 6 8 081020, 
081120 
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Appendix B: List of countries with weighted, unweighted scores and their standard 
deviations 
country Unweighted Scores Weighted Scores 
Score 1 
Score 1 
std. Score2 
Score 2 
std. Score 1 
Score 1 
std. Score 2 
Score 2 
std. 
Australia 1.95 0.58 1.19 0.43 1.66 0.55 1.20 0.39 
Japan 1.71 0.76 0.93 0.26 1.57 0.71 1.11 0.29 
Jamaica 1.51 0.58 1.27 0.39 1.22 0.41 1.12 0.27 
European Union 1.51 0.57 1.27 0.38 1.23 0.59 1.09 0.41 
Turkey 1.50 0.58 1.30 0.57 1.26 0.47 1.75 0.70 
Canada 1.46 0.50 1.20 0.43 1.29 0.44 1.09 0.36 
Israel 1.06 0.20 1.06 0.20 1.06 0.08 1.06 0.08 
Brazil 1.04 0.11 1.29 0.48 1.10 0.12 1.25 0.22 
Chile 1.03 0.15 1.01 0.32 1.04 0.10 1.05 0.14 
Argentina 1.03 0.09 1.03 0.09 1.04 0.07 1.04 0.07 
Russian Federation 1.03 0.10 1.55 0.75 1.07 0.14 1.83 0.79 
Rep. of Korea 1.01 0.16 0.98 0.46 1.00 0.11 0.99 0.21 
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China 1.01 0.05 1.04 0.40 1.03 0.10 1.17 0.37 
Hong Kong 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.01 1.01 0.01 1.01 0.01 
Thailand 1.00 0.02 1.00 0.02 1.00 0.02 1.00 0.02 
Vietnam 1.00 0.08 1.00 0.08 0.99 0.05 0.99 0.05 
Indonesia 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.07 1.02 0.03 1.08 0.13 
Peru 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Colombia 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Guatemala 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Philippines 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Dominican 
Republic 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Honduras 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Algeria 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Bahamas 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Barbados 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Bermuda 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
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Costa Rica 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Ecuador 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Egypt 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
El Salvador 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Jordan 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Kenya 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Lebanon 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Morocco 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Nicaragua 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Pakistan 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Panama 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Tunisia 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Venezuela 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Malaysia 0.99 0.04 0.99 0.04 0.99 0.04 0.99 0.04 
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United Arab 
Emirates 0.99 0.03 0.99 0.03 0.99 0.03 0.99 0.03 
United States 0.98 0.36 0.98 0.36 0.89 0.35 0.89 0.35 
Mexico 0.98 0.35 0.98 0.35 0.97 0.26 0.97 0.26 
India 0.97 0.14 0.96 0.18 1.03 0.09 1.05 0.13 
New Zealand 0.97 0.07 0.97 0.07 0.97 0.04 0.97 0.04 
Singapore 0.96 0.13 0.96 0.13 0.98 0.11 0.98 0.11 
South Africa 0.87 0.15 0.87 0.15 0.82 0.11 0.82 0.11 
Sri Lanka 0.53 0.20 0.55 0.20 0.43 0.15 0.47 0.16 
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Appendix C: The number of products under each substance count 
 
 
Substance 
Count 
Number of 
Products with 
Corresponding 
Substance Count 
1 14 
2 7 
3 7 
4 3 
5 3 
6 3 
7 9 
8 19 
9 12 
10 24 
11 8 
12 14 
13 9 
14 7 
15 3 
16 3 
17 3 
18 5 
19 6 
20 2 
21 1 
22 2 
23 1 
24 8 
25 5 
26 9 
27 3 
28 2 
29 1 
30 3 
31 2 
32 2 
33 4 
34 1 
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35 2 
36 2 
37 2 
38 3 
39 2 
40 1 
41 3 
42 4 
43 2 
44 2 
45 1 
47 1 
48 2 
49 1 
51 1 
52 2 
55 1 
56 1 
57 1 
60 1 
62 1 
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CHAPTER 4: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOOD STANDARD 
DETERMINATION: INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE FROM MAXIMUM RESIDUE 
LIMITS 
 
Abstract 
I build a parsimonious partial equilibrium political-economy model for a tradable 
good with a negative externality addressed by a single quality standard. The policy-maker 
solves for the standard that maximizes a weighted sum of welfare measures reflecting rent-
seeking activities. Comparative statics are derived and are ambiguous despite the simple 
setting. Then I empirically implement a reduced form derived from the conceptual model to 
econometrically investigate the determinants of protectionism in maximum residue limits 
affecting food trade among a large number of countries. Protectionism is measured as 
proposed in essay 2, that is, an index of strictness of MRLs relative to Codex international 
standards. Higher-income countries tend to protect their domestic market and their 
consumers’ health more than lower income countries do; MRL and tariff are substitute policy 
instruments; the impact of democratization on strictness of MRLs shows a inverted u-shaped 
pattern; the quality of governmental institutions increases MRL protection.  
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Introduction 
In the second essay, we calculated the protectionism scores of maximum residue 
limits (MRLs) at country and product levels. We observed variations across countries, across 
products, as well as variations across products within a given country. In this essay, we take 
these scores one step further and attempt to rationalize their variations as explained by 
political economy motives. We develop a parsimonious political economy model to motivate 
a set of specifications which are then explored econometrically using the scores as dependent 
variables and a set of commodity and country level determinants derived from the political-
economy model. 
Agricultural protection and its political economy have been enduring topics. With 
very few exceptions, most of the literature on agricultural protection is devoted to price-
related policies and distortions through macro-economic policies such as over-valued 
currencies (See Swinnen and Vandemoortele (2008) and (2009); and Farnsworth (2012) for 
exceptions). Anderson (2009) reviewed the extensive literature on Agricultural protection. As 
Tariffs are being lowered by multilateral and preferential trade agreements, the focus of 
attention has switched to non-tariff measures (NTMs) and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in 
agricultural protection. NTMs, which are intended to regulate markets and protect health 
and/or the environment, have been allegedly used increasingly as disguised protection 
purposes. This conjecture motivated my second essay. 
Traditional price-related protection measures are easier to identify and could also be 
specific to the direction of trade flows (imports versus exports). For example, to protect 
domestic producers from import competition, traditional measures include tariffs, tariff rate 
quotas, direct payment/transfer, etc. On the other hand, to make export sectors more 
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competitive, export subsidies, direct payment/transfers, etc, can be used. Rodrick (1995) 
conducted a thorough review of endogenous trade policy models, which typically link the 
level of trade price policy to the amount of lobbying resources. But for NTMs and NTBs, and 
Maximum Residue Limits (MRLs) specifically, standards are set for and faced by both 
domestic producers and importers. In addition, many NTMs and NTBs potentially serve to 
internalize and mitigate negative externalities, unless they are overtly protectionist  that is, 
not based on science or a legitimate precautionary motive. This market-imperfection 
possibility makes it less obvious to define the non-protectionist benchmark when external 
effects such as health risk exist. Since last decade, conceptual work by Fischer and Serra 
(2000), Swinnen and Vandemoortele (2008), Marette and Beghin (2010), and Berti and 
Falvey (2011) has emerged on the endogeneity and protectionism of NTM/NTBs, especially, 
standard-like NTMs. These conceptual models for NTMs differ from those of tariffs in that 
they build the positive externality (or reducing negative externality) effects of NTMs into the 
models. In particular, Fisher and Serra (2000), and Marette and Beghin (2010) compare what 
a global social planner and a domestic counterpart would do to maximize welfare. If the 
optimum NTM set by the global planner is less stringent than the one set by the domestic 
planner, then the domestic standard is deemed protectionist. In the methodology section, we 
provide more details about the conceptual model setup. 
             A few studies tried to explain the variations of NTBs in a political economy context. 
NTBs in these studies encompass all standards-like policies but also other quantitative 
restrictions and other non-tariff policies. The  prior is that  NTBs have similar effects as 
tariffs do and are set by a similar political economy context. Ray (1981) first started to 
simultaneously model tariff and NTBs for manufacturing industries. His measure of NTBs 
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was the “Index of the Incidence of Nontariff Barriers” constructed by the U.S. Tariff 
Commission, which measures the comprehensiveness of nontariff protection. Without 
defining protectionism explicitly, the author took the protection in tariff and nontariff in a 
similar manner: NTM existence simply means NTM protection. 
Trefler (1993) similarly conducted an empirical study of NTBs in U.S. manufacturing 
industries. He treated NTBs as being endogenous and simultaneously estimated imports and 
NTBs. The author used the coverage ratio to measure of NTBs. Mansfield and Busch (1995) 
conducted a cross-national analysis to explain how the coverage ratio of NTBs is determined 
by the number of constituencies, the unemployment rate, exchange rate, etc. Cropper et al. 
(1992) is one of the rare investigations of the determinants of pesticide regulations, EPA 
pesticide cancellation in particular. The latter investigation is restricted to the U.S. domestic 
context and abstracts from trade or protectionist considerations.  
Empirical studies of protectionism based on NTMs and NTBs are relative few, mostly 
due to the following two reasons. First, protectionism as defined in the conceptual papers 
cited above is hard to implement empirically because production cost information is difficult 
to collect and the relevant international sector hard to define. Second, as mentioned above, 
quantification and aggregation of NTMs and NTBs are challenging tasks relative to 
collecting data on border tariffs. The latter tasks are hard or impossible given the different 
nature and impacts of many NTBs and NTMs. The coverage ratio is the most commonly used 
measure, but the coverage ratio of NTBs is not necessarily the same as of the intensity and 
stringency of standard-like NTMs. It is a relatively gross proxy of stringency of policy.  
Recently, USDA FAS has provided access to the MRL database used in my second 
essay. The database covers about three hundreds products for more than eighty countries, and 
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millions of MRL records. In the second essay, we proposed aggregation indices applied to 
this newly available MRL database to solve these two problems, using Codex MRLs as the 
non-protectionist science-based benchmark. Related (but different) to my effort here, 
Farnsworth (2012) also conducted a related investigation based on the same MRL raw 
dataset but selected only a small subset of products and did not provide a structural model 
leading to the estimated reduced forms. Farnsworth did not formalize his protectionism 
measure. Instead, he constructed “strictness” measures, based on maximum and averages of 
MRLs.  
In this third essay, we systematically study the variation of protectionism scores 
calculated in essay two. In particular we investigate the relationship between MRL 
protectionism scores at the product level and across countries, and traditional determinants of 
agricultural protection as posited in the literature and derived from the proposed conceptual 
model. We also investigate the relationship between MRL protection and tariff protection to 
see whether they are substitutes or complements in protection. 
 In the next section, we provide the simple conceptual framework following Fischer 
and Serra (2000) and others, to derive the theoretical underpinning for the empirical 
regressions. Then, we discuss the data steps, the variables used, and their sample statistics. 
Following the data section, we present the estimation results which are followed by 
robustness checks. Finally, we close with a summary of the major findings and their 
implications. 
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Methodology 
We follow the spirit of Fisher and Serra (2000), Marette and Beghin (2010), and Berti 
and Falvey (2011) and their parsimonious two-country model with an externality addressed 
by a single NTM standard and the weighted sum of surplus measures of Berti and Falvey 
(2011). The NTM standard impacts cost and a negative externality, which is decreasing in the 
standard’s stringency. The negative externality can be thought of as the negative health 
consequences of consuming unsafe food, but it could be more general. We incorporate the 
previous theoretical literature but with a slightly more general setup, with N countries and no 
pre-assumed direction of trade. Producers produce homogeneous products, freely trade 
between each other, and without any explicit constraints on the direction of trade. The 
drawback of the more general approach is that it is impossible to sign the comparative statics 
of changes in the NTM standard induced by underlying variables. The gain is that this less 
constrained-characterization is more appropriate for an empirical investigation.  
The cost function for producer at country i, supplying country j is cij, where  
𝑐𝑖𝑗 = 𝑒𝜆𝑗𝛾𝑖𝑗𝑞𝑖𝑗 + 1
2
(𝑞𝑖𝑗)2. 
The quality of the export has to meet the stringency of the standard of the destination market 
(𝜆𝑗), which can be either higher or lower than the domestic standard (𝜆𝑖) (Berti and Falvey 
(2011)). The cost is increasing in the standard level, at an increasing rate (Fischer and Serra 
(2000)). Following Marette and Beghin (2010), We use parameter 𝛾𝑖𝑗, which captures the 
relative cost efficiency/advantage of producers in country 𝑖 to producers located in country 𝑗. 
The output produced in country 𝑖 then exported to country 𝑗 is 𝑞𝑖𝑗. The variable cost of the 
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production exported from country 𝑖 to country 𝑗 that does not depend on the standard is 
1  2 (𝑞𝑖𝑗)2. 
We assume no additional fixed cost for supplying foreign markets. The total cost, 
𝐶𝑖, for producers in country 𝑖 is obtained by summing over the individual cost for supplying 
all destination markets. That is expressed as  
𝐶𝑖 =  ∑ 𝑒𝜆𝑗𝑁𝑗=1 𝛾𝑖𝑗𝑞𝑖𝑗 + 12 (𝑞𝑖𝑗)2. 
 
Standards do not directly affect the demand, but the price, 𝑝𝑗, will be shown to be an implicit 
function of the standard.  
On the consumer side, we assume that the consumer cares about her health but is not 
aware of any particular food safety status of a specific good. This simple structure allows to 
separate the externality and the demand of the good and avoid feedback from the externality 
into the demand. The consumer’s welfare is additive into the consumer surplus from 
consumption and the health externality. A more complicate structure is conceivable but 
would further clutter the model (see Marette and Beghin (2010) on this point). Demand at 
destination market country j depends on the market size, 𝑎𝑗, own-price elasticity of 
demand, 𝜀𝑗, and the domestic price pj, that is, 
𝑄𝑗 = 𝑎𝑗 − 𝜀𝑗𝑝𝑗. 
          Following Fischer and Serra (2000), we assume the unit dollar amount externality is 
decreasing in the standard, at a diminishing rate. The parameter 𝜆0 puts a lower bound to the 
unit externality, −𝑒𝜆0 , when the standard imposed by the country where the consumption 
takes place is very low. Note that I implicitly assume the dollar valuation of heath is the same 
across all countries. We could add a country specific scalar to the unit externality and let it 
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vary across countries. The parameter would reflect the country differences in valuing the 
externality. For example, consumers in some countries may value health externalities from 
food intake more than consumers in other countries, depending on their income, medical cost, 
etc. For simplicity’s sake, we stipulate the externality as 
𝐿𝑗 = −𝑒(𝜆0−𝜆𝑗)𝑄𝑗. 
 
The product associated with the standard is homogenous, except for the standard, but 
receives different prices at different consumption markets due to different standards and 
associated cost, and local demands in the destination markets. A country can be both an 
importer and exporter as long as the unit profit is the same across all destination markets 
(Berti and Falvey (2011)). 
The profit maximization problem for the producer in country 𝑖 is  
max
𝑞𝑖𝑗
�(𝑝𝑗−𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑗) 𝑞𝑖𝑗 − 𝑒𝜆𝑗𝑁
𝑗=1
𝛾𝑖𝑗𝑞𝑖𝑗 −
12 (𝑞𝑖𝑗)2 
with variable t being the tariff imposed in the destination market j, except the home 
market(𝛿𝑖𝑗 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, 𝛿𝑖𝑖 = 0 for all 𝑖). First order conditions are:  
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑞𝑖𝑗
= 𝑝𝑗 − 𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑗 − 𝑒𝜆𝑗𝛾𝑖𝑗 − 𝑞𝑖𝑗 = 0 . 
Then we have optimum output for firms in country i to destination j as  
𝑞𝑖𝑗 = 𝑝𝑗 − 𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑗 − 𝑒𝜆𝑗𝛾𝑖𝑗               (1). 
Together with the demand function, we can determine the equilibrium quantity and price at 
destination market j, where 𝑄𝑗 =  ∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑁𝑖=1  and is the sum of domestic produced and imported 
products. We have 
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�𝑝𝑗 − 𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑗 − 𝑒
𝜆𝑗𝛾𝑖𝑗 𝑁
𝑖=1
=  𝑎𝑗 − 𝜀𝑗𝑝𝑗  , 
then  
𝑝𝑗
∗ = (𝑁 − 1)𝑡𝑗 + 𝑎𝑗 + 𝑒𝜆𝑗𝛾.𝑗
𝜀𝑗 + 𝑁  , 
and 
𝑞𝑖𝑗
∗ = (𝑁 − 1)𝑡𝑗 + 𝑎𝑗 + 𝑒𝜆𝑗𝛾.𝑗
𝜀𝑗 + 𝑁 − 𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑗 − 𝑒𝜆𝑗𝛾𝑖𝑗 , 
and 
𝑞𝑗𝑗
∗ = (𝑁 − 1)𝑡𝑗 + 𝑎𝑗 + 𝑒𝜆𝑗𝛾.𝑗
𝜀𝑗 + 𝑁 − 𝑒𝜆𝑗𝛾𝑗𝑗 , 
where 𝛾.𝑗 = ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗𝑁𝑖=1  , is the sum of relative cost efficiency/advantage of country j to every 
country. It measures the overall relative cost efficiency/advantage of country j to the rest of 
the world. The equilibrium price in market j is 𝑝𝑗∗ , and the equilibrium quantity imported 
from market i to market j is 𝑞𝑖𝑗∗  as shown above. So, the equilibrium consumption in any 
country 𝑗 is 
𝑄𝑗
∗ = �𝑞𝑖𝑗∗𝑁
𝑖=1
= �𝑝𝑗∗ − 𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑗 −𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑒𝜆𝑗𝛾𝑖𝑗 = 𝑁𝑝𝑗∗ − (𝑁 − 1)𝑡𝑗 − 𝑒𝜆𝑗𝛾∙𝑗 . 
The associated equilibrium consumer surplus in country j is 
𝐶𝑆𝑗
∗ = 1
2
𝑄𝑗
∗ �
𝑎𝑗
𝜀𝑗
− 𝑝𝑗
∗� .            (2) 
The equilibrium externality in country 𝑗 is 
𝐿𝑗
∗ = −𝑒�𝜆0−𝜆𝑗�𝑄𝑗∗  . 
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To introduce political economy, we assume that the policymaker maximizes a 
weighted sum of surpluses with weights representing influence obtained through the political 
process. This is a generic way to proceed in political-economy modeling. de Gorter and 
Swinnen (2002) reviewed several political economy models that lead to such weighted sum 
of surpluses objective function, such as Beghin and Foster( 1992) and the protection-for-sale 
model of Grossman and Helpman (1994). 
The political-economy objective function of policymaker of country 𝑗 is max
𝜆𝑗
𝑊𝑗 = 𝜔𝜋𝑗∗ + (1 − 𝜔)�𝐶𝑆𝑗∗ + 𝐿𝑗∗� , 
or 
𝑊𝑗 = 𝜔∑ ((𝑝𝑖∗ − 𝛿𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑖)𝑞𝑗𝑖∗ − 𝛾𝑗𝑖𝑒𝜆𝑖𝑞𝑗𝑖∗ − 1
2
𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑞𝑗𝑖
∗ 2) + (1 − 𝜔) �1
2
𝑄𝑗
∗ �
𝑎𝑗
𝜖𝑗
− 𝑝𝑗
∗� − 𝑒�𝜆0−𝜆𝑗�𝑄𝑗
∗�.  
(3) 
The first order condition to maximize the weighted sum of surpluses with respect to the 
standard is  
𝜕𝑊𝑗
𝜕𝜆𝑗
= 𝜔�𝑝𝑗∗ 𝜕𝑞𝑗𝑗∗𝜕𝜆𝑗 +  𝑞𝑗𝑗∗ 𝜕𝑝𝑗∗𝜕𝜆𝑗 − 𝛾𝑗𝑗𝑒𝜆𝑗𝑞𝑗𝑗∗ − 𝛾𝑗𝑗𝑒𝜆𝑗 𝜕𝑞𝑗𝑗∗𝜕𝜆𝑗 − 𝑞𝑗𝑗∗ 𝜕𝑞𝑗𝑗∗𝜕𝜆𝑗 � + 
(1 − 𝜔)�12 𝑎𝑗𝜀𝑗 𝜕𝑄𝑗∗𝜕𝜆𝑗 − 12𝜕𝑄𝑗∗𝜕𝜆𝑗 𝑝𝑗∗ − 12 𝜕𝑝𝑗∗𝜕𝜆𝑗 𝑄𝑗∗ − 𝜕𝑄𝑗∗𝜕𝜆𝑗 𝑒�𝜆0−𝜆𝑗� + 𝑄𝑗∗𝑒�𝜆0−𝜆𝑗�� = 0. (4)   
Note that since we assume no interaction among countries’ standards, the export volume 
𝑞𝑗𝑖(𝑖≠𝑗)∗  does not depend on the producer’s domestic standard, 𝜆𝑗, but rather depends on the 
importing country’s standard, 𝜆𝑖. This simplifying assumption implies that 
𝜕(∑ (𝑝𝑖∗ − 𝛿𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑖)𝑞𝑗𝑖∗ − 𝛾𝑗𝑖𝑒𝜆𝑖𝑞𝑗𝑖∗ − 1
2
𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑞𝑗𝑖
∗ 2) 𝜕𝜆𝑗� = 𝜕(𝑝𝑗∗𝑞𝑗𝑗∗ − 𝛾𝑗𝑗𝑒𝜆𝑗𝑞𝑗𝑗∗ − 12 𝑞𝑗𝑗∗ 2) 𝜕𝜆𝑗�  . 
Next, we substitute equilibrium values and arrange terms, The first order condition becomes 
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𝑒𝜆𝑗𝛾.𝑗 �𝜔 + 𝜀𝑗(1 −𝜔)� �(𝑁 − 1)𝑡𝑗 + 𝑎𝑗 + 𝑒𝜆𝑗  𝛾.𝑗�(𝜀𝑖 + 𝑁)2
+ 𝑁𝑎𝑗(1 − 𝜔)𝑒�𝜆0−𝜆𝑗� − (𝑁 − 1)𝑡𝑗�𝜔𝛾𝑗𝑗𝑒𝜆𝑗 + (1 − 𝜔)𝜀𝑗𝑒�𝜆0−𝜆𝑗��
𝜀𝑗 + 𝑁
−
2𝜔𝛾𝑗𝑗  𝛾.𝑗𝑒2𝜆𝑗 + 𝑎𝑗𝑒𝜆𝑗�𝜔𝛾𝑗𝑗 + (1 −𝜔)𝛾.𝑗�
𝜀𝑗 + 𝑁 + 𝜔(𝑒𝜆𝑗𝛾𝑗𝑗)2 = 0. (5) 
Equation (5) is not likely to have closed-form solutions, despite the parsimonious 
approach. So next we differentiate this implicit function (5) with respect to key variables of 
interest that is the quality standard, the market size, price responsiveness of demand, 
comparative advantage at home and abroad, the political economy weight, the tariff, and the 
lower-bound standard. Note that standard depends on all other variables in the model, which 
makes it difficult to sign. This remark holds for most of the other variables. Nevertheless the 
value added  of the conceptual model is to provide a sound specification for the empirical 
investigation. 
Differentiating with respect to the standard 𝜆𝑗, we obtain 
 
𝑓𝜆 = 𝑒𝜆𝑗  𝛾.𝑗 �𝜔 + 𝜀𝑗(1 −𝜔)� �(𝑁 − 1)𝑡𝑗 + 𝑎 + 2𝑒𝜆𝑗  𝛾.𝑗�(𝜀𝑗 + 𝑁)2  
−
𝑒�𝜆0−𝜆𝑗�(1 − 𝜔)�𝑁𝑎𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗� + 𝜔𝛾𝑗𝑗𝑒𝜆𝑗 �(𝑁 − 1)𝑡𝑗 − 4𝑒𝜆𝑗  𝛾.𝑗� −  𝑎𝑗𝑒𝜆𝑗�𝜔𝛾𝑗𝑗 + (1 − 𝜔)𝛾.𝑗�
𝜀𝑗 + 𝑁+ 2𝜔(𝑒𝜆𝑗𝛾𝑗𝑗)2 . 
Differentiating with respect to market size  𝑎𝑗 , leads to 
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𝑓𝑎 = 𝑒𝜆𝑗𝛾.𝑗 �(𝜔 + 𝜀𝑗(1 − 𝜔)�(𝜀𝑗 + 𝑁)2 + 𝑁(1 − 𝜔)𝑒�𝜆0−𝜆𝑗� − 𝑒𝜆𝑗�𝜔𝛾𝑗𝑗 + (1 − 𝜔)𝛾.𝑗�𝜀𝑗 + 𝑁  . 
Next differentiate with respect to the price responsiveness of demand 𝜀𝑗. We have  
𝑓𝜀 = − 2𝑒𝜆𝑗𝛾.𝑗 �𝜔 + 𝜀𝑗(1 − 𝜔)� �(𝑁 − 1)𝑡𝑗 + 𝑎𝑗+𝑒𝜆𝑗𝛾.𝑗�
�𝜀𝑗 + 𝑁�3  
+ 𝑒𝜆𝑗𝛾.𝑗(1 − 𝜔)�(𝑁 − 1)𝑡𝑗 + 2𝑎𝑗+𝑒𝜆𝑗𝛾.𝑗� + 𝑒𝜆𝑗𝛾𝑗𝑗𝜔�(𝑁 − 1)𝑡𝑗 + 𝑎𝑗+2𝑒𝜆𝑗𝛾.𝑗�
�𝜀𝑗 + 𝑁�2
+ (1 − 𝜔)𝑒�𝜆0−𝜆𝑗� �(𝑁 − 1)𝑡𝑗𝜀𝑗 − 𝑁𝑎𝑗�(𝜀𝑗 + 𝑁)2 − 𝑡𝑗(𝑁 − 1)(1 − 𝜔)𝑒�𝜆0−𝜆𝑗�(𝜀𝑗 + 𝑁) . 
Then differentiate with respect to abroad cost efficiency 𝛾𝑗𝑖 , where 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. We have 
𝑓𝛾𝑗− = 𝑒𝜆𝑗  �𝜔 + 𝜀𝑗(1 − 𝜔)� �(𝑁 − 1)𝑡𝑗 + 𝑎 + 2𝑒𝜆𝑗  𝛾.𝑗�(𝜀𝑗 + 𝑁)2  
−
2𝜔𝛾𝑗𝑗𝑒2𝜆𝑗 + (1 − 𝜔)𝑎𝑗𝑒𝜆𝑗
𝜀𝑗 + 𝑁  . 
Differentiating with respect to own-cost efficiency  𝛾𝑗𝑗, we get  
𝑓𝛾𝑗 = 𝑒𝜆𝑗  �𝜔 + 𝜀𝑗(1 − 𝜔)� �(𝑁 − 1)𝑡𝑗 + 𝑎𝑗 + 2𝑒𝜆𝑗  𝛾.𝑗�(𝜀𝑗 + 𝑁)2  
−
2𝜔𝑒2𝜆𝑗�𝛾𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾.𝑗� + 𝑡𝑗𝜔𝑒𝜆𝑗(𝑁 − 1) + 𝑎𝑗𝑒𝜆𝑗
𝜀𝑗 + 𝑁 + 2𝜔𝑒2𝜆𝑗𝛾𝑗𝑗 . 
Differentiating with respect to weights chosen by policy maker 𝜔, we have 
𝑓𝑤 = 𝑒𝜆𝑗𝛾.𝑗�1 − 𝜀𝑗� �(𝑁 − 1)𝑡𝑗 + 𝑎𝑗 + 𝑒𝜆𝑗  𝛾.𝑗�
�𝜀𝑗 + 𝑁�2  
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+ 𝑒�𝜆0−𝜆𝑗� �(𝑁 − 1)𝑡𝑗𝜀𝑗 − 𝑁𝑎𝑗� − 𝑒𝜆𝑗𝛾𝑗𝑗 �(𝑁 − 1)𝑡𝑗 + 2𝑒𝜆𝑗  𝛾.𝑗� − 𝑎𝑗𝑒𝜆𝑗�𝛾𝑗𝑗 − 𝛾.𝑗�
𝜀𝑗 + 𝑁+  �𝛾𝑗𝑗𝑒𝜆𝑗�2. 
Next the differentiation with respect to the tariff 𝑡𝑗 is derived: 
𝑓𝑡 = 𝑒𝜆𝑗𝛾.𝑗(𝑁 − 1) �𝜔 + 𝜀𝑗(1 −𝜔)�(𝜀𝑗 + 𝑁)2 − (𝑁 − 1)�𝜔𝛾𝑗𝑗𝑒𝜆𝑗 + (1 − 𝜔)𝜀𝑗𝑒�𝜆0−𝜆𝑗��𝜀𝑗 + 𝑁  . 
Finally, differentiating with respect to the lower bound standard 𝜆0 , we have  
𝑓𝜆0 = 𝑁𝑎𝑗(1 − 𝜔)𝑒�𝜆0−𝜆𝑗� − (𝑁 − 1)(1 − 𝜔)𝑡𝑗𝜀𝑗𝑒�𝜆0−𝜆𝑗�𝜀𝑗 + 𝑁  . 
Using these differentiation components, we summarize the total differentiation of the first 
order condition as 
𝑓𝜆𝑑𝜆𝑗 + 𝑓𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑗 + 𝑓𝜀𝑑𝜀𝑗 +  𝑓𝛾𝑗−�∑ 𝑑𝛾𝑗𝑖𝑖≠𝑗 � + 𝑓𝛾𝑗𝑑𝛾𝑗𝑗 +  𝑓𝑤𝑑𝜔𝑗 + 𝑓𝑡𝑗  𝑑𝑡𝑗 + 𝑓𝜆0  𝑑𝜆0 = 0; (6) or 
 𝑑𝜆𝑗 = 𝑓𝑎/𝑓𝜆𝑑𝑎𝑗 + 𝑓𝜀/𝑓𝜆𝑑𝜀𝑗 +  𝑓𝛾𝑗−/𝑓𝜆�∑ 𝑑𝛾𝑗𝑖𝑖≠𝑗 � +  𝑓𝛾𝑗/𝑓𝜆𝑑𝛾𝑗𝑗 +  𝑓𝑤/𝑓𝜆𝑑𝜔𝑗 + 𝑓𝑡𝑗/𝑓𝜆 𝑑𝑡𝑗 +
𝑓𝜆0  /𝑓𝜆𝑑𝜆0 (7). 
Equation (7) explains the variation in the endogenous standard as explained by the variation 
in important underlying determinants.  
Model implementation  
Equation (7) provides guidance for the determinants of the endogenous NTM 
standard in the econometric investigation. The differential multipliers (f./fλ) have ambiguous 
signs as they depend on numerous variables and parameters. Later when we discuss empirical 
results based on equation (7), we provide empirically established signs for these effects to 
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add understanding to the comparative statics above. Next we explain how we implement a 
variation of equation (7) (see equation (9) below) and match it to the empirical data. 
         Recall that the protectionism score of country j in the second essay are  
𝑆𝑗 = 1𝐾 (∑ exp (𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙,𝑘−𝑀𝑗𝑘𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙,𝑘𝑘 )). (8) 
Note that we only considered one standard case in the theoretical model, but, in reality, 
countries regulate each food product through a vector of standards.  To formally link my 
protectionism measure with the theoretical model above, we map the score (8) into the 
unique NTM standard of the conceptual model in equation (7). We have  
𝑆𝑗 = exp (1 − 𝑀𝑗𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙), 
where 
𝑀𝑗
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙
 is the standardized MRL, and  
𝑑�𝑆𝑗� = 1𝐾�𝑒�1− 𝑀𝑗𝑘𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙,𝑘�
𝑘
𝑑 �−
𝑀𝑗𝑘
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙,𝑘� . 
Standard 𝜆𝑗 relates to the MRL as  𝜆𝑗 = − 𝑀𝑗𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙 .Together with eq. (2), I have 
𝑓𝜆(∙)𝑑 �− 𝑀𝑗𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙� + 𝑓𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑗 + 𝑓𝜀𝑑𝜀𝑗 +  𝑓𝛾𝑗−�∑ 𝑑𝛾𝑗𝑖𝑖≠𝑗 � +  𝑓𝛾𝑗𝑑𝛾𝑗𝑗 + 𝑓𝑤𝑑𝜔𝑗 + 𝑓𝑡𝑗  𝑑𝑡𝑗 +
𝑓𝜆0  𝑑𝜆0 =  0.  
That is, 
 𝑑 �−
𝑀𝑗𝑘
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙,𝑘� = −1𝑓𝜆(∙) �𝑓𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑗 + 𝑓𝜀𝑑𝜀𝑗 +  𝑓𝛾𝑗−�∑ 𝑑𝛾𝑗𝑖𝑖≠𝑗 � +  𝑓𝛾𝑗𝑑𝛾𝑗𝑗 +  𝑓𝑤𝑑𝜔𝑗 + 𝑓𝑡𝑗  𝑑𝑡𝑗 +
𝑓𝜆0  𝑑𝜆0� . 
Then I have the final equation used for the regressions as 
𝑑�𝑆𝑗� = 𝑒�1− 𝑀𝑗𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙�𝑑 �− 𝑀𝑗𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙�, or 
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𝑑�𝑆𝑗� = −  𝑒�1− 𝑀𝑗𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙�𝑓𝜆(∙) �𝑓𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑗 + 𝑓𝜀𝑑𝜀𝑗 +  𝑓𝛾𝑗−�∑ 𝑑𝛾𝑗𝑖𝑖≠𝑗 � + 𝑓𝛾𝑗𝑑𝛾𝑗𝑗 +  𝑓𝑤𝑑𝜔𝑗 + 𝑓𝑡𝑗  𝑑𝑡𝑗 +
𝑓𝜆0  𝑑𝜆0� (9). 
 Note that in the empirical investigation, we use the aggregated protectionism measures based 
on the vector of MRLs for each product. The reduced form (9) provides the theoretical 
foundation for empirical application to explain the variations of protectionism scores.  
Variables used 
The protectionism scores are taken from the results of second essay and based on the 
same data source. We removed the truncation of the MRL scores when countries impose 
more relaxed MRLs than Codex to preserve variation in the dependent variable. This allows 
any anti-protectionism situation to arise that was ignored in essay 2. We have detailed 
descriptions of the database used to compute the protectionism scores in the second essay. To 
avoid redundancy, we do not repeat them here but will when the essay is submitted for 
publication. 
         We use per capita GDP based on purchasing power parity to capture the market size or 
income factor of country 𝑗 (𝑎𝑗 ); we use the number of tariff lines of the HS classification 
system under each product to approximate the number of substitutes of the product, therefore 
the inverse of the demand elasticity of country 𝑗 (1/𝜀𝑗 ). Variable 𝛾𝑗𝑗 represents the cost 
advantage or competitiveness of country 𝑗 ; variable ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝑖𝑖≠𝑗  represents the total cost 
advantage or competitiveness of the rest of the world. If normalize the cost advantage by 
∑ 𝛾𝑗𝑖𝑖≠𝑗  , we have the relative comparative advantage or relative competitiveness of 
country 𝑗 . We will use the revealed comparative advantages or the so-called Balassa index 
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(Balassa (1965)) to capture the information on competitiveness. The Balassa index (BI) is the 
most frequently used index measure of revealed comparative advantage (RCA). BI uses the 
normalized export share to calculate the relative advantage/disadvantage of certain product 
for a certain country. More specifically, 𝐵𝐼𝑗𝑘 = 𝐸𝑗𝑘 ∑ 𝐸𝑗𝑘𝑘⁄∑ 𝐸𝑗𝑘𝑗 ∑ ∑ 𝐸𝑗𝑘𝑘𝑗� , where 𝐸𝑗𝑘 is the export of 
product 𝑘 of country 𝑗. In other words, BI of product 𝑘 in country 𝑗 is calculated as the export 
share of product 𝑘 of country 𝑗 ‘s total export, normalized by the export share of product 𝑘 of 
a group of reference countries’ total exports.          
Variable ωj represents the weight the policymaker puts on producer surplus versus 
the weight (1-ωj) put on the consumer surplus cum externality. This variable is related to 
political systems as well as lobbying activities. Beghin and Kherallah (1994) empirically 
examined the impact of political institutions framing rent-seeking on agricultural producer 
support. They found significant impact differences between multiparty and other party 
systems. Similarly, Opler (2001) found that protection is the highest in democratized 
countries with multiparty systems.  Olper, Falkowski, and Swinnen (2009) found 
democratization would increase agricultural protection.  We control for political institution 
systems with dummy variables for each level of Legislative Indices of Electoral 
Competitiveness (LIEC). 
We also control other forms of protection or price policy distortions as summarized 
by the tariff variable in the model. It is obvious that tariffs affect market size (recall the tariff 
affects the price and quantity produced and consumed), but also the endogenous NTM again 
with much ambiguity on the sign of the impact of the import tariff on the domestic NTM 
standard. Systematic data on these distortions are hard to find for a large set of countries. 
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Several previous investigations of agricultural distortions are based on price-related 
distortions, Producer support equivalent (PSE) in particular (see Beghin and Kherallah 
(1994), and others). PSE data cover only 19 countries and 15 products, which is much fewer 
than my NTM protectionism measure coverage. Another price-related agricultural distortion 
database developed by Kym Anderson et al. (Anderson, et al. (2009)) covers 77 products and 
75 countries. However, the product coverage is unbalanced per country, and only a dozen 
products per country on average. Again matching that data base with the MRL scores would 
induce a big loss of observations. In order to preserve the maximum observations of the 
scores, we use the real exchange rate from the World Bank (WDI) and import tariffs from 
WITS to capture the macro policy distortion and major price distortion in each market. These 
are the main form of price distortions but they do not cover agricultural subsidies 
unfortunately. All variables and their source are summarized in Table 1. 
The retained empirical specification based on equation (9) is 
𝑆𝑗𝑘 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐺𝐷𝑃_𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑗 + 𝛼2𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑠_𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑗𝑘 + 𝛼3𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑗𝑘 + 𝛼4𝑅𝐶𝐴_𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑗𝑘 + 𝛼5𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑗 +
𝛼5𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑘 + 𝛼6𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗 + 𝛼7𝑋𝑗𝑘 + 𝜀𝑗𝑘. (9) 
Similarly to Trefler (1993), no hypothesis would be tested, since the theoretical model 
does not yield unambiguous and therefore testable hypothesis. This illustrates the essential 
limitations even using a parsimonious framework as here. On the other hand, the estimated 
coefficients may shed some light on the determinants of endogenous NTM protection.  
Data 
The per capita GDP based on purchasing power parity and real effective exchange 
rate data were obtained from Penn World Table Version 6.3 (Heston et. al. 2009). The tariff 
and the number of tariff line data are downloaded from TRAINS. We downloaded the 
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Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) index from World Integrated Trade System (WITS) 
using the underlying UN COMTRADE data.  We are aware the possible simultaneity 
problem of imports and MRLs as pointed by Trefler (1993). With a few exceptions, we used 
lagged trade data in year 2009 (MRL data in the year 2011) to accommodate the potential 
bias. When the 2009 data were unavailable, the latest available data was used to substitute. 
Political institution data were obtained from the Database of Political Institutions 2010 (Beck 
et. al. 2001).  The worldwide governance indicators (WGI) data come from the World Bank 
and were downloaded from The World Bank website 
(http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp).  
Other considerations 
To investigate the potential endogeneity of trade policies, we develop some 
instruments based on the existing trade literature on endogenous protection (See Trefler 
(1993), Mansfield and Busch (1995), etc.).  We use the agriculture labor/land ratio to 
measure the labor and capital (land, in this case) ratio. Agriculture labor endowment is the 
count of labor force employed in agriculture sector; the labor endowment is the area of 
agriculture land. These data were obtained from World Bank. The formula to compute the 
labor/land ratio is as follows: Ag labor/land ratio = Employment in agriculture / agriculture 
land area). Agriculture import penetration rate, a second instrument, is a measure of the 
importance of Ag import.  We downloaded the gross import and export data for ISC division 
1-5 from WITS, and used the agriculture value added data from World Bank. We then 
followed Trefler (1993) and his formula to calculate the Agriculture import penetration ratio: 
import penetration ratio = (Gross imports / (Domestic production + net imports)) X 100.    
 
118 
 
 
Table 1: Variable Definition and sources 
Variable 
Name 
Definition Source 
Scorejk Protectionism scores for country j product 
k, where non-established MRLs are 
substituted with default levels 
Essay 2 
Intercept  Protectionism score at Codex level USDA MRL database 
GDP_PPPj Gross domestic product at purchasing 
power parity per capita 
Penn World Table Version 
6.3 (Heston et. al. 2009). 
GDP_PPP_
Scaledj 
GDP_PPP /1000, Gross domestic product 
at purchasing power parity per capita in 
1000 dollars. 
 
Penn World Table Version 
6.3 (Heston et. al. 2009). 
Elas_Invjk Country j total tariff lines for product k TRAINS 
Elas_Inv_Sc
aledjk 
Country i total tariff lines for product k in 
10 tariff lines 
TRAINS 
RCAjk Revealed Comparative Advantage index at 
product level 
WITS, UN COMTRADE 
RCA_ROWjk Summing over the Revealed Comparative 
Advantage index of all other exporters 
except country j for product k 
WITS, UN COMTRADE 
Tensysj the number of years the country been 
autocratic or democratic, respectively 
Database of Political 
Institutions 2010 (Beck et. al. 
2001) 
VAj Voice Accountability, one of the aggregate 
indicators of governance. 
World Bank 
PSj Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism, one of the aggregate 
indicators of governance. 
World Bank 
GEj Government Effectiveness, one of the 
aggregate indicators of governance. 
World Bank 
RQj Regulation Quality, one of the aggregate 
indicators of governance. 
World Bank 
RLj Rule of Law, one of the aggregate 
indicators of governance 
World Bank 
CCj Control of Corruption, one of the aggregate 
indicators of governance. 
World Bank 
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Table 1: Variable Definition and sources continued 
Variable 
Name 
Definition Source 
Liecj Legislative Indices of Electoral 
Competitiveness, categorical variable. 
Scale is as follows: no legislature (1); 
unelected legislature (2); elected, 1 
candidate (3); 1 party, multiple candidates 
(4), multiple parties are legal but only one 
party won seats (5); multiple parties DID 
win seats but the largest party received 
more than 75% of the seats (6); largest 
party got less than 75% (7). 
 
Database of Political 
Institutions 2010 (Beck et. al. 
2001) 
Tariffjk Country j simple average of effectively 
applied rates over all tariff lines for product 
k 
TRAINS 
Exchangej real exchange rate in 2009 Penn World Table Version 
6.3 (Heston et. al. 2009). 
AgLaborLa
ndj 
number of Ag labor for every square 
kilometer of Ag land 
World Bank 
AgLaborLa
nd_Scaledj 
AgLaborLand /100, the number of Ag 
labor for every 0.01 square kilo meter of 
Ag land. 
World Bank 
AgImportPe
netrationj 
Agriculture import penetration ratio * 100, 
in percentage 
World Bank, WITS 
RTAj the number of unique Regional Trade 
Agreement (RTA) partner. 
Regional Trade Agreements 
Information System by the 
World Trade Organization 
RTA_Scaled
j 
RTA/10, the number of unique Regional 
Trade Agreement (RTA) partner in 10 
partners. 
Regional Trade Agreements 
Information System by the 
World Trade Organization 
 
We also account for constraints on protection via preferential and multilateral trade 
agreements which constrain the ability to use tariffs for protection. We counted the number 
of unique regional trade agreement partners as a proxy for the intensity of trade integration. 
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The original data was compiled from Regional Trade Agreements Information System by the 
World Trade Organization (http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx).  The 
types of agreements considered include Custom Union (CU), Free Trade Agreement (FTA), 
Partial Scope Agreement (PSA), and Economics Integration Agreement (EIA). We are aware 
of the different extent of the integration by different types of agreements. For transparency, 
however, we count each agreement equally. The country trading partner which is involved in 
more than one agreement will only be counted once. 
Finally, we take the EU as one aggregate group, and take the average of values of 
individual EU countries if necessary when EU data are not available.  For example, we use 
the average WDI, exchange rate, and GDP at purchasing power parity per capita, of all EU 
countries.  
Data Distribution and Sample Statistics 
In this section, we discuss the distribution of nontruncated protectionism scores, and 
the sample statistics of all variables. The total sample contains 11,885 observations. From 
figure 1, one can observe a spike of scores is at the value of 1. More specifically, 7,577 out of 
11,885 values equal one (about 74%). This means that they are set at the international 
standard level.  
Figure1: Histograms of score 1. 
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Table 2: sample statistics of numerical variables 
 Min.  Median Mean Max. Standard 
Deviation  
score1 0.00 1.00 1.08 2.72 0.38 
GDP _PPP 1403.01 10521.17 16645.84 65864.35 15165 
GDP_PPP_Scaled 1.40 10.52 16.65 65.86 15.16 
Elas_Inv 1.00 8.00 34.56 2531.0 147.44 
Elas_Inv_Scaled 0.1 0.8 3.46 253.1 14.74 
RCA 0.00 0.11 4.48 3743.45 43.61 
LogRCA16 -9.90 -2.19 -2.52 8.23 3.38 
RCA_ROW 4.38 118.08 203.96 6502.54 257.55 
LogRCA_ROW 1.48 4.77 4.77 8.78 1.06 
Tensys 1.00    20.0 24.28 79.0 21.36 
VA -1.72 0.07 0.6 1.48 0.84 
PS -2.68 -0.13 -0.23 1.14 0.91 
GE -0.95 0.17 0.33 2.27 0.85 
RQ -1.54 0.26 0.29 1.83 0.83 
RL -1.59 -0.16 0.08 1.92 0.91 
CC -1.19 -0.30 0.14 2.43 0.98 
Tariff 0.00 7.20 14.09 800.3 23.34 
Exchange 0.71 7.76 666.19 17941.0 2850 
LogExchange -0.34 2.05 2.62 9.79 2.46 
AgLaborLand 0.09 25.44 125.97 3739.24 532.68 
AgLaborLand_Scaled 0.00 0.25 1.26 37.39 5.32 
AgImportPenetration 0.00 0.02 0.19 4.63 0.79 
LogAgImportPenetration -6.09 -4.11 -3.94 1.53 1.39 
RTA 1.00 44.00 37.56 113 25.16 
RTA_Scaled 0.1 4.4 3.76 11.3 2.52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16  RCA is added by 0.0001 when taking log if RCA is zero. 
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Table 3: sample statistics of categorical variable 
liec: 
legislative indices of electoral competitiveness 
 
level Description count 
2 elected, 1 candidate 249 
3 1 party, multiple 
candidates 
493 
4 multiple parties are legal 
but only one party won 
seats 
380 
6 multiple parties DID win 
seats but the largest party 
received more than 75% of 
the seats 
874 
7 Largest party got less than 
75%. 
9889 
 
For the liec categorical variable, since category 7 is dominant amount of observations, 
and we use liec=7 as baseline. We also included HS4 sector dummies, and used the base line 
to be the combination of multiple HS4 sectors that appear to cause collinearities with other 
independent variables. 
Regression Results 
 
Collinearity 
We check the data for some potential collinearity17. Collinearity is a problem with 
data itself, and it can be, but not need to be, harmful. We use conditioning index, variance 
inflation index (VIF) and variance-decompositions jointly to diagnose the multi-collinearity 
problems in my sample as described in Belsley et al. (1980). Practically, multicollinearity 
may be a serious problem when the conditioning index is greater than 30, the VIF is greater 
                                                 
17 Results available upon request. 
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than 10, and variance-decomposition proportions for two or more estimated regression 
coefficient variances are higher than 0.5.  
Estimation 
The endogeneity of tariff has been a recurrent issue in the trade literature. 
Rodrik(1995) reviewed some of the most commonly used approaches to endogenize trade 
policy by linking the level of the trade policy, such as a tariff, to the amount of lobbying 
resources. Ray (1981) simultaneously estimated the endogenous tariff and nontariff 
restrictions equations. I conduct a Hausman test for the endogeneity of tariff, and the test 
results support the endogeneity of  tariffs. Hence, we use 2-Stage Least Square to correct the 
endogeneity. Further, we use all the variables we have in the second stage plus the tariff 
bindings as the instruments in the first stage. The tariff binding mean members of World 
Trade Organization commit not to increase tariffs beyond the agreed level (www.wto.org).  
The tariff binding data was obtained from WITS. 
In table 4, we listed the marginal effects of the preferred regression results, based on 
2-Stage-Least-Square (2SLS). The results bring the following remarks. The intercept is the 
protectionism score for liec=7 and omitted HS4 sectors and implicitly the codex  standard 
score since the latter is equal to 1. Variable GDP_PPP , the measure of PPP income, has 
significant positive impact on protectionism scores. This result shows that higher income 
countries tend to protect domestic market and their consumers more than lower income 
countries do. This is expected as consumers may value food safety more than consumers in 
poorer countries, and it is also consistent with other related studies on agricultural protection 
increasing with development (see Beghin and Kherallah (1994), Mansfield and Busch (1995), 
etc.) 
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Table 4: Marginal Effect from preferred 2SLS 
Variable 2SLS 
Marginal 
Effects 
Intercept 0.630*** 
(0.033) 
GDP_PPP_scaled 0.020*** 
(0.001) 
Elas_Inv_scaled 0.001*** 
(0.001) 
RCA18 -0.0007*** 
(0.0002) 
RCA_ROW -0.00002 
(0.00002) 
tensys -0.005*** 
(0.000) 
RQ 0.026*** 
(0.007) 
liec219 -1.061*** 
(0.036) 
liec3 -0.163*** 
(0.018) 
liec4 -0.027 
(0.020) 
liec6 0.203*** 
(0.017) 
tariff -0.002*** 
(0.000) 
Exchange_rate 0.00001*** 
(0.000003) 
AgLaborLand_Scaled -0.020*** 
(0.001) 
AgImportPenetration -0.453*** 
(0.021) 
RTA_Scaled -0.003** 
(0.001) 
R2=0.230 
 
                                                 
18  The marginal effects of log-transformed variables are calculated using mean values. 
19  The marginal effects of liec dummy variables are compared against leic7. 
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The inverse of demand price elasticity, which is approximated by the count of the 
number of tariff lines under HS6 shows that the higher the demand elasticity the lower the 
MRL strctiveness. Elastic markets tend to have lower tariff protection and domestic 
distortions (Gardner, 1987), and our results show MRLs have consistent patterns as other 
distortion methods. 
The Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) variable shows a negative impact on 
protectionism scores. If a country exhibits comparative advantage, meaning it has advantage 
in exporting, then it maybe that the sector is competitive and does not fear competing imports. 
Hence, demand for protection maybe smaller from export oriented sectors as opposed to less 
competitive sectors that may fear the competition of imports and may demand higher NTMs 
to block imports. On the other hand, we found negative, but not significant impact of the 
RCA of the rest of world on the protectionism score. The magnitude of the coefficients are 
consistent with what we show in the conceptual model part, that is the impact of the RCA of 
the rest of world should be smaller than the impact of RCA, but the former is not significant. 
This may happen because the measure of the RCA of the rest of the world is not good enough 
to capture the actual variation in RCA. 
Moving to the political institutions variables, variable Tensys is the years in place for 
the current government and it’s a measure of the political stability. We find that the longer 
the government in power, the lower the protectionism scores. This is somewhat a surprise as 
one associates political stability with higher income countries. In the robustness section 
below, We found that the estimate of  Tensys from 2SLS and univariate OLS have opposite 
and significant sign, which suggest the result may be unstable. 
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Regulation Quality (RQ) is a government quality index. There are total six 
government quality indices in the World Bank database, and they are highly positively 
correlated (correlation coefficient above 0.7). We chose RQ since it seems to have the most 
power among the seven measures to explain variation in MRL protectionism scores. RQ has 
a positive impact on protectionism score, showing that the higher quality of regulation the 
higher the MRL scores. The result is stable; coefficient loses significance in 3 out of 10 
robustness runs but do not alternate signs.  
Political institution dummies (liecs) show an inverted u-shape impact on 
protectionism scores. The liec2 has the lowest protectionism scores, then liec3 is lower than 
liec4, liec6 has the highest protectionism scores, and liec7 is lower than liec6. The more 
democratic the system leads to the higher protectionism scores up until liec6. This pattern is 
consistent with that Beghin and Kherallah (1994) found in explaining the role of political 
institutions in determining producer subsidy equivalent (PSE). 
The higher the tariff, the lower are the MRL scores. This result shows that tariff and 
non-tariff measures are substitute instruments in protection. Countries with high tariffs tend 
to have less stringent MRL-based NTMs, while countries with lower tariffs tend to have 
stricter NTMs. This is different from Ray (1981) found in manufacturing industry, which 
showed nontariff protection had supplemented tariff restrictions. Note that his nontariff 
indices restrictions covered 15 quantitative restriction categories, including quotas, licensing, 
minimum price, restrictions, etc. Consistent with the results here, Mansfield and Busch (1995) 
showed that tariff and NTBs are substitutes in protection as well. Therefore, the interaction 
between tariff and nontariff may have evolved overtime because of successive round of 
General Agreement of Tariff and Trade (GATT). 
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The real exchange rate is the other measure of policy distortion. Results for this 
variable were not robust. The sign of the real exchange rate impact on the scores is sensitive 
to the inclusion/exclusion of GDP_PPP (the income level variable). See the robustness check 
section for further results. Before controlling for GDP_PPP, the real exchange rate variable 
has a negative impact on the protectionism score, and after controlling for GDP_PPP, the 
real exchange rate has a positive impact on the protectionism scores. Such sign reversal 
suggests being cautious interpreting the results on exchange rates. 
The Agricultural labor/land ratio is related to the domestic cost of production of 
agricultural products. It has a negative impact on protectionism, showing that the more labor 
per square kilometer Agriculture land, the lower the protectionism. In other words, the 
country that is more labor intensive in agriculture tend to have less protection via MRLs than 
a country that is more capital intensive in agriculture. This result is consistent with most 
other studies found in other agriculture protection policies. See de Gorter and Swinnen (2002) 
for a summary of the studies that found a similar negative impact of the agricultural labor/ 
capital ratio on the level of protection. 
The agricultural import penetration ratio measures the importance of agricultural 
imports to the overall economy. Grossman and Helpman (1994) provide a theoretical 
justification for this positive link. The higher the import penetration the lower the trade 
protection. My results seem support this prediction with standard-like NTM, that agricultural 
import penetration ratio has negative impact on MRL scores, indicating that countries which 
rely heavily on agricultural imports tend to have lower MRL scores. We are aware the 
possible simultaneity problem of imports and MRLs as pointed by Trefler (1993). We use 
128 
 
 
lagged trade data in year 2009 (MRL data in the year 2011) to accommodate the potential 
bias.  
RTA, the number of Regional Trade Agreement partners, measures the integration 
level with partner countries.  Everything else equal, RTA has a negative impact on 
protectionism scores, which shows economic integration reduces MRL scores. This could be 
due to the fact that very integrated economies have overcome protectionist tendencies and 
may have rationalized some of their NTMs through these RTAs. The estimated RTA impact 
is not very stable (lose significance 4 out of 10 runs of robustness check), and particularly 
sensitive to the political institution dummy variables liec’s (with a sign reversal). 
Variable Correlation and Robustness Check 
Our independent variables are clearly correlated as it is often the case with social 
science data. A better understanding of their correlation patterns would help us gauge the 
robustness of the results, and also deepen our understanding of these results. In a multivariate 
regression system, correlations among variables are complex, could potentially have various 
directions and magnitudes. Different combinations of variable may make the coefficients 
quite different. 
In this section, we first compare 2-stage least square with OLS, and single variable 
OLS. Please note that single variable OLS suffer obviously from omitted variable bias issues, 
but it provides an essential benchmark for my discussion and allows seeing how the direction 
and significance of the direction persist and survive the addition of additional variables.  
        Then we compare the 2SLS results with the OLs runs (full runs and runs with one 
variable deleted at each run, to see how sensitive other variables’ estimates to any one 
variable. This is to help us better understand the impact of the correlations on estimates. 
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Table 5:  2SLS, OLS, and Univariate OLS 
Variable 2SLS 
(R2=0.230) 
OLS 
(R2=0.208) 
Univariate 
OLS 
Intercept 0.630*** 
(0.033) 
0.552*** 
(0.026) 
1.078*** 
(0.003) 
GDP_PPP_scaled 0.020*** 
(0.001) 
0.019*** 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
Elas_Inv_scaled 0.001*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.0002) 
0.004*** 
(0.000) 
logRCA -0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
logRCA_ROW -0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.00006 
(0.003) 
tensys -0.005*** 
(0.000) 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
0.004*** 
(0.000) 
RQ 0.026*** 
(0.007) 
0.023*** 
(0.007) 
0.131*** 
(0.004) 
liec2 -1.061*** 
(0.036) 
-1.023*** 
(0.035) 
-0.102*** 
(0.024) 
liec3 -0.163*** 
(0.018) 
-0.143*** 
(0.018) 
-0.092*** 
(0.017) 
liec4 -0.027 
(0.020) 
-0.014 
(0.020) 
-0.093*** 
(0.020) 
liec6 0.203*** 
(0.017) 
0.179*** 
(0.017) 
-0.107*** 
(0.013) 
tariff -0.002*** 
(0.000) 
 
-0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
 
-0.0005*** 
(0.000) 
logExchange_rate 0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.015*** 
(0.001) 
RTA_Scaled -0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
AgLaborLand_Scaled -0.020*** 
(0.001) 
-0.018*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
logAgImportPenetration -0.086*** 
(0.004) 
-0.085*** 
(0.004) 
            
0.003 
(0.003) 
 
The coefficients are rather stable comparing 2SLS with OLS, but show noticeable 
discrepancy with univariate OLS results. More specifically, GDP_ PPP, Elas_scaled, 
logRCA, logRCA_ROW, RQ, liec2, liec3 tariff, AgLaborLand_Scaled, are consistent in sign 
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and significance from 2SLS, OLS, and univarate OLS, though the magnitudes are different 
which is to be expected as omitted variables bias these univariate magnitudes. Also note that, 
after the tariff is instrumented in 2SLS, the estimated effect of tariff is four times larger than 
the non-instrumented tariff effect. logExchange_rate, tensys and liec6 are still significant but 
sign reversed.  RTA lost significance and liec4 gained significance.  
  Further based on the 2SLS with one variable deleted at each run, I observe the 
following patterns. Tariff appears to be very robust to most of the single deletions, but lost its 
significance if not controlling for different political systems (the liecs).  GDP_PPP, 
Elas_Inv_scaled, RCA, RCA_ROW, tensys, liec2, liec3, AgLaborLand, AgImportPenetration 
are robust to the exclusion of any single variable. Their sign and significance are consistent 
for 9 out of 10 robustness check runs.  
logExchange_rate is sensitive to the deletion of GDP_PPP. Without controlling for 
country income level, the exchange rate has negative impact on protectionism score, but after 
controlling income levels, logExchange_rate has positive impact on protectionism score. In 
other words, given the same country income level, the higher exchange rate the higher 
protectionism score, but ignoring income level, higher exchange rate values are associated 
with lower protectionism scores. logExchange_rate appears to lose its significance if we 
don’t control the political institutional differences (liecs). In conclusion, the results 
associated with the real exchange rate variable are not robust. 
Variable RQ has positive significant results for the most cases, but tend to lose 
significance if I do not control for the logExchange_rate, tensys, or AgImportPenetration 
effects. Similarly, RTA is not very stable either. It loses significance 4 out of 10 runs of 
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robustness check), and particularly sensitive inclusion/deletion to the political institution 
dummy variables liec’s  with a sign reversal. 
The intercept captures the impact of the international standard (value of 1), in 
addition to the defaults of variables (liec=7, and HS4 sectors). Abstracting from these 2 
categorical variables, one can see that the international standard on average explains roughly 
63 percent of the standards and than other elements are also important. Looking at Table 6, 
one can see that income variation and agricultural import penetration explain the major 
portion of the departure from the international standard (1 versus .63). Once either variable is 
omitted, the estimated intercept goes back to around one (see table 6 columns omitting the 
income and agricultural import penetration variables). 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 6: 2SLS results with one variable deleted at each run 
 
Intercept 1.010*** 
(0.032) 
0.618*** 
(0.033) 
0.643*** 
(0.032) 
0.605*** 
(0.021) 
0.690*** 
(0.033) 
0.625*** 
(0.033) 
0.731*** 
(0.032) 
0.630*** 
(0.033) 
0.658*** 
(0.032) 
0.583*** 
(0.033) 
1.017*** 
(0.028) 
0.622*** 
(0.033) 
GDP_PPP_s
caled 
 
 
0.020*** 
(0.001) 
0.020*** 
(0.001) 
0.020*** 
(0.001) 
0.014*** 
(0.000) 
0.021*** 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
0.020*** 
(0.001) 
0.019*** 
(0.001) 
0.015*** 
(0.001) 
0.015*** 
(0.001) 
0.020*** 
(0.001) 
Elas_Inv_scal
ed 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.002** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
logRCA -0.010*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
 
 
-
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.0004 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
logRCA_RO
W 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
 
 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.0003 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
tensys -0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
-
0.005*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
RQ 0.171*** 
(0.006) 
0.026*** 
(0.007) 
0.021*** 
(0.007) 
0.027*** 
(0.007) 
0.011 
(0.007) 
 
 
0.105*** 
(0.006) 
0.026*** 
(0.007) 
0.034 
(0.007) 
0.043*** 
(0.007) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
0.027*** 
(0.007) 
liec2 -0.136*** 
(0.025) 
-1.059*** 
(0.036) 
-1.079*** 
(0.035) 
-
1.060*** 
(0.036) 
-0.709*** 
(0.031) 
-1.117*** 
(0.032) 
 
 
-1.061*** 
(0.036) 
-1.033*** 
(0.035) 
-0.738*** 
(0.033) 
-0.927*** 
(0.036) 
-1.053*** 
(0.035) 
liec3 -0.142*** 
(0.019) 
-0.163*** 
(0.018) 
-0.166*** 
(0.018) 
-
0.163*** 
(0.018) 
-0.079*** 
(0.018) 
-0.160*** 
(0.018) 
 
 
-0.163*** 
(0.018) 
-0.168*** 
(0.018) 
-0.067*** 
(0.018) 
-0.270*** 
(0.018) 
-0.156*** 
(0.018) 
liec4 0.141*** 
(0.020) 
-0.027 
(0.020) 
-0.032 
(0.019) 
-0.027 
(0.020) 
0.017 
(0.020) 
-0.050* 
(0.019) 
 
 
-0.027 
(0.020) 
-0.002 
(0.019) 
0.001 
(0.020) 
-0.016 
(0.020) 
-0.028 
(0.020) 
liec6 -0.013 
(0.01) 
0.196*** 
(0.017) 
0.200*** 
(0.017) 
0.203*** 
(0.017) 
0.133*** 
(0.016) 
0.209*** 
(0.017) 
 
 
0.203*** 
(0.017) 
0.180*** 
(0.016) 
0.027* 
(0.015) 
0.078*** 
(0.016) 
0.196*** 
(0.016) 
tariff -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0003 
(0.0002) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
logexchange_
rate 
-0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.008*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
 
 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
AgLaborLand
_scaled 
-0.008*** 
(0.001) 
-0.020*** 
(0.001) 
-0.020*** 
(0.001) 
-
0.020*** 
(0.001) 
-0.014*** 
(0.001) 
-0.021*** 
(0.001) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
-0.020*** 
(0.001) 
-0.019*** 
(0.001) 
 
 
-0.022*** 
(0.001) 
-0.020*** 
(0.001) 
logAgImport
Penetration 
-0.025*** 
(0.004) 
-0.084*** 
(0.004) 
-0.084*** 
(0.004) 
-
0.086*** 
(0.004) 
-0.051*** 
(0.004) 
-0.084*** 
(0.004) 
-0.062*** 
(0.004) 
-0.086*** 
(0.004) 
-0.085*** 
(0.004) 
-0.095*** 
(0.004) 
 
 
-0.085*** 
(0.004) 
RTA_scaled -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
 
 
R-Square 0.152 0.224 0.229 0.230 0.206 0.229 0.169 0.230 0.229 0.199 0.201 0.229 
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Conclusion 
The empirical literature about endogenous standard-like NTMs, especially MRLs, 
and the determinants of their protection level is limited. In this paper, I built a parsimonious 
partial equilibrium trade model with an externality addressed by a single NTM standard. The 
policy maker solves for the standard that maximizes a weighted sum of welfare measures. I 
derive the comparative statics of underlying determinants to see how they impact the 
political-economy standard. Despite the parsimonious structure, it is impossible to sign 
comparative statics. Then, I undertake an empirical investigation of the determinants of 
endogenous standards based on the MRL protectionism score developed in my second essay. 
I attempt to explain its variation in terms of the determinants derived from the simple 
conceptual model.  
After correcting for endogeneity bias, tariff protection shows 4 times larger impact on 
the MRL protectionism score than without instruments. In addition, tariff and MRL 
protections are shown to be substitute instruments in protection (NTM and tariff are 
negatively linked). A country with a higher income level has a higher protectionism score as 
expected, and comparative advantage as measured by RCA has a negative impact on the 
MRL stringency. Demand price responsiveness has a negative impact on protectionism score, 
which is consistent with results in existing literature of tariff protection and domestic 
distortions (Gardner, 1987). We also found an inverted u-shaped MRL protection level in 
terms of political institutions from the least democratic, “elected, 1 candidate” to most 
democratic, “largest party got less than 75%”. In addition, comparing existing results with 
manufacturing industries, and/or coverage ratio measure of NTMs, and different set of NTMs, 
our results are mostly consistent in the directions of impact on protection level. 
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The robustness analysis suggests that the estimates of exchange rate, Tensys, and 
liec6 may be less robust, since we found sign reversals by comparing results from 2SLS with 
univariate OLS. We also check how sensitive coefficients are to the deletion of variable one 
at a time. Regional Trade Agreement, real exchange rate, and regulation quality index seem 
to be relatively less robust than other variables. The robustness analysis also suggests that 
income per capita and agricultural import penetration explain a large portion of the departure 
of actual standards and international ones.  
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